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The Vienna based record label Mego is known for establishing an uncompromising, 
radically experimental electronic music in the 1990s. This thesis considers the work o f  
various different artists on the label, examining in particular their approaches to 
technology. The artists discussed appear to share an approach that I describe as pragmatic 
or experimental, which I contrast with idealist or rational approaches. In the latter, music 
appears to be understood within the framework o f a simplistic model o f communication, 
where technology is seen as a medium that should be transparent, allowing the music to 
pass unaffected. In the pragmatic approach however, I claim that technology is not seen not 
as a medium for the communication o f ideas, but rather as a source o f ideas. Implications 
follow for the ontology o f the music. In the simplistic model o f communication, physical 
sound can be considered merely a representation o f something more abstract: musical form 
conceived by the composer. But if music is materially constructed and based on 
experimentation with the technology at hand, then the sound should not be considered a 
representation; there is no preconceived idea for it to be a representation of. This concept, 
which 1 refer to as 'literalism', is explored in a number o f  musical examples, and 1 link it to 
a definition o f noise.
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6Introduction
This thesis will focus on the Vienna-based label Mego, and associated artists. Mego, in the 
latter half o f  the 1990s, provided a focal point for a new kind o f experimental electronic 
music influenced in various ways by techno, as well as by academic electronic music 
music, but ultimately resulting in a form o f music alien to both traditions. The music of  
Mego remains largely undocumented in academia, and the gap left by a lack o f attention 
towards it is significant. Cursory attempts have been made to fill this gap, often focussing 
primarily on the notion of'glitch', and discussing the incorporation o f technological failure 
into aesthetics. However 1 will argue that this is insufficient, and that this music has 
consequences more radical and fundamental in aesthetics.
The aim o f the thesis is therefore twofold: to document the history o f Mego, and to 
discuss the ways in which we can describe, analyze or otherwise understand this music. It 
is interesting to note that this roughly corresponds to Guido Adler's original stated aims o f  
musicology; the historical and the systemic subdivisions (Mugglestone & Adler 1981). 
Adler’s method, briefly, consisted o f the identification and documentation o f  historical 
categories o f music (the first subdivision), followed by the analysis of each category and its 
underlying trends (the second subdivision). The identification o f a category is simplified in 
this case, as we are using a record label as the focal point, and operating on the assumption 
that there is something shared between all o f the music on the label. The validity o f this 
assumption can then be assessed based on the results o f the second subdivision: the 
investigation o f these supposed shared attributes.
Adler viewed the history o f music as a series o f epochs or categories, each o f which 
requires its own methods o f analysis. There is no suggestion o f a universal framework for 
the understanding of music, or a universal aesthetic. He stated that the 'student o f tonal art 
and tonal science is presented with a complex system o f musical maxims which have been 
extracted from particular tonal products . .. for a time tonal production is muzzled and 
curbed by these rules and measures, until it again paves for itself a pathway; and once more 
the demands on the science alter' (Mugglestone & Adler 1981, italics mine). The theory 
developed by a musicologist is in response to 'particular tonal products", based on analyses
1 'Tonal' does not have to be taken to exclude 'atonality' or noise—atonality is a misnomer, even according to 
Schoenberg: 'The word “atonal” could only signify something entirely inconsistent with the nature of tone ... 
to call any relation o f tones atonal is just as farfetched as it would be to designate a relation o f colors 
aspectral or acomplementary. There is no such antithesis.’ (Schoenberg 1983), similarly, noise can be 
considered tonal in its broadest sense, or technically as a summation of inharmonic tones.
7o f particular pieces o f music; it is not free o f context or universal. Adler also highlights the 
way in which theory tends to lag behind practice, with theory in turn stifling practice by 
solidifying and naturalizing one particular form o f music.
Each chapter in the thesis focuses on a particular work, and examines it in an 
attempt to understand what, if anything, draws together the potential category represented 
by Mego. Initial research carried out by interviewing and observing relevant artists (New 
Aesthetics in Computer Music 2011) suggested that this might be found not in stylistic or 
formal aspects, or even an overarching 'aesthetic', but potentially in a general approach to 
the process o f musical production. I am primarily interested in exploring the role o f  
technology in this process. The thesis therefore becomes something like a contemporary 
organological study in parts. 1 conclude that the music in question is in fact notable for an 
emphasis o f the technological, material aspect o f its production. This leads to a discussion 
o f the philosophical implications o f such an approach; if the music is determined materially 
rather being a reflection o f a predetermined idea, this tells us something about the aesthetic 
— the fundamental ontological-aesthetic question: 'what is the music (or art or literature 
etc.)?'
By this I do not mean defining the word music; delimiting what does and does not 
qualify as music. It is more to do with discussing what type o f thing we are dealing with 
when listening to music (or looking at an artwork, or reading etc.). For instance, when we 
think o f a book, the thing of importance is not taken to be the physical object itself. If we 
destroy the object, the 'book' still exists— if there are many copies then the content still 
exists. For philosophers o f aesthetics such as Nelson Goodman this leads to the idea that a 
book has 'notional' form:
Goodman drew an important distinction between what he called 
notional and non-notional works o f  art. In a novel, for example, he 
argued that any sequence o f letters that corresponds with the 
original text is a genuine instance o f the work. One might say that 
the essence o f the novel is not the book object at all. It is in the 
‘notional object’ that we access through the book. He drew a 
distinction between execution, e.g. the writing o f a novel and its 
implementation as a book. (Edmonds 2007)
One can say the same o f music. When written as a score, the music is not the paper that the 
score is written on, it is notional; even a recording o f music can be reproduced in various 
ways and on various formats. The music is not generally taken to be the material medium
8itself, the music is only notional. Goodman takes this position, advocating, like many 
analytic philosophers, the concept o f a 'work'. If the existence o f such an abstraction is 
taken as given, the task for the philosopher is to define the nature o f a work. A musical 
work, for example, cannot be the actual sound produced, since the same work can be 
played numerous times, perhaps even on different instruments while still being considered 
the same work. The musical work therefore (what is often taken to be 'The Music' itself) is 
taken to be an abstract entity. Importantly however for Goodman, the musical work is 
purely a linguistic construct. He defends a nominalist view, in which the work has no 
existence outside o f language, only individual instances o f  the work actually exist. 
(Goodman 1976)
Lydia Goehr compares this nominalist view to the more extreme Platonist position, 
in which the work is considered to be a thing that exists in its own right, apart from any 
instances or performances o f it (Goehr 1994). But she ultimately considers all analytic 
approaches (identified as nominalist, Platonist, Aristotolean and idealist) to share an 
unjustified elevation o f the abstract 'work concept'. The approach to artistic production that 
these ontologies engender is central to this thesis. They will be drawn in contrast to an 
approach in which we cannot consider the 'work' as an abstract entity set apart from its 
material realization as Goodman does in his distinction between execution and 
implementation. I identify a musical practice that suggests the music is materially 
constituted (manifest as a recording or a live performance), rather than being ideal (a 
'work').
To debate the nature o f a musical work already assumes the existence o f such a 
thing, or that such a thing indeed has a nature. The question being asked is already idealist, 
irrespective o f any answer. As Goehr explains, this is even the case if the question is 
concealed as one concerning language and commonsense: 'when we talk o f a musical 
work, to what are we referring?' Attempts to articulate an answer to this always seem to 
have been found wanting, yet surely we already know the answer since we often talk about 
'musical works' without the least bit o f confusion caused.
I have already used the word 'work' to describe the music on Mego, and will 
continue to do so, purely for convenience. However the 'works’ I refer to are not the same 
kind o f works described by analytic philosophers, or found in the Western canon. Due to 
the centrality o f timbral aspects, they can exist only as audio, and cannot be reduced to any 
higher level abstraction such as a score. In Goodman's terms we are concerned with 'non- 
notional works'; they are not abstract entities. This means that the kind o f issues dealt with
9by musical ontologists (e.g. to what extent can different performances be said to be 
instances o f the same work, what counts as a work and what does not, etc.) become largely 
irrelevant.
Despite this, it is the contention o f this thesis that ontological discussions are still o f  
interest in issues o f aesthetics, even if the conclusion amounts to the rejection o f a general 
ontology. We could instead, as Goehr does (and as is suggested by Adler), take a more 
historical approach to musical ontology. 'What is a musical work?' is a very different 
question to 'what is this specific musical work?' We are then, via ontology, examining the 
aesthetics of particular musics—what music is considered to 'be' will fundamentally affect 
the way it is both created and appreciated.
To summarize, in the discussion o f how we should understand this music, I focus 
on the creative process, which reveals the importance o f technology as a determining 
factor. This in turn leads to a discussion o f the ontological (and aesthetic) implications. The 
remainder o f this chapter therefore introduces the relevant themes o f technology and 
ontology. There is then a brief overview o f the history o f Mego and discussion o f how it 
sits in a wider context, before 1 consider specific musical examples in the chapters that 
follow.
Technology
Music or sound art (I am uninterested in the distinction) as with any artistic production, is 
in essence a kind o f making, o f techne. Despite this, music has traditionally been 
considered one o f the liberal arts, separated from mechanical craft based practices. I will 
try to avoid this distinction and attempt to show that, far from existing in an ideal 
mathematical realm, music can in fact be better understood as a craft, a product o f material 
processes. As such, the relationship with technology in the production and reception o f  
music is o f primary importance. Music is fundamentally a technological phenomenon; 
literally the combination of techne and logia, the application o f a body o f knowledge in the 
production of something physical (etymology o f course proves nothing, but in this case 
highlights a certain narrow conception o f technology and hopefully broadens its scope).
Especially if we take this broad definition, technology has always been integral to 
music. More than merely facilitating work, the technological, material, nature o f music has 
been a determining factor in its development. For example in Western art music the 
development o f notation enabled repeatable performances. But in addition to this enabling 
function, its limitations began to define the content to some extent: restricting music to a
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twelve note scale affording adherence to a key, eventually leading to equal temperament 
and so on; contextually it separates the concepts o f composer and performer; and more 
fundamentally it reinforces the view o f music as a series o f discrete events ordered in time. 
Likewise, recent technologies such as the the MIDI standard further reinforce the event 
based nature o f music.
So what we choose to do is determined by technology, not just what we are able to 
do. Stated this way it appears obvious, but the view that technology merely enables work 
appears to be widespread. We could call this the 'any sound you can imagine' approach, in 
which a composer has a musical 'idea' and wishes to use technology to communicate it. In 
this view, if the technology is seen to be determining the music, it is considered bad 
practice (see Fell 2010 for further discussion). This could be thought o f as a rationalist 
approach, and it does not take account o f the fact that ideas are based on experience. In the 
case o f composition this might be the knowledge o f what the technology being used is 
capable o f doing. Even (or especially) in pioneering work, for instance the invention o f a 
new synthesis technique, the compositional process is one o f empirical experimentation 
with what is physically possible, not the rational formation of a musical idea followed by 
its realization. The process is primarily a technical one, the music is not divorced from its 
material basis.
So the influence o f technology on music is nothing new. But although it may 
always be the case that the material means o f musical production fundamentally affect the 
result, some music, and music criticism, appear to have been conceptualized as if this was 
not the case. I will return to numerous examples o f this throughout the thesis.
In order to discuss the technological aspect o f music, I will draw on some existing 
philosophy o f technology, in particular developing a pragmatic position based mainly on 
Dewey's work. He uses the concept of'technological inquiry' as a fundamental description 
o f the way in which we act in the world. It places practical activity at the centre o f thought, 
demonstrated for example by his attitude towards ancient Greek philosophy and science (as 
summarized by Hickman):
The problem was that the social status o f Greek artisans was 
inferior to that o f scientists and'thinkers'; and their methods could 
not, therefore, for reasons that were purely and unfortunately social 
... be used as part o f scientific inquiry. So the Greeks pursued a 
version o f science in which instrumentation was no more than 
peripheral... Greek scientists and philosophers failed to do what
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their artisans, businessmen, and practical people knew what had to 
be done to solve problems: they failed to test their conclusions by 
means o f overt actions. In short they had not so much science as 
'the idea' o f  science: their science was not technological. (Hickman 
1990, italics mine)
I will later discuss various examples o f musics that are not technological, that privilege 
rationalist thought over embodied practice, or transcendence over material concerns. All 
activity should be seen as technological according to Dewey, including abstract thought: 
While there may be good grounds elsewhere for distinguishing 
extra-organic tools from those that are interorganic— a hammer 
from a 'therefore' for example— such a distinction is not appropriate 
to Dewey's technologized theory o f inquiry. Controlled thinking is 
technological insofar as it utilizes tools and instruments: some o f  
those tools are conceptual; some, physical; some, the hardware that 
extends our limbs and senses. For the purposes o f Dewey's theory 
of inquiry, tools o f  all types come into play. (Hickman 1990)
I therefore attempt to give an account o f music as a fundamentally technological activity, in 
which the physical tools used in musical production are given as much weight as 
conceptual and theoretical tools.
Heidegger's conception o f technology is also discussed (Heidegger 1993), 
particularly in relation to Rutsky's 'high techne' (Rutsky 1999), in chapter two. Heidegger 
defines a'nontechnological' essence o f technology— technology as noninstrumental, i.e. 
not primarily defined by its functional use as a means to an end. He describes this 'techne' 
as unsecuring the instrumental order o f the world, and therefore revealing its being.
Modem technology though, he claims, fixes the world in place, enframes it in instrumental 
terms. Rutsky takes as his subject the idea o f a postmodern technology— with a 'high tech' 
aesthetic— and explores this concept in relation to Heidegger's techne.
This consideration o f technology and aesthetics leads to Heidegger's thoughts on 
the relationship between techne and poesis. Art (like technology) is described by Heidegger 
as revealing being, pointing towards the aforementioned aesthetic and ontological 
consequence o f a technological approach; a 'non-notional' artform. I develop a theory of 
'literal' music, in which the sound is not a carrier o f meaning or a medium of  
communication; it does not attempt to signify anything above and beyond its own being.
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Communication
Throughout the thesis when I use the term communication, it should be taken unless 
otherwise stated to refer to the linear model o f communication, usually attributed to 
Shannon (Shannon et al. 1969). It is sometimes referred to as the Sender-Message- 
Channel-Receiver model, i.e. there is an identifiable message (information) being 
transmitted from a sender to a receiver. The channel, according to Shannon, is 'merely the 
medium used to transmit the signal from transmitter to receiver'.
Communication theory has o f course become a complex field o f study with many 
competing theories, going beyond the Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver model. My 
interest here however, is in the way in which certain understandings o f music appear to 
retain the linear model.
Idealism and Ontology
This model o f communication is linked to what we might call idealism. Idealism here is 
meant in its broadest possible sense, as philosophies in which abstract entities are in any 
way considered to have their own existence (in the analytic tradition idealism has generally 
come to refer only to philosophies in which abstracta exist in thought, opposed to 
creationism in which they have independent existence). We will repeatedly return to this 
concept o f idealism, so it should be defined in some detail before continuing. In its most 
extreme form, it would be an approach in which the music itself is seen as something 
abstract (the 'work') 'behind' or 'contained within' the physical sound, and is therefore 
universal and set apart from the contingency o f the material world. The genesis of such 
music must be some kind o f immaculate conception in the composer's mind, developed 
through pure imagination and the 'inner ear', which is then communicated with technology 
as a mediating entity. If the technology interferes in any way, imparting its character, this is 
seen as a weakness o f the technology or its application. The resulting physical sound is a 
shadow o f the arrangement o f the ideal forms it represents.
The split between idealist and what can loosely be termed materialist approaches to 
music is ancient. Aristoxinus argued for empiricism in music (Barnes 2004), claiming that 
a scale should be judged by the ear and not by mathematical ratios, disdaining the 
possibility o f music's transcendence beyond the sensible world. This was in reaction to 
Plato's advocacy o f Pythagorean theory, which holds music as a rational exercise, revealing 
truths underlying all things and reflecting a universal harmony. This is the height of 
idealism; Plato claimed that all o f  reality is a reflection o f ideal forms, and in music saw
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the potential to transcend the sensible world through pure mathematical reason (Hamilton 
2007).
Plato's idealism, and idealism in general, arises from the question o f universal. The 
Socratic method attempted to find general definitions— for concepts such as 'justice' or 
'goodness'. This involves first collecting instances of, for example, 'just' acts. Socrates 
claimed that most people stop at this point satisfied that they have defined the term, but the 
next step is crucial, constituting perhaps the invention o f inductive argument: the common 
'essence' between the acts must be found. This method makes the assumption that a 
universal, abstract thing like 'justice' actually exists. It may well be the case that there are 
only individual acts, with no unifying essence behind them. But Plato maintained that 
universal must have their own existence in order for us to understand the world. For 
instance, a 'good' pie and a 'good' book share almost no qualities superficially, so to 
understand what they have in common, we must have knowledge o f such a thing as 'Good'. 
Hence the need for a realm o f ideal forms, o f which the world we perceive is merely a 
reflection. Note that the term idealism in the context o f Plato does not imply existence in 
the mind, as the English word 'idea' might suggest. It comes rather from the Greek idea 
meaning pattern or form. For Plato these ideai are the only things that truly exist, so even 
mind is subordinate to the ideal realm. (Guthrie 1968)
If this kind o f philosophy sounds spiritual, that's because it is— Plato believed in a 
soul or spirit that comes from and returns to the ideal realm on birth and death, a concept 
modified from Pythagoreanism. We 'remember' universal concepts from the ideal realm 
when we see material approximations o f them. Pythagoreanism was essentially a religion, 
steeped in mysticism. In a break from the materialism that previous natural philosophers 
had begun to move towards, it is based around an explicit belief in the immortality o f the 
soul and its transmigration.
Spiritualism aside, it appears to be through music that the Pythagoreans came to 
their most important metaphysical conclusions. Someone (possibly Hippasus (Barnes 
2004)) discovered that the most pleasing intervals to the ear were ratios between whole 
numbers. Specifically, these were the numbers 1,2, 3 and 4, which sum to 10, described in 
Pythagorean theory as the perfect number. 2:1 is an octave, 3:2 is a fifth, and 4:3 is a 
fourth. The revelation here, was that something like the tuning o f a lyre is not based on trial 
and error, which previously must have seemed to be the only option. It is in fact based on 
an inherent order, it has an existence beyond the human experience o f it. Music itself is 
therefore not arbitrary, but based on absolute and eternal laws.
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At this point in Greek thought, it has been argued by scholars that abstract concepts 
were not yet understood as separate from their material basis, i.e. the belief was that, 
fundamentally, things are numbers. The number is not conceptually divorced from the 
thing counted. For instance, 1 is a point, 2 is a line, 3 is a surface, 4 is a volume (Guthrie 
1968).
The world is therefore conceived as principally pure form. For Pythagoreans, 
'numbers are causes o f substances and o f their being' (Aristotle, in Barnes 2004). They 
believed that the discoveries they made regarding music reflected the order o f the entire 
universe. Since harmonies depend on number, so too must everything else in nature. This is 
the 'music o f the spheres', as championed by Plato, the complimentary and harmonic 
movement o f all things around each other. So at this point, music is certainly not regarded 
as something material, but is used as a term to indicate mathematical patterns which were 
seen, not as abstracted from the world, but as the world itself. This is the first recorded 
idealist philosophy: the world is form, what we perceive as material is simply a reflection 
(as Plato would later describe it) o f  this idealized mathematical reality, or 'kosmos' (order, 
beauty).
As seductive as this theory is, we need to examine its consequences. The 
Pythagoreans concluded that music is the imposition o f order onto chaos, more specifically 
the introduction o f an ordered and mathematical limit on chaotic unlimited material 
(aperion). The range o f possible tones is infinite, but when restricted to certain numbers it 
creates beauty. And so it is with the world. This is referred to by Philolaus as 'harmonizing'; 
the coming into being o f things from the aperion is their harmonization, i.e. their 
subordination to limits (Guthrie 1968). Ethical and aesthetic conclusions follow that limits 
are inherently good, and the unlimited is bad. Everything is defined in terms of universal 
absolutes— what is intelligible and determinate is preferred over the vague and shapeless. 
Such black and white approaches to ethics and aesthetics, based on opposites, led 
Pythagoras (according to Aristotle) to split the world fundamentally into opposite 
principles: good, light, unity, male, limits; and bad, darkness, plurality, female, the 
unlimited. Thus we begin to see what I would argue is the patriarchal impulse behind 
idealism, a fear o f ambiguity and a desire to understand and dominate the world.
Schiller, in his 'Aesthetic Letters' (Schiller 2004, part III) provides an 
Apollonian/Dionysian type o f framework for understanding this impulse. He called it the 
formal instinct (formtrieb), and very clearly links the desire to abstract to the desire for 
order. Pure form constitutes a kind o f escapism in which we can retreat from the chaos and
relativism of the real world into a world of eternal order and certainty. He contrasts this 
with the sensuous instinct (sinnestrieb) which is the desire for physical experience, rooted 
in the real world. Schiller here is not talking about ontology. It should be clear that form 
and matter are not at all separable, we cannot have one without the other, except in thought. 
This is the crux of naive idealism. A fundamental dualism is formed by rationalism; the 
potential for abstract thought appears to split the world irreconcilably into the empirical on 
one hand, and knowledge arrived at through pure reason on the other. Both epistemological 
and ontological idealism can be associated with an elevation of the latter.
Parmenides' philosophy is the archetypical example of an exercise in pure reason 
(Guthrie 1968); he argued ultimately that difference and change are impossible. This was a 
remarkable feat of abstract thought, consisting of rational argument without apparent 
reference to external facts. He said that all things that exist have the fact that they exist in 
common, so what differentiates them? This must be something other than existence, which 
clearly does not exist, so all of existence must be a single mass of undifferentiated 
substance. There can be no such thing as a void for things to move around in, because a 
void by definition is the absence of existence— it does not exist. Likewise, for change to 
occur, something must become something else, something it is not. The coming into being 
of something that does not exist is impossible, since 'something that does not exist' is a 
contradiction. So the world as we perceive it does not exist— it must be merely an illusion 
(one of the most convincing counter arguments against Parmenides uses his own denial of 
the non-existent: how can something that does not exist even produce an illusion?) 
Running completely contrary to common sense, this is the perfect example of what 
happens when abstractions are thought to be 'real', or are given primacy over empirical 
evidence. Nietzsche describes Parmenides thinking, which is considered to have been very 
influential on Plato, as fundamentally flawed in its reification of'such fearsome 
abstractions as the'existent'and'non-existent":
The logical truth of the pair of opposites being and nonbeing is 
completely empty, if the object of which it is a reflection cannot be 
given, i.e., the sense perception from which this antithesis was 
abstracted. Without such derivation from a perception, it is no more 
than playing with ideas, which in fact yields no knowledge ...
Words are but symbols for the relations o f things to one another and 




We end up with a Parmenidean type of philosophy when we fail to recognize abstractions 
as abstractions, i.e. as abstracted from  experience. Without this recognition, meaning in 
language tends to be seen as absolute— an abstract concept is taken to be real simply 
because there exists a word to represent it. Since Wittgenstein, philosophy has tended to 
describe meaning as something along the lines of a 'social-linguistic product' instead. 
Sentences about the world, even if they appear to be irrefutably 'true', do not hold any truth 
value outside of language. As Rorty says, 'truth cannot be out there— cannot exist 
independently of the human mind—because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The 
world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not' (Rorty 1989). For Parmenides 
though, 'thinking' and 'being' (or the 'truth' about being) were the same thing, which 
involved a subordination of the senses, using the capacity for abstraction to split thought 
and experience in two, 'encouraging man to indulge in that wholly erroneous distinction 
between “spirit” and “body” which, especially since Plato, lies upon philosophy like a 
curse ... This is a conclusion which rests on the assumption that we have an organ of 
knowledge which reaches into the essence of things and is independent of experience' 
(Nietzsche 1996).
For Nietzsche, in contrast to this elevation of logic and reason, materialism is very 
different. Thales' prototypal materialism was the result of a less rational thought process: 
'what drove him to it was a metaphysical conviction which had its origin in mystic 
intuition' (Nietzsche 1996). Nietzsche shows a clear preference for this kind of intuition in 
philosophy over what he sees as a fundamentally flawed reliance on logic and reason— 
concepts are derived from reality, reality should not be seen as a reflection of concepts.
The materialism of Thales and others from the milesian school leads onto the 
atomism of later philosophers such as Democritus and Epicurus, in which there is an 
attempt to have material causes account for everything (light, sound, even the soul are said 
to be atoms in various combinations). Democritus questioned the reliability of the senses 
(light atoms could be subject to interference before they reach the eye etc.), leading to a 
doubting of any kind of stable reality. He said that things are 'by convention sweet and by 
convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention colour; in reality, 
atoms and the empty' (Barnes 2004). That these qualities come merely from the temporary 
arrangement of atoms and their contact with the senses means they are relative to the 
perceiver and do not exist as absolutes. Nothing can be said in absolute terms to be red, 
only that someone might perceive it that way. In relation to the 'problem of univcrsals' 
then, this position is nominalist—universal such as 'red' or 'circle' or 'beauty' do not exist,
they are simply words to denote rough correspondence to a perceived quality in particular 
instances. Later, Plato's position, in a similar vein to Pythagoreanism, held the ultimate 
nature of reality to be abstract, precisely to get around this relativism. Universals in this 
case are real2; something can be, for example, inherently beautiful.
But before this return to idealism, the sophists began teaching a kind of relativism 
in line with Democritus. If universals like sweet or bitter do not exist except as arbitrary 
conventions, then it follows that justice and injustice, good and bad, right and wrong do not 
exist in nature either, Gorgias, aping the usual title for a book on physics at the time—'On 
nature or the existent'—wrote 'On nature or the non-existent'. The implication is that there 
is no such thing as nature, no fundamental truths.
This resulted in essentially a very pragmatic philosophy. If truth is relative, then all 
opinions are equally 'true'. If  a particular person tastes sugar as bitter rather than sweet, 
then for them it is true that sugar is bitter. And in matters of ethics, if someone thinks it is 
okay to murder then that is true for them. However, Protagoras argued that some truths can 
be said to be 'better' than others in some sense, they are preferable for practical reasons. 
Often this comes down to popular consent, as with the social contract— it may not be a 
fundamental truth that murder is bad, but enough people agree that it is for it to be practical 
to turn it into law. What becomes important is rhetoric—persuading others of your ow n 
'truths'. Given this, it might sometimes be prudent to act as if there are absolute truths, even 
if we know they are not absolute. As Democritus said, although there is no such thing as 'a 
good man', 'one should either be or imitate a good man' (Barnes 2004). Similarly in 
aesthetic judgement, we say one thing is better than another even though we know this 
means nothing in absolute terms.
A lot of the themes I discuss in this thesis with reference to music later were already 
well established before Socrates/Plato. Importantly it seems that the materialism of the 
natural philosophers led into the relativist pragmatism of the sophists. However, after 
Plato, idealism (often in the form of theology) seems to dominate western thought until the 
reappearance of materialism in the 19lh century, and pragmatism, phenomenology etc. in 
the 20th century.
In aesthetics, we could sum up the question of idealism by asking: to talk about
'beautiful' things, do we need a class-concept of'beautiful' that has its own existence
separate to the things themselves? Guthrie points out that most people these days would
2 This position is confusingly labeled realism—referring to the idea that universals are real. Realism tends 
to be used these days to refer to the reality o f an ’external' world, i.e. as opposed to idealism. Materialism 
is a type of realism in this latter sense, but is ironically congruent with a nominalist view of universals.
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say no in answer to this, and yet we still use everyday language as if the answer was yes 
(Guthrie 1968). For instance we talk about diseases as if they are absolute categories, yet 
no two cases of a disease are the same. There are only individual patients with symptoms 
that are always unique. The categorization does not have ontological consequences, it is 
generally understood by doctors to be merely a tool. Likewise in music, we can use 
notation, mathematical representation, algorithmic description etc. whilst remaining aware 
that these abstracta are only tools in a process that is essentially material. However, the 
evidence suggests that there remains a lot of implicit idealism in musical practice and 
theory, as I will show in the rest of the thesis—reification of the score, the subordination of 
sound to gestural 'content', technology used merely as a medium for communication, and 
so on.
Romanticism
This latent idealism can on the one hand readily manifest itself in a classical way, 
something like the music of the spheres; the ideal forms indicated by the music are based 
around notions of universal harmony and mathematical perfection. This crops up in certain 
aspects of computer music, particularly in algorithmic composition, which is considered in 
chapter 5. However, since I am defining the music represented by Mego negatively— 
explaining what it defines itself in opposition to— perhaps of greater relevance is what we 
might call romantic idealism: the expression of'the self through music.
Romanticism as a movement, it is usually argued, was not unified by any particular 
style (e.g. Honour 1979). However there are a clear set of values and approach to art that 
we can identify in the romantic period: universal rules of form, the rejection of the 'cold' 
formalism of classicism in favour of instinct and emotion, and the expression of the self as 
absolutely primary. Music is particularly susceptible to these ideas: according to Blayney 
Brown, 'because they sprang entirely from within, music and poetry were the supreme 
romantic arts' (Brown 2001).
The romantic arts are variously described as dealing with universal themes of death, 
nothingness, 'the sacred', 'fantasies of infinity' (Brown 2001). Friedrich Schlegcl claimed 
'[the sacred] can never be seized because the mere imposition of form deforms if (Berlin 
2001). So despite a refocussing of concern to the specific and individual—the self—with 
Schlegel's romanticism there is still an innate interest in something that cannot exist 
materially; something ideal. Honour also describes the point of a romantic artwork as being 
a (necessarily) inadequate expression of something fundamentally inexpressible. This
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inexpressible 'something' that can only be gestured towards (i.e, Schlegel's 'the sacred'), 
never fully grasped, is identified by Honour as the idea of the spirit or soul of the artist 
(Honour 1979). This focus on the artwork as window to the soul of the artist gives rise to 
the concept of the artistic genius, who occupies a privileged position. For Butler, 
'romanticism inflates the role of the artist' and results in 'a heightened interest in the 
personality of the artist'(Butler 1981).
Rejecting formalism and concentrating instead on the individual gives the artist free 
rein; expressed in maxims at the height of the romantic period such as 'the artist's only law 
is his feelings' or 'trust your own genius' (Caspar David Friedrich and Washington Allston 
respectively, quoted in Honour 1979). The free rein of the imagination was, according to 
Brown, 'preferable to current reality... escapism lay at the heart of the romantic instinct' 
(Brown 2001). So perhaps despite appearances to the contrary, romanticism actually 
represents a similar escapism to the aforementioned form drive. Expression defined as 
escapism like this is not concerned with materiality other than as a signifier of more 
abstract concepts.
As Brown argues, there is a certain nostalgia for faith in romanticism; faith in a god 
is replaced by faith in the 'emotional self. There is an elevation of the human, a spiritual 
humanism—the soul (with which music has some special relationship), the sacred, 
transcendence and so on. The expression of what it is to be human, the human condition 
and its communication to others is often taken to be central in much artistic practice, 
particularly music. There are exceptions, in both theory and practice—notably serial ism, 
other kinds of formalism and the avant-garde in general—but there appears to be a 
tendency to lapse back into themes of expression.
Musique concrète for example seems ostensibly concerned with the results of 
experimentation and interaction with concrete sound materials, however it bears a 
resemblance to later spectromorphological thinking in the electroacoustic tradition, 
revealing the notational centricity that was always implicit in attempts to discover 'musical' 
content in concrete sound (Schaeffer: 'to discover the instinctive paths that lead from the 
purely “sonorous” to the purely “musical” ... to put in front of us the sonorous and its 
musical “possibility”' (Schaeffer 1966, p.81)). According to Smalley, 
'spectromorphological ideas can help perceivers to focus on the imagination and craft of 
the composer' (Smalley 1997). This can be interpreted to suggest that the proper way to 
listen to music is to appreciate the virtuosity of the person behind it. More specifically 'we 
detect the humanity behind [sounds] by deducing gestural activity'.
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The romantic period is useful to reference as epitomizing certain ideas, but the 
notion of romanticism relevant to this thesis is not simply that of a historical period, rather 
it is a useful term tying the above characteristics together and very broadly defining an 
approach to art. As Honour argues, 'romantic' tendencies can be shown to exist since 
antiquity, and they of course exist no less today than in the romantic period. Rock music 
for instance often embodies a very clear continuation of the tradition of music as an 
expressive medium, with corresponding focus on the personality of the artist, notions of 
artistic genius and so on. '[Romanticism's] concepts of authenticity, integrity and inner 
truth remain relevant. They are fundamental to our concept, not only of art, but also 
ourselves’ (Brown 2001).
Richard Coyne describes a romanticism specifically relevant to the digital age, 
which he calls 'technoromanticism'—IT narratives that 'attempt to transcend the material 
realm'; 'narratives that develop the claims that we can transcend the constraints of the 
embodied world toward unity through the power of information technology' (Coyne 2001). 
We will see an example of an approach like this in chapter two. Coyne is critical of the 
romanticism in this approach to technology, claiming that 'it is easy to show how 
romanticism encourages inflated expectations, diminishes tangible concerns with 
equipment and embodiment, promotes the heroism of the digital entrepreneur, and dresses 
conservative thinking in the guise of radicalism'(Coyne 2001).
These issues have also been identified previously in new musicology, generally in 
relation to emancipatory issues, such as McClary's assertion that music is 'too important a 
cultural force to be shrouded by mystified notions of Romantic transcendence' (Brett et ai. 
2006), and against idealism there is the idea that music existing as notation encourages 
'reification: the score comes to be seen as 'the music', or perhaps the music in an ideal form' 
(Middleton 1990). Much of this musicology however does not move beyond discussion of 
the traditional western canon or the occasional inclusion of popular music, often 
contradictorily analyzed notationally.
1 will use the word 'idealist' to refer to artworks in which the material form of the 
work is seen only as a pointer, to something immaterial; in classicism this is ideal form and 
universal harmony, and in romanticism the soul, the sacred, the infinite etc. These are 
fundamentally works of representation. A.W. Schlegel in defining romanticism stated 
clearly that '[beauty] is a symbolical representation of the infinite' (Bonds 1997). Abrams' 
mirror and lamp metaphors, for classicism and romanticism respectively, neatly 
encapsulate the representative nature of each; both kinds of artform exist to indicate
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something else beyond themselves, by reflection on the one hand or illumination on the 
other (Abrams 1971). Art as a reflection of reality, or art as an illumination o f reality; both 
options retain the idea that 'reality' is the object of interest, and that art is somehow 
separate to this reality. Dewey provides an effective metaphor to dispel this idea:
Mountain peaks do not float unsupported; they do not even just rest 
upon the earth. They are the earth in one of its manifest operations.
It is the business of those who are concerned with the theory of the 
earth, geographers and geologists, to make this fact evident in its 
various implications. The theorist who would deal philosophically 
with fine art has a like task to accomplish. (Dewey 2009)
The representative conception of art is also manifest in the notion of'content'. Sontag's 
Against Interpretation is of great relevance here. She saw art in the west as persistently 
emphasizing content over material form; beginning with the idea of art as mimesis with 
Plato, which in essence continues in the more recent idea of art as expression:
Even in modem times, when most artists and critics have discarded 
the theory of art as representation of an outer reality in favor of the 
theory of art as subjective expression, the main feature of the 
mimetic theory persists. Whether we conceive of the work of art on 
the model of a picture (art as a picture of reality) or on the model of 
a statement (art as the statement of the artist), content still comes 
first. The content may have changed. It may now be less figurative, 
less lucidly realistic. But it is still assumed that a work o f art is its 
content. Or, as it’s usually put today, that a work of art by definition 
says something. ('What X is saying i s , . . , '  'What X is trying to say 
is . . . , '  'What X said i s , . . '  etc., etc.) (Sontag 2001)
Aesthetics that problematize representation
So can there be an artform that is neither mimetic nor expressive? Issues to do with 
representation are of primary importance to aesthetics—what is the nature of the artwork? 
Is it a depiction? Does it rely on metaphor? If artistic practice is at all reflective, it seems 
inevitable that it will lead to a questioning of its own representative nature, through 
attempts to either avoid representation, or 'play' with representational processes in order to 
make them more apparent. There are a number of historical precedents in this area giving 
us an eclectic range of examples from other disciplines that it will be beneficial to draw on.
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This is partly a case o f cherry-picking and borrowing aspects of theory which have no 
equivalent in musicology, in order to avoid starting from scratch. But it also has the effect 
of illuminating the concept to a greater degree, highlighting the various issues at stake by 
contemplating them from a number of different viewpoints.
The most obvious precedent is what has been referred to as 'literalism' in the plastic 
arts, which found its fullest articulation in American minimalism in the 60s and 70s. This 
was a move away from depiction (including the depiction of abstractions, i.e. a reaction to 
abstract expressionism), to create pieces that are perceived as objects themselves rather 
than as a window into something else. Joanna Demers has recently argued for the link 
between literalism and contemporary sound art and experimental electronic music (Demers 
2010). The idea is to avoid the view of art or music as a container of meaning. Demers 
claims that 'conceptualisations of sound as blank, meaningless objects are deserving of 
continued study, especially since so much of the scholarship devoted to electronic and 
electroacoustic music theorises the communicative abilities of music and sound' (Demers
2009). She references (Emmerson 2007), (Smalley 1996) and (Wishart 1986) as examples 
of the latter.
Other relevant precedents are found in writing on architecture ('truth to materials', 
machine aesthetics, brutalism), film (particularly structuralist/materialist film), and some 
aspects of literary theory. The history of Marxist aesthetics is of particular interest, being 
characterized by debates centered around the intersection of ontology, aesthetics and 
politics—trying to determine what a materialist aesthetic might be (or indeed if materialist 
aesthetic is actually a contradiction in terms (see for example Eagleton 1990). To clarify, 
materialism in the widest sense is an ontology that asserts the existence of a real world 
'external' to mind or phenomena, or more specifically asserting that the material world is 
the only thing that exists— ideas are just a result of material interactions, and crucially 
represent an abstraction from the material world, therefore sharing its contingency and 
arbitrariness. Althusser describes it thus: 'For us, the 'real' is not a theoretical slogan; the 
real is the real object that exists independently of its knowledge—but which can only be 
defined by its knowledge' (Althusser 1969).
This is not so different from a Kantian position. Kant understood Hume as stating 
that 'no objects can be represented through pure concepts of understanding, apart from the 
conditions of sensibility' (Kant 1855). Kant, rather than taking this as an argument for 
empiricism, as Hume intended it, focused on the latter part of the statement: the apparent 
pre-requisite of an understanding of the conditions of sensibility, leading him to conclude
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that a priori knowledge is not only possible but of fundamental importance. Knowledge, in 
the Aristotolian tradition, is split into analytic judgement (essentially tautologous, e.g. 'blue 
is blue') and synthetic judgement (determining complex facts, e.g. 'the sky is blue'). The 
latter seems clearly a posteriori, it relies on observation; a priori knowledge was thought 
exclusively to belong to analytic judgement. But Kant extended the realm of a priori' 
thought to include synthetic judgement, for instance holding the whole of pure 
mathematics as an a priori truth, claiming that '5 + 7 = 1 2 ' is both a priori and synthetic.
The concept of a priori knowledge is clearly ideal—as an object of pure 
contemplation it exists prior to sense data and independently of the 'external' (or 
'noumenal') object world. As such Kant ultimately asserts that the noumenal world is 
unknowable. The phenomenal world that is knowable, is only appearance, representation— 
it does not give access to'things in themselves'.
'Transcendental idealism' is the term Kant applies to this position: the objects of 
transcendental knowledge (a priori knowledge, pure reason regarding the conditions of 
experience) are not real but merely ideal. Space, time and causation cannot be shown to 
exist independently of thought. He claimed, however, that transcendental idealism was 
necessary for an 'empirical realism'. The objects of empirical knowledge do exist, and it is 
the understanding made possible by pure reason that allows us to make such a claim. ■ 
Causation and substance are basic categories of the understanding, ideal and 
transcendental. Thus the unknowability of 'things in themselves' does not prevent the 
attribution of a cause to the appearance in sense data of a representation, via a priori 
synthetic judgement.
For a materialist however, there is no a priori at all, the understanding of what Kant 
thought of as fundamental categories of the understanding are empirically derived like 
anything else (a type of derivation that does not require rational concepts on which to build 
because it is precisely not a rational process). The distinction is thus epistemological as 
well as ontological, but this is unavoidably linked with aesthetic, ethical and political 
issues.
In 20th century pragmatism, the rejection of metaphysics is a general theme. 
Materialism, although basically consisting of a speculative metaphysical statement, results 
in a similar position: the statement is that there is only the physical, the metaphysical is 
itself physical. This leads to a rejection o f absolutes; in ontology and consequently in ethics 
and aesthetics etc. The aforementioned escapism of idealist or romantic approaches to art is 
often seen in Marxist aesthetics as a distraction from material reality, a means of
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suppressing political thought and activity. The conclusions are very pragmatic, in the 
tradition of Marxist materialist philosophy there is a strong emphasis on 'a philosophy of 
praxis' (Gramsci 1998), beginning perhaps with the famous 11th thesis on Feuerbach: 
'Philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it' 
(Engels & Marx 2009). This point in the context of Feuerbach's materialism is that a 
metaphysical/spiritual unity or teleology provides comfort but ultimately downplays 
agency and promotes fatalism. But in its absence, pragmatism, acting in the world and 
increasing material well-being, becomes primary. It also demonstrates the idea that theory 
is not prior to or even separate from practice, but is itself a type of practice. Philosophy and 
art are not separate from the world (they should not be thought of as faithful and truthful 
reflections of the world) but as themselves part of the world. This ¡s very much in line with 
the arguments of pragmatists later such as Dewey:
The traditional theory in both its empiricist and rationalistic forms 
amounts to holding that all propositions are purely declaratory or 
enunciative of what antecedently exists or subsists, and that this 
declarative office is complete and final in itself. The position here 
taken holds, on the contrary, that declarative propositions ... are 
intermediary means or instruments... of effecting the controlled 
transformation of subject-matter.... All controlled inquiry and all 
institution of grounded assertion necessarily contains a practical 
factor; an activity of doing and making which reshapes antecedent 
existential material. (Dewey 2007)
As an example in Marxist aesthetics, although Lukács' realism saw art and literature as 
essentially mimetic, as a pragmatic political imperative he understood their function as the 
faithful reflection of material reality— social structures and class relations. As such he 
attacked expressionism for its failure to do this; precisely on the grounds of its idealistic 
character, its aim to represent the nature of 'bourgois' subjectivity. But similarly, the 
idealism of his own aesthetic is manifest in the concept of mimesis; his belief in the 
possibility of faithfully and objectively representing the nature of society. Adorno, 
Marcuse, and various others favoured a more dialectic approach than this, but one of the 
most interesting approaches in the history of Marxist aesthetics is the materialism of the 
London Film-Makers' Co-op.
Unlike Luk^cs' realism, materialist Film (as theorized and practiced by Peter Gidal, 
Malcolm LeGrice, Lis Rhodes and others) in general attempted to problematize
representation. It seems a logical progression: the aim is initially to faithfully represent 
reality, but this is followed by the recognition that representation is itself reality. Materialist 
film generally aimed to make the viewer aware of the representational apparatus; including 
conceptual apparatus—the language of cinema, its ideological basis and so on. The 
techniques for achieving this are varied but tend to involve a disruption of conventional 
forms that are taken to be natural in cinema. The idea of anything taken as natural is 
anathema to a materialist approach: 'since everything is constructed, no 'nature' pre-existent 
... meanings can be recognized as arbitrary' (Gidal 1989). Arbitrariness is repeatedly 
emphasized. We ultimately see again a reaction against the artform as a medium for the 
communication of predetermined and naturalized meaning; rejecting notions of 
identification, narrative and anything that can be described as illusionistic. Illusionism is 
seen to be the primary form of dominant cinema by theorists like Gidal.
Georgina Born describes a similar situation in music. Seeing music as a more-or- 
less arbitrary sign, she describes the way in which meaning in music proceeds via 
metaphor:
It is at the level of connotation that music is particularly subject to 
extramusical meaning through its extraordinary evocative power.
The signifieds that music connotes are of many kinds: visual, 
sensual, emotional, and intellectual—such as theories, domains of 
knowledge. All are metaphors... metaphors may be motivated, 
distorted, yet naturalized or organized into a pseudocoherence for 
purposes of irrefutability. (Born 1995)
This emphasizes the ideological quality of music:
The essential point, however, is that the relation of these 
extramusical connotations to music as signifier is cultural and 
historical. Yet they are experienced as 'immanent in' the music by a 
process of projection of the connotations onto the musical sound 
object. It is this process of projection that achieves the'naturalizing' 
effect—the connotations appear natural and universal when they are 
conventional—and that makes it apt to describe them as ideology.
(Born 1995)
Certain musical practices appear to operate primarily on this level, on the level of the 
construction of meaning; the artist wishes to communicate extramusical ideas, and 
manipulates musical materials to give the right connotations. A practice centered around
26
the linear communication of meaning therefore almost by definition must work with 
existing connotations, further entrenching them, and further naturalizing dominant 
ideological structures (for example the self-expression of rock or other gestural musics 
could quite easily be linked to individualism in politics).
However a practice can perhaps work closer to the level of musical material prior to 
signification. The attitude discussed previously in relation to technology, in which it is seen 
in a means-ends manner generally as an inconvenient but necessary imperfect medium, can 
be applied to semiology in general (or as Dewey might have it: semiology is 
technological). Coyne explains this in relation to Derrida:
One of Derrida's major themes is his identification of the tendency 
within conventional language theories to subordinate the signifier 
(word or language event) to the signified (the meaning or the entity 
referred to). The signifier exists to give access to the signified and 
is subordinate to the concept or meaning it communicates. Within 
this regime of thinking, the task of interpretation is always to get 
back to what is meant in any language situation. The words are 
obviously important but sometimes get in the way ... Derrida 
argues for a reversal of this priority. (Coyne 1995)
This brings us to a recurring theme in the thesis: there are two possible ways we could 
describe the effect of a musical practice that attempts a reversal like this and prioritizes the 
signifier.
1. It is less prescriptive in its connotations. It therefore opens up a space for new 
connotations to be formed.
Or more radically:
2. It strives toward the ideal of the 'empty signifier'. The focus is shifted to the 
signifier itself, its materiality, in the absence of anything signified.
These two possibilities will be explored throughout the course of the thesis.
Sontag describes how critics generally see their task as interpretive, essentially a 
task of translation—taking the content of the artwork and re-presenting its meaning in the 
form of writing. But if a recurring conclusion here is that the music exemplified by Mego 
is not concerned with communicating meaning, this presents a problem for the critic— 
there is nothing to interpret:
It is always the case that interpretation of this type indicates a 
dissatisfaction (conscious or unconscious) with the work, a wish to 
replace it by something else ... What would criticism look like that 
would serve the work of art, not usurp its place? What ¡s needed, 
first, is more attention to form in a r t ... The best criticism, and it is 
uncommon, is of this sort that dissolves considerations of content 
into those of form. (Sontag 2001)
I therefore primarily consider the ways in which the technological approach creates music 
that affords apprehension on the level of material form, rather than discussing any notion 
of content.
Interpretation, based on the highly dubious theory that a work of art 
is composed of items of content, violates art. It makes art into an 
article for use, for arrangement into a mental scheme of categories 
... Our task is not to find the maximum amount of content in a 
work of art, much less to squeeze more content out of the work than 
is already there. Our task is to cut back content so that we can see 
the thing at all. (Sontag 2001)
Mego
Towards the end of 1994, Ramon Bauer, Peter Meininger, Andi Pieper and Peter Rehberg 
formed Mego, driven largely by a general dissatisfaction with the current status quo in 
Austrian music. Rehberg describes Vienna as a 'cultural wasteland' at that time, with the 
music scene dominated by imitations of Anglo-American pop/rock. However they did have 
an interest in techno, which was seen as more european centric and its model of 
dissemination as independent from the mainstram of popular music. Techno was heavily 
influential on the formation of Mego: Bauer and Pieper were previously involved in the 
running of the techno label Mainframe, and Rehberg cites the second wave of Detroit 
techno— Underground Resistance in particular—as an influence. Despite this, techno was 
ultimately, for them, not fulfilling its experimental or challenging potential. Rehberg 
therefore describes the basic concept of Mego as taking the model of techno but applying it 
to music with a more experimental approach [1],
Rehberg was DJing at the time in the 'chill out' room at the U4 club in Vienna, next 
door to Bauer and Pieper's studio. In May 1994 they played what could be considered the 
first Mego performance. By running cables through the wall, Bauer and Pieper were
27
playing on one side using studio equipment, and Rehberg on the other using CD decks and 
outboard effects, loops and so on; 'extending the DJ format' [1], In the same year, the word 
'Mego' was first mentioned as a label name ('chosen because it did not mean anything' [2]), 
and Rehberg, Bauer and Pieper started to make recordings by putting microphones in 
various different fridges, which would later become the sole source of sounds for the 
Fridge Trax 12’ (MEGO 001).
Fridge Trax was released in May 1995, along with Die Mondlandung (MEGO 002) 
and UFO Beobachtungen 93-95 (MEGO 003) by Bauer and Pieper (General Magic) and 
Alex Müller (Elin/Stützpunkt Wien 12) respectively. By this point, Peter Meininger had 
left the project despite, according to Rehberg, being predominantly responsible for the 
genesis of the label.
There is an overt techno influence in Die Mondlandung to some extent, and UFO 
Beobachtungen 93-95 more so, with its minimal arrangement of 4/4 kick drum and hi hat 
patterns over pulsing bass parts. Fridge Trax however (recently re-issued as FLAC 
download) consists predominantly of drones, and slowly repeating fragments of 
recordings; it is more representative of the kind of work Mego would later become known 
for.
The distribution for these records was handled by a German techno distributor 
called Neuton who, according to Rehberg, 'tried to sell them with descriptions like 
“pumping, driving tracks”' [1], the inappropriateness of which (in the case of Fridge Trax 
and Die Mondlandung at least) highlights the departure from techno that Mego 
represented, at the same time as an initial reliance on the infrastructure and audience 
created by it.
The same was true of other comparable labels at the time. Tommi Grönlund's Sahko 
label was founded a year earlier, releasing Mika Vainio's Kvantti and Röntgen EPs in 1993, 
and his first full length album Metri in 1994. Although Sahko would go on to experiment 
with less rhythmic material in later releases, Metri owed something to techno genre 
conventions, making it less of a break from techno and more like an offshoot; beginning 
what journalists dubbed minimal techno. Also by this time Autechre had released 
Incunabula, Amber, and Anti EP; Oval's Systemisch was released on Mille Plateaux; and so 
on. Mego was formed in the context of various contemporary precedents for 
experimentation in commercial electronic music. According to Rehberg such contemporary 
influences were combined in Mego with various interests in industrial music, post-punk 
and synth pop, ultimately resulting in an aesthetic more eclectic than these other labels.
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There was also a conviction that it could be taken to more of an extreme—the Artificial 
Intelligence series on Warp for instance was for Rehberg 'hyped as being experimental 
music, but was just another form of techno ... it was a good idea, but wasn't enough, it 
could really be experimental' [1]. In addition Rehberg states that the concept was to move 
away from the paradigm of techno records with a white label and no cover, to more 
unusual packaging with interesting artwork (by designers like like Tina Frank). It was 
intended to be a cross-media coming together of artists, graphic designers, programmers.
By word of mouth alone, various like-minded artists in Vienna had contacted Mego 
before any records were released. Christian Fennesz approached them in April 1995, and 
Farmers Manual sent a demo at around the same time, resulting in Fennesz' seminal heavy 
guitar processing in the Instrument 12' (MEGO 004) and eventually the first Farmers 
Manual album No Backup (MEGO 008). Additionally, the internet and email at this time 
began to enable the creation of a larger network of people working in similar directions, 
acting as a catalyst for non-institutional experimental computer music globally. Bauer and 
Pieper, at the same time as running Mego, ran a web design company with Tina Frank 
called URL. This helped with distribution since Mego was very quickly able to set up its 
internet mail order shop MDOS, in 1996.
1996 also saw the release of Rehberg's first solo album (as Pita) Seven Tons for  
Free (MEGO 009) which, along with No Backup, began to define the sound that 
characterizes much of the Mego catalogue. Rehberg sees the influence of Russell Haswell 
as important from this point. Although Haswell's first Live Salvage album wasn't released 
until 2001, he was present in Vienna much of the time from the inception of Mego, 
socializing and playing in the same venues. Through him there was an influence from 
Japanese noise music; explicitly manifest in the Masimi Akita (Merzbow) / Ilaswell 
collaboration Ich SchnittMich In Den Finger (MEGO 022).
In 1997 and 1998, the debut albums of General Magic (Frantz!, MEGO 010), 
Fennesz (Hotel Parallel, MEGO 016), and Florian Becker (ITISO 161975, MEGO 014), 
followed by a number of Mego tours began to result in international media recognition.
The Wire magazine devoted an issue to the Vienna electrónica scene in August 1997, citing 
the 1995 Phonotaktik festival as the event initially drawing attention to labels like Mego, 
and claiming that the most productive period for the scene had already passed.
There was a tendency in these days of burgeoning international recognition for 
Mego artists to find themselves playing in unusual venues, creating a confrontational 
atmosphere (as might be expected in the reception of any formal innovation). For instance
a performance at a typography conference in San Francisco in 1998 called FUSE was 
described in one review as 'an unbearably loud and hardly structured techno show ... with 
pointlessly shrill high frequencies way above pain level. Most held their ears shut; many 
left the audience. Apparently adolescent technical overkill' (Muller-Lance 1998). These 
situations, according to Rehberg, were not intentionally sought out (they were 'mostly 
because of bad booking agents' [1]), but at the same time they were not avoided, and were 
generally seen as a positive thing by the artists involved.
Most Mego artists were originally using typical techno hardware in the production 
of their music—samplers, drum machines, sequencers and so on. The move to laptop 
production and performance, that they would later become known for, was initially made 
for entirely pragmatic reasons. To play an increasing number of international shows, 
carrying numerous large pieces of equipment became impractical. The release of the G3 
PowerBook in 1997 was roughly the point at which it became possible (and affordable) to 
do the same kind of audio processing on something a fraction of the size and weight. As a 
side-effect of this development, there was a fundamental change in the kind of sound being 
created.
Supercollider became the software environment of choice, with the occasional use 
of institutionally developed programs such as Steim's LiSa. Andy Pieper (previously a 
programmer), began creating software in Supercollider, that started to be adopted by other 
Mego artists. This led to a kind of communal iterative patch development; Pieper 
experimenting with various ideas, and Rehberg and Bauer suggesting changes or new 
features. Farmers Manual (Mathias Gmachl, Stefan Posert, Oswald Berthold and Gert 
Brantner) were also programmers, and used the algorithmic possibilities of the computer in 
Explorers_We (OR 1998, SQUISH 4) and the majority of the live performances on their 
Recent Live Archive (MEGO 777).
1999 and 2000 saw further international recognition, with tours in Japan and 
Australia widening the audience. Rehberg claims that Australia remains the biggest market 
for the label to date [ I ]. There was also further critical acclaim, with Rehberg and Fennesz 
winning a Prix Ars Electrónica distinction in digital musics, for Seven Tons For Free and 
Hotel Parallel respectively. This success was complimented by the release of The Magic 
Sound O f Fenn O'Berg (MEGO 031), a collaboration between Rehberg, Fennesz and Jim 
O'Rourke presenting a fragmented collection of live recordings in which an eclectic bank 
of soundfiles (including a recognizable John Barry theme from a James Bond film) are 
distorted and processed. The second Pita album Get Out (MEGO 029) is often considered a
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benchmark in the 'laptop' genre, evidenced by descriptions such as 'a milestone in early 
laptop music' (Sohns 2008) or 'the first major musical laptop statement' (Keenan 2008). It 
follows a similar compositional process to the Fenn O'Berg album; a highlight being eleven 
minutes of looping a reversed Ennio Morricone sample, distorted in various ways.
Also released around this time, but occupying a very different sonic territory, was 
Principio (MEGO 18) by Roc Jiménez de Cisneros and Miguel Ferré as Evol. It consists of 
high pitched short envelope sounds from a drum machine, arranged and edited into 
complex but sparse patterns using a minidisk editing station. This release was the result of 
a meeting between Rehberg and Jiménez de Cisneros at the Barcelona Sonar Festival in 
1996. Jiménez de Cisneros cites exposure to the work of other Mego artists—Rehberg and 
Farmers Manual in particular ('somehow extreme and accessible at the same time' [3])—as 
the main influence that led to an involvement in computer music from previous interest in 
metal and hardcore. In particular, he considers Seven Tons fo r Free as a major influence 
and turning point, referring to this emerging scene as 'post-techno', According to Jiménez 
de Cisneros the experimental computer music of the mid to late 90s would not have been 
possible without techno, in the sense that it prepared an audience (and artists) for electronic 
sounds presented in anti-expressive machine-like ways [3j. Techno has often been 
described as the antithesis of a traditional human centric, emotional or expressive music. 
'Detroit Techno refutes the p a st... it prefers tomorrow's technology to yesterday's heroes. 
Techno is a post-soul sound ... For the young black underground in Detroit, emotion 
crumbles at the feet of technology' (Cosgrove 1988). For more on this aspect of techno see 
(Pope 2011) or (Reynolds 1998).
Despite the vague 'post-techno' focus, throughout the history of Mego there has 
been an attempt to avoid restricting the label to one style; the aim is to make the label 
uncategorisable. There is an influence here from labels such as Mute and Factory, and an 
obsession for Rehberg in following release series and catalogue numbers. For instance 
STUMM 4 on Mute was 'the Black Album' by Boyd Rice (NON), which was followed by 
Depeche Mode's Speak & Spell as STUMM 5. The hugely eclectic nature of this series was 
a point of fascination for Rehberg. Interestingly, the influence from these labels provides 
another link with techno; according to Cosgrove: 'strange as it may seem, the techno scene 
looked to Europe, to Heaven 17, Depeche Mode and the Human League for its inspiration' 
(Cosgrove 1988).
In 1999 the sublabel fals.ch was founded, to be run by Oswald Berthold (of Farmers 
Manual), and Florian Flecker. Fals.ch was one of the first online only labels; a 'netlabelV
The catalogue consists of MP3 downloads only, there were no physical releases other than 
the retrospective Fals.ch and Fals.ch 02 mini-CD compilations.
Consistently the biggest selling release in the Mego catalogue [1], Fennesz's 
Endless Summer (MEGO 035), was released in 2001. This was followed by a Jim 
O'Rourke solo album, I'm Happy, And I'm Singing, And A 1, 2, 3, 4 (MEGO 050); the 
eventual release of Haswell's Live Salvage 1997-2000 (MEGO 012); Kevin Drumm's Sheer 
Hellish Miasma (MEGO 053), which became very influential on a burgeoning electronic 
noise scene in the US; as well as (amongst others) releases by CoH (Ivan Pavlov), Sluta 
Leta (a 'Swedish' pseudonym for Ramon Bauer and Andi Pieper), Tujiko Noriko, and a 
collaboration between Hecker and Yasunao Tone.
This productive period was threatened by various factors. Some major distributers 
for the label went out of business, due to a general drop in sales usually linked to the rise of 
MP3 downloads. Bauer left the company, and in 2005 Mego and MDos ceased to exist. But 
in 2006 Rehberg restructured the organization to run with no office and no staff, instead 
outsourcing when necessary. He rebranded the label as Editions Mego, the concept was to 
reissue items from the back catalogue as well as continuing to release new material.
This music could be placed in the context of discourses in Western art music, but 
this could be misleading, since the music, though perhaps sharing some superficial 
similarities, appears to have almost no roots in such a discourse. Most of its practitioners 
seem to have no interest in this discourse, and their musical influences come from entirely 
different traditions. Where comparisons between the two kinds of music have been made 
(usually simply because the comparison is interesting) I have tried to maintain the sense 
that this is a comparison between two categorically different kinds of music, the 
comparison is for the purposes of shedding light on certain aspects of the music by 
defining it negatively. It should not imply that there is much of a relationship of influence 
between the two.
There are some exceptions to this: artists such as Russell Haswell show a strong 
interest in the academic tradition of computer music, but, as will be explained in more 
detail later, this is not so much a continuation of that theory and practice, but rather a quite 
unique 'curatorial' practice that takes this history as just one of many objects of fascination. 
In a different way, Jiménez de Cisneros has a knowledge and interest in the 20th century 
avant-garde, but the parallels between this and his own work only became apparent to him 
when he had already been a professional artist for some time [3]. Again, therefore, this 
does not represent a continuation of that practice. Similarly, Peter Rehberg says of the
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institutional tradition: 'when I was a teenager we didn't have access to any of the academic 
music—things like Stockhausen and Pierre Schaeffer. We hadn't heard of that, we didn't 
know what it was ... but I probably would have been interested'[4].
In contrast to institutional musics, Mego sustains itself commercially, 
unsubsidized. Rehberg is critical of publicly funded music, claiming: 'if you put a record 
out you should have enough confidence in it that money will come back in' [1].
In relation to notions of postmodernism, it is interesting to note that this music does 
not merely 'borrow from' or 'reference' popular culture, it is itself situated within popular 
culture, if we take popular culture to be those aspects of culture that are commodified and 
regulated by the market. But note that the term 'popular culture' is perhaps misleading in an 
age of such diffuse cultural dissemination. If a music sustains itself commercially, this does 
not necessarily mean it is 'popular' music. The scene in question appears to consist of a 
small but committed audience, organized internationally (in a way that was not possible 
before the internet).
Chapter Summaries
In the following chapters 1 will ground the discussion in specific musical examples that 
demonstrate the theory introduced above. Each chapter focusses on one or a few particular 
works, using them to connect with different themes.
Chapter 2 introduces the relationship between technology and aesthetics, by 
comparing two different approaches, as found in Ryoji Ikeda's +/- on the one hand, and 
Pita's Seven Tons For Free on the other. I explore the theory of machine aesthetics and 
high-tech aesthetics, specifically in relation to notions of materialism and literalism.
Donald Judd's essay Specific Objects and Michael Fried's Art and Objecthood are 
discussed in order to explain this concept of literalism. Judd and Fried's writing constitutes 
an exchange providing perhaps the clearest expression of a split between materialist and 
idealist approaches to art. It provides a useful starting point for the theory that will be 
developed. I also link this to Heidegger's thought regarding art.
In Chapter 3 I compare Haswell & Flecker's Blackest Ever Black, made using 
Xenakis' UPIC machine, to Xenakis' own music made with the UP1C. Their approaches are 
contrasted, and I begin to use Dewey's philosophy to describe a pragmatic approach to 
technology, which is exemplified in Blackest Ever Black', an approach that is experimental, 
in contrast to one in which technology is seen as a medium for channeling an abstract 
musical idea.
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Chapter 4 takes a piece of software as its focus—Andy Pieper's 'apPatch' 
SuperCollider patch, used in a number of early Mego releases. The idea of a transparent 
medium is discussed, using the 'digital audio workstation' concept as an example. In 
contrast, the limitations and inherent affordances of the apPatch software are highlighted, 
and shown in relation to examples o f music made using it, thus examining the extent to 
which the technology is implicated in the music. I argue that using the arbitrary 
contingency of technological affordances acts as a means of getting away from making 
decisions based on existing ideas of musicality.
Chapter 5 is based around Roc Jimenez de Cisneros' Evol project, using various 
examples of Evol releases, which tend to have a large element of algorithmic composition.
I review the existing literature on algorithmic composition in relation to the theory 
developed so far, and compare this to the Evol approach. I emphasize the potential for 
algorithmic techniques to take the music to places that would remain otherwise 
undiscovered, i.e. getting away from existing notions of musicality. Algorithmic 
composition can be thought of in this way—as one particular method of using 
technological affordances to determine the music.
Chapter 6 also touches on algorithmic composition, this time in relation to Farmers 
Manual, specifically the album ExplorersJVe. It returns to the notion of materialist 
aesthetics, via ideas to do with 'glitch', comparing this to the 'splice' in materialist film. 1 
develop a theory of noise music, drawing on theory from the previous chapters, in which 
noise is defined as something that does not contain meaning (and is therefore 'literal').
Finally, chapter 7 looks to some more recent Editions Mego releases: Returnal by 
Oneohtrix Point Never, and A New Way To Pay Old Debts by Bill Orcutt. Both appear to be 
in some way backwards looking, to have some special focus on the past, supported by 
claims to this effect in their critical reception. I explore these claims and come to the 
conclusion that although superficially quite different to the rest of the Mego catalogue, they 
in fact share similar approaches in the creative process and resulting 'noise' aesthetic.
Digital technology and the high tech aesthetic:
Seven Tons For Free and +/-
Rehberg's first solo album Seven Tom For Free (Mego 009, 1996) was released some 
months before Ryoji Ikeda's +/- (Touch TO :30,1996). Both are often cited retrospectively 
as seminal works or archetypes in the following highly active period in computer music, 
especially in marketing copy:
Seven Tom fo r  Free was quickly realised to be an experimental 
electronic classic and paved the way for the whole glitchy minimal 
scene we would see erupt from labels such as Mille Plateaux,
Raster Noton and 12k. (Boomkat 2007)
And:
when it was first released,+ /-came like a bolt out of the white ...
Ryoji Ikeda has progressively refined and enhanced the distinctive 
sonic fields and microsounds that have strongly influenced post­
digital composition3. (Touch 2001)
As well as being contextually similar, these albums superficially share a lot aesthetically; 
they focus on experimentation with digital technology, they have a similar palette of 
sounds (very short pops and clicks, drones) and both result from what appears to be a 
rejection of existing musical vocabularies. However a more detailed comparison of these 
two albums will highlight the differences between them and reveal the distinctiveness of 
the aesthetic that was being established by Mego at this time.
By 1996, Sahko was already well established, with the Mika Vainio EPs Kvantti 
and Röntgen released in 1993, and the album Metri in 1994. This, along with Wolfgang 
Voigt's work as Studio 1 in 1995, epitomize a 'minimal techno' sound comparable to Seven 
Tom For Free and +/-. One suggestion that the material from +/- was not intended to be 
played in clubs, distancing it from any techno scene, is that it received no release on vinyl. 
Accordingly it has very little of what might be called 'danceable' content. This was not lost 
on journalists at the tim e:'[+/-] opens with three tracks of jittery machine-rhythm, dropping 
any pretence of danceability in favour of a more disruptive aesthetic' (Duguid 1997).
Likewise, Seven Tom For Free opens with six minutes of metronomically repeating 
clicks at 896 beats per minute interspersed with lower frequency pops, like a mutilation of
3 'Post-digital' is a term coined by Kim Cascone, to describe a music that embraces 'failures' of digital 
technology. (Cascone 2000)
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the standard techno hi hats and kick pattern, taken to extremes of tempo and timbre and 
divorced from a coherent rhythmic relationship. Thus despite demonstrating a relationship 
to techno, both albums represent a significant shift away from any dance music function. 
Instead, there appears to be an interest in the extremes made possible by digital technology; 
single-sample impulses, near-instantaneous envelopes, the precise manipulation of 
waveforms, and extremes such as the +/- title track, consisting only of a sine wave at 
16kHz (generally taken to be the upper limit of human hearing for the average adult).
The digital technology which facilitated the exploration of such extremes became 
widely available to artists who were not affiliated or associated with academic institutions 
at around this time—home computers or laptops became affordable and powerful enough 
to work with sound at the sample level, with possibilities for experimentation in digital 
synthesis. Algorithmic sequencing also became more of a possibility. Rehberg and Ikeda's 
work seems to demonstrate a desire to explore the limits of this newly available technology 
(or at least a desire to be seen to be doing this, as will be discussed below).
+/-
The opening three tracks of +/-, Headphonics 0/0, 0/1 and 1/1 are built around a single sine 
wave in what might conventionally be called rapid panning—from hard-left to hard-right 
of the stereo audio field. It soon becomes clear that 'hard' is the only kind of panning used 
throughout the work—a sound is placed in the left channel, the right channel, both 
channels or neither channel. This strictly speaking is not panning, it exhibits instead an 
approach to spatial audio that lays bare the technology used in reproducing the music. 
Panning can be thought of as an illusory trick. By playing the same sound from both 
speakers at the same time and adjusting their relative levels, it can appear to come from 
anywhere in the stereo field—creating the illusion of a 'panorama', a sound world 
occupying the space between the speakers. But contrary to the creation of an illusory 
uninterrupted screen of audio, if sounds are exclusively placed in the left channel or right 
channel only, then we perceive the two discrete separate sound sources that are actually 
there (the speakers), rather than a stereo field. It thus appears that the music is not intended 
to represent something above and beyond its own sound, it simply results from material 
processes that are foregrounded, and illusion or representation are avoided. Of course, the 
same technique can function in different ways in different pieces, it is not the case that 
panning is always an idealist technique, compared to a materialist shunning of 
spatialization. But in this instance, in combination with the structure and the sounds used, it
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can be argued that it emphasizes the literal aspect of the piece (the sound making 
equipment).
In what we could refer to as a'digital aesthetic', one of the most fundamental 
characteristics, implied by the term, is that things are either on or off, binary, discrete, 
rather than based on continuous change. But this is of course also possible with analogue 
technology, and we should therefore question whether this is actually an innate 
characteristic of digital technology, or just something that is associated with it on a 
symbolic level.
Ikeda's earlier work, although not released until after +/-, as 1000 fragments (CC1 
Recordings CCD23001,1995), includes a track titled This Is A Recording featuring the 
words 'left' and 'right' spoken, placed in their respective channels followed by another 
voice stating 'this is a recording'. We could call this a proto-materialist approach, the idea 
being that the work documents itself, that the production is revealed, laid bare. Peter Gidal 
takes issue with this approach in relation to materialist film: 'the point here is that not every 
procedure should be “there” on film, exposed or explained, as that is merely another level 
of documentation, “seeing what is 'really' taking place”' (Gidal 1989). This kind of'pseudo­
documentary' is ultimately more illusionist than a work of straightforward representation, 
because its representational nature is obscured by an apparent exposition of its 
representational nature. In attempting adequate documentation, it is ironically more 
effectively illusionistic than the normative use of basic illusionistic techniques.
The work-as-documentation line of thought was followed in materialist film, and 
apparently in the work of Ikeda, by the realization that the work does not need to be a 
faithful representation of reality (in this case the reality of its own production), because the 
process of representation is itself already real, and can be made the focus of attention. So 
the proto-materialism of This Is A Recording is refined in +/- where ideas to do with 
transparency (the work documenting its own creation) are replaced with a more subtle 
fidelity to the technology, allowing traces of process to be foregrounded. Where such 
processes concern digital technology, we have a convenient definition of a materialist 
'digital aesthetic'.
This idea of a digital aesthetic is in fact central to the rhetoric surrounding such 
releases as +/-. Ikeda is often described in biographies and press releases as a pioneer (see 
(Forma 2011), or (Ikeda 2011)), with +/- cited as the starting point of his pioneering 
activities. Since then, he has continued to maintain an impression of being on the cutting 
edge of digital technology, pushing it to its limits. The 'Dataplex' CD (Raster-Noton R-
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N068, 2005) has a sticker on the front stating: 'This CD contains specific waveform data 
that performs a data-read test for optical drives. The last track will cause some CD players 
to experience playback errors'. And similarly on 'Test Pattern' (Raster-Noton R-N093, 
2008): 'Caution! This CD contains specific waveform, impulse and burst data that perform 
a response test for loudspeakers and headphones. High volume listening of the last track 
may cause damage to equipment and eardrums'. The hyperbolic nature of these statements 
beg the question: to what extent is the adoption of this digital experimentation merely 
rhetorical, designed to sell records? We will see below that there are indeed aspects of +/- 
that undermine my previous claim that it might represent a materialist approach.
Figure 1: Headphonics 0/0 detail (+/-. Ryoji Ikeda)
A typical example of the mechanical rigidity of the sequencing in +/- is shown in figure 1. 
The piece proceeds with a 4/4 structure around which various elements are placed as if 
with perfect quantization: a 1kHz sine wave alternately in the left and right channels on 
each 1/32 measure, a 50Hz pulse lasting exactly a 1/4 measure on each down beat, and a 
13kHz tone and clicks on 1/8 measures. In the precision of the realization of these rhythms, 
the implication is that this is a technological music; quantization is something only a 
machine can do with this accuracy. In listening the sound immediately brings to mind high- 
tech machinery, in its inhuman precise repetition. Could we consider this a machine 
aesthetic?
Machine Aesthetics
In retrospective writing surrounding the modernist machine aesthetic (Banham 1980), the
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starting point tends to be Louis Sullivan's phrase 'form follows function', implying not so 
much that form is subservient to function, but that consideration of function results in the 
best formal properties. Beauty derives from efficiently functional forms. Taking nature as 
the archetype for beauty he uses various analogies to make his point—'the sweeping eagle 
in his flight or the open apple blossom, the toiling work horse, the blithe swan, the 
branching oak, the winding stream at its base, the drifting clouds, over all the coursing sun, 
form ever follows function, and this is the law'(Sullivan & Twombly 1988).
This principle had various consequences for modem architecture. The most notable 
aspect was a drive towards 'efficiency' of form. Ornamentation was seen as the antithesis of 
good design, anathema to technological modernity (see for example Adolf Loos' Ornament 
and crime (Loos 1998)). Hence we see, ultimately in the International style, large plain 
elementary shapes combined in a way to suggest a minimization of decorative features, 
emphasizing the basic form of their composition instead. This 'efficiency' is also to do with 
efficiency of production—functionalism extends to the consideration of form that is not 
only most functional in its use, but also most efficient to produce. Emphasis began to be 
put on the materials and techniques used in production.
In Auguste Choisy's History o f  architecture, we find a clear exposition of the 
mantra 'truth to materials' in architecture, and the approach that Reyner Banham describes 
as 'form as the logical consequence of technique' (Banham 1980). Choisy says, for example 
of iron in the Halles de Paris: 'we can see realized a whole body of forms that arise 
naturally from the material employed'. And on modular proportions he states 'we have 
observed that they result, as an inevitable consequence, from the use of brick' (Banham 
1980). Even in gothic architecture, Choisy sees the style not primarily as an aesthetic 
development, but as a consequence of the development of buttresses, ridged vaults and 
their exposed rib-work, and so on. He was interested in the concept of the architect-as- 
engineer, an architect concerned with the material reality of construction. According to 
Banham, this was in contrast to the prevailing Beaux Arts concept: 'design first, structure 
afterwards'—the architect working in abstract forms that are to be realized later.
This 'truth to materials' approach is appealing and perhaps applicable in all art 
forms (it is relevant to all types of 'making'). We can also find it prior to Choisy in the 
writing of John Ruskin—his second 'lamp' of architecture (Ruskm 2009), where it is 
generally taken to be an inspiration for the arts and crafts movement. Later, the Russian 
constructivists used the word faktura to describe the idea that an art object should, in its 
own materiality, exhibit its means of production; there should be no attempt to hide the
properties of the materials that were used to make it (incidentally faktura has already been 
linked to electronic music, see (Battier 2003)). The Bauhaus also took the idea, and, like 
the constructivists divorced it from the associated distrust of industrialization and 
mechanical technology found in the English arts and crafts. But despite their interest in 
mass production and modern technology, the focus in the Bauhaus is still very much on 
craftsmanship; the artist as someone whose skill is based in the reality of making, 
understanding the material and working with it in a way that is suitable to its affordances 
and limitations. The point at which modern technology is combined with the idea of a 
fidelity to materials is where we begin to see the 'machine aesthetic' emerge.
There is a subtle mutation of the motivation, from a desire to create functional (and 
therefore beautiful) forms based on an understanding of the material employed, to a desire 
to make a statement about functional form. The important thing is that objects look as 
though they are prioritizing function. This is perhaps politically motivated. In the 
Deutscher Werkbund, and later in the Bauhaus, we begin to see the idea of aesthetic 
standardization as a virtue (Banham 1980). Forms that were efficient in a way that made 
them suitable for mass production (in architecture, but also particularly in furniture design) 
were seen as democratizing aesthetics, making aesthetic objects available to everyone 
where previously they were the domain of an elite.
Regardless o f its motivation, the elevation of efficiency of 'function', which finds its 
apotheosis in engineering, means that what begins in the arguments of Ruskin and then 
Sullivan as a romanticization of nature easily becomes a romanticization of technology. We 
start to see this in Choisy's theory, and then realized in the Bauhaus. There is a fascination 
with the look of technological, machine produced forms; it becomes an aesthetic 
consideration. So although it appears that form is following function, the impetus for a 
technological aesthetic often actually results in a form less functional. For instance, 
Rietveld's chairs are an economy of form, straight lines without decoration, simple 
materials etc. The form appears to be entirely functional, and yet it is somehow (arguably) 
less comfortable to sit on than it should be— its primary function. The machine aesthetic 
involves a much more complex relationship between function and form, in which 
technological style is preferred over technological functionality.
Rather than bringing technology and aesthetics together then, the machine aesthetic 
separates them, with a technological look or feel abstracted away from any actual 
instrumentality or function. Technology is understood in a rationalist way as a means to an 
end, but since the focus now is on the technology, the 'means' is abstracted from its 'end'
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and therefore becomes an end in itself, becoming once again non-instrumental, bringing 
the non-rational back into the equation. We have the paradox of a non-instrumental 
instrumentality. This is what R. L. Rutsky calls the myth of functional form (Rutsky 1999), 
it is a paradox. The apparent inescapability of this situation became clear in the split 
between productivism and constructivism in the 1920s. The productivists found the only 
solution to it was a retreat from art, to work instead in design, textiles, ceramics, furniture, 
propaganda etc. The constructivists, however, worked with the paradox in what rightly can 
be called a machine aesthetic, embracing the myth of functional form.
High Tech
Rutsky traces the development of the machine aesthetic into the more extreme 'high tech' 
aesthetic with the advent of electronic and especially digital technology. In the high tech 
aesthetic, technology is fetishized to such a degree that the reproduction of its style 
becomes entirely the point, function is almost an aside. As the physical appearance of 
technology tends towards the invisible, we're left only with images, data. But, as we began 
to see in the machine aesthetic, the interest remains rooted in signifiers o f  the technology, 
not the technology itself. We could say that Ikeda's work actually epitomizes this high tech 
aesthetic rather than the materialist aesthetic it first appeared to, through a combination of 
the precisely ordered nature of the sequencing and the sound materials chosen. It has a 
glossy veneer and a feeling of science fiction—this is, in reality, not necessarily what 
digital technology sounds like (unaltered, uninterpreted), but it's what we expect digital 
technology, or more specifically, 'data', to sound like. It is simulacral, a representation of 
digital technology. Digital glitches can be intentionally added (for example at the 
beginning of the track +.) to achieve this signification of new-ness, in the same way that a 
film director might intentionally add a certain kind of grainyness to the image to signify 
old-ness.
Thierry Chaput describes the 'aesthetic of the microchip' as an aesthetic of 
complexity. Its underlying logic has become too complex for any one person to understand 
in its entirety, giving it a 'secret aesthetic' of its own (Chaput 1988). We are left in awe of 
this complexity, and can only engage with it at a higher level of abstraction. This is a 
hallmark o f the high tech style—a sleek minimalist exterior which acts as a signifier for a 
hugely complex interior. +/- is minimal on certain levels, but in signifying the flow of data 
it evokes a sense of overwhelming complexity, a technological sublime. What does the data 
represent? The implication in its presentation is that it doesn't matter: freed from its
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instrumental bonds it becomes the object of pure aesthetics instead. But of course the data 
is in fact composed only for the record itself. So it attempts to evoke something like 'the 
secret aesthetic' of the microchip, while in fact being a work of straight-forward 
composition. It uses one set of technologies (sequencer or sampler or audio editor etc.) to 
make something that attempts to evoke a different set of, possibly science fictional, 
technologies (networks and flowing data etc., as if they had a sound).
This relates to another 20,h century precedent: the futurist fascination and 
fetishization of technology. Russolo's Art o f  Noises, as with most futurist work appears to 
be inspired by a fascination with the modern city: 'we find far more enjoyment in the 
combination of the noises of trams, backfiring motors, carriages and bawling crowds than 
in rehearsing, for example, the Eroica or the Pastoral'. He states that 'although it is 
characteristic of noise to recall us brutally to real life, the art of noise must not limit itself 
to imitative reproduction' (Russolo 1987). Yet despite this, the programme for Russolo and 
Marinetti's first concert consisted of pieces titled: Awakening o f  Capital, Meeting o f  cars 
and aeroplanes, Dining on the terrace o f  the Casino and Skirmish in the oasis. All clearly 
pointed towards a narrative depiction involving signifiers of modernity. The '¡ntonarumori' 
are used to mimic the sounds of the city, the sounds of war and so on. In this obsession 
with the modem world developing around them, there is a utopianism and faith in 
technological progress. Yet rather than actually participating in this technological progress 
and making use of modern technology for its own sake in music, they used it merely in a 
representational aesthetic, to depict the idea of technological progress.
Following on from a traditional aesthetics concerned with wholeness and unity, the 
first machine aesthetic was, according to Rutsky, an attempt to aestheticize society as a 
whole, using the 'aura' of art. As already mentioned, politically, an industrial or mass 
produced style was associated with democratization. The idea was to change society not 
through the content of art, but by changing the way it functions. In the Bauhaus it was 
thought that returning to an emphasis on craftsmanship would remove the boundaries 
between high and low art, which embody a class division. But as discussed, as soon as this 
becomes a machine aesthetic, content once again becomes the focus— it is less important if 
an artifact does or does not achieve a particular function, and more important that it looks 
as though it does.
In a high tech aesthetic, Rutsky states that we see a return to an even more obvious 
emphasis on content. +/- is more a work about technology, than it is a work o f  technology. 
This statement requires some justification, since clearly +/- in every aspect of its
43
production could not have been created without digital technologies (including CD 
pressing and so on). However, its content is compositional, gestural, and 'science-fictional' 
to such a degree that it functions on a representational rather than material level. In the 
process the modernist politics of a machine aesthetic are turned upside down—replaced by 
a technological style which is associated with expensive gadgets and exclusivity instead.
The influence of technology in aesthetics is an opportunity to yield to the 
fragmentation and contingency of the material world, but there remains a temptation to 
maintain an idealist aesthetic, particularly in music. As Ikeda himself concedes: 'the form, 
style and way of representation will be endlessly transformed by technological trends ... 
but I am more interested in thinking about what will not change—I naively believe that the 
essentials of music will never change'. This thing that never changes, universal and 
immutable behind the material of the music itself, is for Ikeda 'the deepest aesthetics 
between math and art' (Eubank 2008). Rhetoric steeped in idealism tends to conceal or 
distract from the material and symbolic relations the work is actually engaged in, in this 
case what Rutsky refers to as the fetishization of late capitalist technologies.
Commodity fetishism, in Marx's terms, involves the reification of the values an 
object represents. Values, instead of being seen as something that people have in relation to 
an object, are seen as inherent in the object. This means use-value is detached from 
exchange-value. In the case of high tech we can see this very clearly. In high tech design, 
something auxiliary—the style of technological (functional) items— is the object of 
fascination. Style is abstracted. Certain values are associated with objects that have this 
style: they are exclusive status symbols, the domain of an elite, a privileged few on the 
'cutting edge'. Rutsky sees this as the avant-garde replaced by a corporate vanguardism, 
comparing the idea of a 'cutting edge' or 'state of the art' with imperial 'pioneering' or 
'trailblazing', A utopian view of technology tends to conceal these circumstances (cf. 
Coyne's 'technoromanticism' (Coyne 2001)).
Through a kind of mathematical idealism in particular, a utopian view of 
technology is constructed. As Rutsky puts it: 'the mathematical and formal aspects of 
science and technology are seen as reflecting an eternal perfection and harmony'. 
Technology in its ability to allow the precise ordering of materials is approached as an 
enabling medium; enabling the expression of pure form. The technology mediates between 
the sensible world and an ideal world, allowing some kind of transcendence. This spiritual 
aspect is something we also see in the modern architecture discussed previously. 
Apparently at odds with the implications of a machine aesthetic, Hermann Muthesius
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(founder of the Werkbund) claimed that 'far higher than the material is the spiritual; far 
higher than function, material and technique, stands Form' (quoted in Banham 1980).
So there are various potentially contradictory rhetorics at play, throughout thought 
on machine aesthetics. The adoption of a machine aesthetic or a high tech aesthetic exhibits 
a fascination with technology, initially implying a materialist approach, in which the 
materials and processes of production are the focus. However this is undermined first by 
the realization that it is not so much a fascination with technology but a fascination with 
the aesthetics of technology, and second by a confusion in which it is claimed 
technological advances are being used to get closer to pure abstract expression ('what will 
not change' in music, or 'the spiritual' that is far higher than 'the material'). Perhaps this 
means the adoption of signifies of technology is accidental, the intention is in fact to 
transcend material limitations (to use technology to transcend technology!) When 
technology is seen as an enabling medium in this way, the ideal technology, the technology 
we are striving for is in a manner of speaking invisible, in that it should have no effect on 
the idea being communicated through abstract form.
If we look at +/- in light of Ikeda's comments on the universality of music/math/art, 
there seems to be an obsession with purity and unity; also particularly conspicuous in his 
recent work reminiscent of Speer's Cathedral of Light ('Spectra' at 'Nuit Blanche' in Paris, 
2008). This feeling of purity is perhaps 'the deepest aesthetics between math and art', 
approached via a certain type of minimalism. A very limited set of sounds and 
compositional strategies are taken, to create an incredibly unified work.
The rigorously ordered minimalism in +/- could be seen as the result of 
approaching composition in a rationalist way. Ikeda reduces sound to the smallest possible 
elements, followed by a strict ordering. If the basic tenet of the machine aesthetic was to 
approach art as an engineer, in Ikeda's high tech aesthetic, audio composition is approached 
as something like a programmer (this re-emphasizes its simuiacral status— it is constituted 
by a representation of technology, signifying function. It has nothing much to do with 
software engineering per se). This kind of reification of rationalism in high tech can be 
thought of as, in Rutsky's words, 'an extension of modernity's tendency to technologize or 
instrumentalize the world, to abstract and reduce it into ever more minimal, more 
controllable forms' (Rutsky 1999). Minimalism in this sense is a strategy to assert control 
and bring order from the arbitrary and chaotic material world, or in this case from the 
complex world of data which is otherwise beyond understanding.
The structure of the album shows a definite and rigorous imposition of order onto
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sound materials exemplifying an additive approach, with the step by step addition and 
layering of new parts. This is what is generally understood by the term composition 
(dictionary definition: 'the act of combining parts to make a whole'; i.e. the arrangement of 
different elements in relation to each other)—a human imposition of form onto materials. 
'My job as an artist is to compose elements. Composition is the key. So any elements, 
which are brushed up carefully, are the subjects to be composed. I compose sounds. I 
compose visuals. I compose materials.' (Eubank 2008)
Perhaps due to this emphasis on composition, despite its technological feel and 
mathematical rhetoric, +/- actually depends heavily on compositional cliches, largely from 
pop/rock/blues or house/techno structures: a multiple of 4 counts of a repetitive phrase, 
after which a bass part is introduced followed by various rhythmic elements, forming a 
kind of counterpoint to the initial phrase and so on. Not only the macro arrangement of 
these sounds, but also the gestural nature of the phrasing attests to their composedness— 
like the bursts of white noise mimicking hi hat patterns in headphonics 0/1, or the kick 
drum patterns in +.. To summarize so far,
1. on the surface'+/-' appears to be a work exploring digital technology, or is at least 
the result of a fetishism and fascination with signifiers of that technology and 
specifically its'soulless'nature. But,
2. the idealism of the mathematical rhetoric supporting the work begins to undermine 
this, pointing instead to an understanding of technology as merely enabling the 
communication of an ideal, eternal, universal aesthetic wholeness or unity. And 
moreover,
3. the composed and often gestural nature of the work reasserts a kind of patriarchal, 
rationalist control and domination of technology, of human will over the 
contingency of the object world.
Engagement with the technology is paradoxically avoided, despite its evocation of 
technological style. It is in fact used merely as a tool, to do something that is seen as non- 
technological—to access the universal essentials of music. With the approach to panning 
(or lack of panning) mentioned at the start of this chapter, it seems fair to say that this is 
very much a foregrounding of an actual arbitrary material aspect of the work, but with 
respect to the sound materials and structure of the album, it is more accurate to say that it 
employs depiction or representation: a depiction or representation of digital technology.
Although nothing much to do with the actual material of digital technology, it is a 
caricature of what we expect something digital to sound like. It is hard to say where such 
expectations come from, but there is certainly a relationship to science fiction (compare the 
style of The Matrix (2009) to Ikeda's recent work in the Datamatics series (2006-2011)). 
Hence the claim that it actually functions on a symbolic level, rather than the material level 
suggested initially.
Buckminster Fuller attacked the international style on the grounds that the plain 
facade often hides brickwork or other materials. So in attempting to remove ornate facades, 
the resulting 'quasi-simplicity' is still decoration, merely a different kind of decoration. The 
technological or functional style remains a facade, rather than a stripping of ornamentation 
it becomes itself ornamental; nothing has really changed. He also complained of the 
illusionism of'hidden steel frames' supporting motif walls. In general, he claimed there 
was a lack of engagement with technological progress in what we might call a machine 
aesthetic:
The Bauhaus and International used standard plumbing fixtures and 
only ventured so far as to persuade the manufacturers to modify the 
surface of the valve handles and spigots, and the colour, size, and 
arrangements of the tiles. The International Bauhaus never went 
back of the wall-surface to look at the plumbing ... they never 
enquired into the overall problem of sanitary fittings themselves. . .
In short they only looked at problems of modifications of the 
surface of end-products, which end-products were inherently sub­
functions o f a technically obsolete world. (Banham 1980)
'+ /-'uses the existing techniques and language of music but adopts a facade based on 
signifiers of digital technology. This will be contrasted in the next section with an approach 
in music that does 'go behind the wall-surface to look at the plumbing' and engages in 
technological enquiry that does not take the fundamentals of musical production as a given.
Rutsky contends that the modernist attempt to technologize aesthetics amounted to 
a disavowal of the 'spirit' or 'soul' of traditional aesthetics— Benjamin's concept of the 'aura' 
of art (Benjamin 1968). Something inherently 'living' in art succumbs to the dead, 
inorganic and inhuman realm of technology. Modernism can be seen on the one hand as 
this drive to remove the aura of art using technology, the 'technologization of aesthetics' 
(Benjamin 2008), or alternatively as an attempt to bring the aura of art and aesthetics to 
technology, the 'aestheticization of technology'. My claim is that the +/- high tech aesthetic
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embodies this worldview that, in attempting to bring technology and aesthetics together 
somehow, ensures their separation by defining each negatively in terms of the other: the 
aesthetic realm, it is implied, is not reducible to the material or mechanical, and likewise 
technology and science has no place for the spiritual or non-material; in this view the two 
arbitrary, constructed categories must instead be forced together.
In seeing technology as something 'other', this represents a pervasive awe/fear of 
technology. A machine brought to life through the spirit of art or through its own 
reproductive logic, i.e. something material that has moved beyond human control and 
domination, is inevitably seen as a dystopian monstrosity. In a discussion on algorithmic 
composition, Nierhaus quotes Garry Kasparov regarding his match against the IBM 
computer Deep Blue: 'to some extent, this match is a defense of the whole human race. 
Computers play such a huge role in society. They are everywhere. But there is a frontier 
that they must not cross. They must not cross into the area of human creativity. It would 
threaten the existence of human control in such areas as art, literature and music' (Nierhaus 
2008). There is a clear threat to the subject posed by an uncanny technological other. It can 
only be suppressed through its instrumental use as merely the means to an end, rather than 
existing as an end in itself.
For Rutsky, 'high techne' contains the possibility of a fundamental ontological shift, 
it moves beyond the utopian/dystopian positioning of technology and begins to replace the 
hardened Cartesian subject with a more fluid dissolving the boundaries of the self (in 
accord with Harroway's cyborg manifesto (Harroway 2000)). But in doing so he dismisses 
the simulacral nature of the aesthetic and its elitist ideological underpinning. As we can see 
in '+/-', it actually represents the continuation of some very traditional beliefs about our 
relationship to technology and its utopian/dystopian nature. Namely, its elevation to a 
romanticized exotic other (the 'technological sublime'), swiftly followed by its 
subordination to a rationalist technique of control.
Seven Tons For Free
Structurally, Seven Tons For Free alternates between two types of track. /, //and  III 
are interspersed with —, Boiler, Fehler (translating as 'Error') and Seven Tons 
Revised. Most of the transitions between tracks are sudden, timplying that they are 
arbitrarily selected fragments of a continuous output. Particularly in the untitled 
pieces, there is barely any development throughout each track, and certainly no 
narrative trajectory leading to tension or climax. The opening track T simply repeats
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a pattern of roughly one second 57 times, with a quick fade from and to silence at the 
beginning and end. As with all the untitled tracks its sound materials consist of high 
frequency clicks, very high frequency drones (inharmonic, akin to aliasing), and 
lower frequency pops.
The pattern repeated in II is more complex, and varies slightly with each 
repetition, in a manner that gives the sense of a generative process rather than 
manually composed development. The pops this time coincide with a change in the 
'aliasing' sound, it disappears momentarily (like a compressor sidechain 'ducking' 
effect) then finds a new resonance before returning to its original frequency.
Likewise the clicks are affected by increased activity in the other 'parts'. The sounds 
appear to be tightly integrated into a system, it is problematic to consider them 
separate elements merely composed by addition.
Literalism
Donald Judd wrote about composition in artwork, being interested in pieces that do not 
attempt to create meaning within the work, but are simply to do with the presence of the 
work. He claimed that any work that is made by addition, 'composed', was concerned with 
this kind of prescribed meaning. The relationships between parts is where 'meaning' is 
created, in the sense of what he calls anthropomorphism: 'A beam thrusts; a piece of iron 
follows a gesture; together they form a naturalistic and anthropomorphic image' (Fried 
2002). This description is resonant with the situation in some music theory; in electro­
acoustic music for example, the concept of gesture is commonly referred to. As mentioned 
in the introduction, part of the motivation my research comes from the feeling that this is 
an entirely inappropriate way to understand or talk about computer music like Seven Tom 
For Free, a different way of thinking about music is required.
In opposition to the creation of an 'anthropomorphic image', Judd focussed on the 
literal aspect of painting and sculpture, pointing out for example that the rectangle of a 
painting is a shape itself. In various previous and contemporary painting he saw the 
beginning of an emphasis of this shape. In the work of Pollock, Rothko, Still, Newman, 
Reinhardt and Noland, he says 'the elements inside the rectangle are broad and simple and 
correspond closely to the rectangle' (Judd 2002). The plane of the shape is also emphasized 
with such broad elements: 'two colors on the same surface almost always lie on different 
depths'. This is working towards an art that is literal, one that does not attempt to depict 
something other than itself.
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Avoiding composition focusses the work on the presence of the object itself and its 
context, its effect on the people encountering it. Judd states that 'the big problem is that 
anything that is not absolutely plain begins to have parts in some way' (Fried 2002). So it is 
precisely because of this desire to avoid composition that the work ends up being minimal; 
not a stripping down to reveal some kind of essence or purity. The point is not minimalism 
as such, but minimalism is required for these other criteria which are to do with literalism, 
hence the aversion of most of these artists (Judd, Morris, Stella) to the term minimalist.
It was in Michael Fried's essay Art and Objecthood in 1967 that this kind of art was 
first described as 'literalisf, as a criticism and response to Judd's and Robert Morris' writing 
on their own work (Fried 2002). The theory he formulated in order to do this provides a 
clear and comprehensive description of an anti-representational approach to art in general. 
Literalism is actually a much more appropriate term than minimalism to describe what 
these artists were doing; the term 'specific objects' (coined by Judd in 1965) suggests 
essentially the same idea. Fried describes a split between the 'literal' and the 'depicted', or 
literal shape and depicted shape, where the literal is the shape of what he calls the support, 
the canvas a painting is painted on and the paint itself, and the depicted is whatever it's a 
picture of. But they cannot be separated this neatly because of course the depicted always 
relies on or is always constituted by the literal, the depiction wouldn't exist otherwise. And 
in this way the literal has primacy. Depiction relies on some kind of illusionism— 
portraying depth that does not exist in the flatness of the support lor instance. The depicted 
is therefore crucially not real, not material, it's an illusion of something beyond or within 
the literal.
To clarify, this is not the same thing as the difference between abstract and non­
abstract approaches to art, because an abstract painting can still be considered a depiction, 
it just happens to be a depiction of something abstract. It can still have a sense of depth for 
example, so illusionism remains involved. If a painting is 'expressionist' then it most 
certainly is a depiction: of an abstract form which is thought to somehow express an idea 
or a feeling. And vice versa, a realist or some other kind of non-abstract painting still has 
literal elements to it, like the way it is framed, or the relief of the paint. 'Depiction as a 
mode seems primitive because it involves implicitly asserting forms as being prior to 
substances' (Morris 2002).
Artists described as 'literalist' were striving towards an ideal where nothing is 
depicted at all, focussing on the physical, material thing itself. Judd's plain cuboids are 
presented on a wall like paintings, but take the leap into three dimensions so that any
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perceived depth is actual depth, not an illusion of depth. Stella's various aluminium and 
copper stripe pieces put the properties of the material on show as central to the work. 
Morris' steel sculptures are closer to (functionless) architecture than representational 
sculpture. These pieces may still have symbolic associations but they are emphasizing the 
literal over the depicted, and asserting its primacy, by not accepting depiction as the 
underlying impetus to make art.
Judd's main concern was the idea of credibility; acknowledging literal reality rather 
than treating art as an escape or idealization, which is how the 'high modernists' at the time 
saw it—such as Fried and his precursor Clement Greenberg (Fried 2002). They resisted 
this movement away from abstract expressionism towards what Greenberg called 'non-art', 
in a way that highlights the fundamental philosophical split between materialism and 
idealism. Their position was that (true, modernist) art must suspend it's 'objecthood', such 
that the object itself is not perceived, and instead provides a transcendent experience-—the 
literal becomes invisible and only the depicted is experienced. The 'condition of non-art' 
then, is one in which the literal object is perceived and fully present—the condition of any 
object other than 'art'. Emphasizing either the literal or the depicted are two fundamentally 
different ways of approaching aesthetics. Literalism can be characterized as a materialist 
approach, and depiction as being concerned with transcending the material world to a 
realm of ideai.
Judd's criticism of the idealism of depiction leads to a solution based on plainness 
and lack of component parts. But this is not without its problems: 'it is not hard to see a 
wider idealism governing much of this process of reduction' (Harrison & Wood 2002). He 
was trying to create a unity and wholeness in his specific objects. However, 'in the hands of 
Morris and others ... a materialism focused on the processing of mute stu IT... turned 
towards making: a concern with processes of manipulation of materials, rather than their 
constitution into some object'. A focus on process turned out to be a more effective 
technique for the foregrounding of materiality than contriving the unity of an object.
There is understandably a deeply entrenched idea of music as a composed structure, 
structure as the composition and ordering of different elements in time, which can be 
contrasted to the approach in Seven Tons For Free where structure appears to be a duration 
in which a mostly automated process is allowed to take its course. As with literalist art, the 
important aspect of this is not the achievement of some kind of unity (or purity or essence), 
but simply managing to avoid a compositional approach, and the repetition of existing 
accepted signifies. Music that is a result o f this approach, almost by definition, relies on
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familiarity and cliché.
Music that does not rely on ordering events in time is, with unfortunate recourse to 
metaphor based on the layout of a score or arrangement in a sequencer, sometimes referred 
to as 'vertical' composition (Kramer 1988). However, the implication here is clearly that the 
piece is still composed, an arrangement of various elements, but in a vertical domain 
(frequency, timbre) rather than in time. Composition of both the horizontal and vertical 
kind, can be avoided in computer music by focusing on a process, making its experience 
closer to Kramer's 'moment time'. Algorithmic or repetitive music is a way of avoiding 
human-centric imposition of form (the 'human condition' and its expression as natural, 
universal); analogous to the materialist film concept of a 'machined-stare' replacing the 
usual cinematic gaze, for example placing the camera not at the conventional human 
height.
Importantly this is noi the same as attempts to remove the composer or the self 
from the work, or to remove human decision making or agency. The composer (for want of 
a better word) still makes all decisions regarding choices of process and sound materials, 
what the end result will sound like, censorship of undesirable output and so on. The 
emphasis on process rather than composition just shifts the work away from ideas to do 
with the expression or communication of pre-conceived ideas or feelings thought to be 
absolute, to a more open, specific, and material appreciation based in reality of the sound 
reproduction instead. It creates an arbitrary technological separation such that the decision 
making involved is one step removed from the result, potentially taking the music in a 
direction (away from the human-centric) which would have remained undiscovered if a 
more direct channeling of the composer's will was possible.
Note that algorithmic techniques are not the only way to achieve this. An un-edited 
sound recording for instance works in the same way, with the recordist fully in control of 
where and what to record, but making the decision to avoid composition (to re-iterate: the 
arranging of different parts within the piece) by presenting the recording as a single entity. 
Of course, there are likely to be different parts to the single recording, but again, these are 
not composed, it is the multiple output of a single process—the process of a sound 
recording, presented as such—presented as a sound recording, not a composition created 
from sound recordings. See for example Russell Haswell's Wild Tracks (Mego 099,2009),
Joanna Demers relates field recordings to literalism, claiming that the work of 
recordists such as Toshiya Tsunoda and Francisco López is closer to the category of sound 
art than it is to music (Demers 2009). Commentators on sound-art such as Alan Licht and
Brandon LaBelle are concerned with defining sound art as a category, and in particular 
determining what separates it from music (Licht 2007), (LaBelle 2006), Their conclusions 
are generally that sound art is site specific in some sense and is therefore immersive, 
whereas music is narrative, the work is self-contained, and therefore not site specific.
Music can be thought of in precisely this way, as an abstract narrative structure 
(narrative in a very broad sense of the word); and sound-art could be considered its 
antithesis, in that it does away with the communicative aspect of sound as a means of 
presenting temporal structures. If we were to use these definitions, then the central point of 
this thesis would be that the music of Mego is not in fact music at all, and it quite 
specifically represents an attempt to retreat from the concept of music. But I do not 
consider this a useful distinction; works that do not fit this definition of music are still in 
most cases considered music, There are plenty of other precedents for non-narrative 
musics, for instance Simon Reynolds describes the difference between rock and rave: 'rave 
music represents a fundamental break with rock, or at least the dominant English Lit and 
socialist realist paradigms of rock criticism, which focuses on songs and storytelling.
Where rock relates an experience (autobiographical or imaginary), rave constructs an 
experience' (Reynolds 1999).
It is in the absence of narrative elements that works are left more open—creating an 
experience rather than relating an experience. In the absence of content, context is more 
important, the material reality in which the work is situated. Site-specificity in its broadest 
sense can refer to this totally contextual and specific aspect of a work, opposed to the idea 
of a work as universal, contained for example in a recording or in a score. Demers draws 
on this to argue that certain types o f field recording works, even when presented as a CD 
release, are site-specific. It is a type of work 'whereby materials refuse to be encased within 
a frame and instead confront the observer as integral objects'(Demers 2009).
This happens when sounds manage to become 'autonomous objects free of residual 
associations'. Although the sound in a field recording clearly has a direct physical cause, 
the idea in some cases is for the listener to hear the sound as pure sound, divorced from its 
source. Demers' evidence that this is in fact what artists such as Tsunoda and López are 
striving for is convincing. Tsunoda:
I do not intend to recreate the atmosphere of a location; and I am 
not interested in recording special situations of historical incidents 
... I do not record for the sake of making music or simply 
discovering interesting acoustics. I am also not interested in
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analysing these sounds scientifically. (Demers 2009)
And López:
There can only be a documentary or communicative reason to keep 
the cause-object relationship in the work with soundscapes, never 
an artistic/musical one. Actually, I am convinced that the more this 
relationship is kept, the less musical the work will be (which is 
rooted in my belief that the idea of absolute music and that of objet 
sonore are among the most relevant and revolutionary in the history 
of music). (Demers 2009)
Following López' comments, the temptation at this point is to equate literalism in music 
with absolute music, completely free from symbolic association: 'an ideal of'pure' music 
independent of words, drama or representational meaning ... objective structure without 
expressive content' (Grove & Sadie 1988); or the Schaefferian ideal of reduced listening, in 
which sound is perceived as entirely abstract (abstracted from its source) (Schaeffer 1966). 
Demers in fact argues for an affinity between literalism and reduced listening. However 
quite the opposite is true— in Iiteralist art (and in music such as Seven Tons For Free) the 
point, as Fried rightly claims, is precisely that the perceiver is not subjected to 
transcendence into abstraction. Demers herself points out that 'minimalist works ... 
assailed the boundaries separating the art work from the world around it', contradicted later 
by her statement that 'objecthood [calls] on the observer to accept materials uncritically, to 
reflect only on their role within the art work rather than the world at large' (Demers 2009). 
This latter statement is applicable to reduced listening, and is a familiar criticism of it, but 
it does not extend to the concept o f literalism.
Schaeffer's idea of acousmatic listening could be said to be the result of a 
fascination with radio and recording technology, when such technology was new and held 
some mystery. The idea is that radio or tape acts like the Pythagorean curtain, hiding the 
source o f the sound. But it ultimately disregards the fact that the playback equipment is 
itself now the source of the sound. In general, when someone listens to a radio or tape they 
are quite aware that the radio or tape machine is the sound producing entity.
Schaeffer was influenced by Husserl in describing objets sonares as the result of 
object-directed intentionality, hence he can claim contrary to the above that 'the sonorous 
object is not the magnetic tape' (Schaeffer 1966). He claims that this approximates a 
'phenomenological reduction' in that it allows the phenomena of objects determined 
subjectively to be separated from their noumenal source. However this is surely a
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misconception of phenomenology; the idea of phenomenological reduction is the 
bracketing out of noumenal concerns in philosophy. It does not imply that we can bracket 
out certain phenomena such as memory, to leave a purely experiential mode of listening 
(hearing a sound without associating it with its known, or imagined, source). Memory, and 
therefore cultural associations and so on, are inextricable parts of phenomenological 
experience. 'Reduced listening perpetuates the fallacy that there is one universal listening 
experience untouched by culture' (Demers 2009). It implies that there is a base mode of 
listening that we can reduce down to.
Confirming these theoretical points, the experience of listening to Seven Tons For 
Free is indeed quite different to the 'pure listening' that Schaeffer describes. Following his 
statement that 'we seek to devote ourselves entirely and exclusively to listening, to discover 
the instinctive paths that lead from the purely “sonorous” to the purely “musicar', musique 
concrète indeed took this direction, utilizing forms amenable to object determination and 
therefore traditional composition—events can be ordered in time, phrased, they can 
approximate gestures. The enjoyment of such music supposedly lies in the appreciation of 
abstract formal patterns. But the material in Seven Tons For Free is not generally arranged 
such that it can be heard this way. Rather, I claim, it utilizes a kind of boredom or anxiety 
that makes the listener very aware o f the materiality o f  the sound, of its existence as a 
recording.
Fried's contention was that literalism fails because it shifts the experience external 
to the work, and doesn't provide the transcendent experience he considered necessary for 
art. According to his theory, art should suspend its objecthood—the perception of the 
object itself rather than the thing it is depicting. Literalism of course does precisely the 
opposite and projects its objecthood. A lot of music is like the former in its suspension of 
objecthood or materiality, based on the idea that the essence of music is some kind of 
meaning or expression behind the music, or contained within it. The experimental 
computer music that is the subject of this thesis has more in common with literalist art as 
Fried describes itT because it does not attempt to suspend its materiality. Music often 
described as 'glitch' or 'post-digital' is better explained as an extension of this literalism.
The sounds and structures the technology suggests are put at the front of the work, rather 
than using the technology to try to express something immaterial.
Seven Tons For Free again
The final untitled track III has a sparser, much slower pattern. The intricacies of the
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relationships between various elements of the system are more distinct. A click 
coincides with distortion in the aliasing sound, and there follows some activity in the 
lower frequencies corresponding to a drop in activity in a repeating high frequency 
metronome, and a drone in the left channel distorting and almost disappearing 
altogether before the next lower frequency pop. As in +/-, there is no conventional 
panning here, but neither are the left and right channel treated as separate. They are 
clearly related, each receiving output from different parts of the same process, 
responding to the problem posed by stereo in an unconventional way.
Returning to the opening track /. figure 2 shows one iteration of the repeating 
pattern. When compared to the track from +/- in figure I, it becomes apparent there are 
rhythmic structures more resistant to reductive analysis. A metronomic high frequency 
pulse repeats 15 times before the pattern begins again. A similar pulse repeats at a slower 
rate, out of phase (labelled 'a'). The lower frequency pops (labelled 'b') occur twice in time 
with the main pulses, and once out of time. At the points marked '/' the audio is 
discontinuous and timings of certain elements are presumably interrupted. There is no 
common measure between these events.
It is hard to find a human rationale behind the organization of the material, based on 
gesture, compositional norms etc. +/- on the contrary has exactly this rationale. Rehberg's 
work manages to make a break from it. partly through a willful disregard for traditional 
musical theory. For example the music is not restricted to certain notes: 'I don't even know
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what the notes are' [4]. Instead of the traditional rationale, Seven Tons For Free displays an 
approach to computer music in which there is an openness to the rationale of the 
technology.
Coming before the proliferation of laptops capable of DSP, these tracks were made 
using sounds from a test tone CD, loaded onto an Akai S I000 sampler (allowing looping, 
truncating, sample merging, pitch shifting, filtering, envelopes and so on). Despite clearly 
not fitting into what is usually meant by the term algorithmic composition—the selection 
of various algorithms, and the mapping from their output to sound parameters and so on—  
Seven Tons For Free does in fact appear to result from an approach in which the composer 
is once removed from decisions regarding the result, via systemic, aleatory processes. 
Although the composer is strictly speaking in control of such systems and processes, the 
imitation of existing music is not the goal. It instead builds upon and follows what is 
suggested by the technology at hand.
Conventional and familiar forms are thus avoided through unexpected results from 
processes suggesting new ways to organize material. The sampler is used in a way that 
results in a mangled, distorted cut-up of the source sounds. It is full of discontinuities, 
rapid splices that mark the character of digital sampled sound. The crudeness of the SI 000, 
far from being a hindrance, encourages this approach and the result holds more interest in 
its foregrounding of materiality.
The repetition shown above is unusual and seems arbitrary, initially difficult to 
listen to. It doesn't fit any time signature and loops at incongruous points. Although +/- ■. 
signifies the machine-like more obviously, the section here actually demonstrates a less 
contrived and more machine-like repetition than the section shown from +/- further above. 
It yields to the 'shocks' o f technology, the non-human and the non-universal contingency of 
matter. Ironically this is exactly what machine aesthetics in general (including high tech) 
fail to do, through the insistence of representing instead of merely presenting technology. 
+/- exemplifies this through its compositional approach, composing sounds to represent 
technology.
In Rutsky's estimation, the 'shocks of the modern city' that Benjamin identified are 
most directly transferred to art through montage or collage (Rutsky 1999, p.27). For 
instance of montage, Benjamin writes, 'the spectator's process of association in view of 
these images is indeed interrupted by their constant, sudden change. This constitutes the 
shock effect of the film, which, like all shocks, should be cushioned by heightened 
presence of mind' (Benjamin 2008). This is particularly exploited in materialist film, where
filmic techniques like the splice are intentionally used to create a 'heightened presence of 
mind', which can be thought of as the alternative to identification and illusion.
Seven Tons For Free certainly has a montage/collage structure: fragmented, pieced 
together arbitrary sections of repeating patterns, again, avoiding composition in the 
traditional sense. The artist sets semi-autonomous processes in motion and makes aesthetic 
judgements in selecting and presenting audio output, not controlling technology to make 
music that sounds like technology but allowing a participation in technological processes to 
become the primary mode of creation. This is an approach that avoids a model based on 
domination or control.
In this music there is no implication of functionality, no associated rhetoric to do 
with, for example, sonifying 'data'. It may be a machine aesthetic of sorts, but the 'myth of 
functional form' (Rutsky 1999) is not propagated in any way. Another result o f this 
approach is the removal of any veiled mysticism or romance in relation to technology. 
Technology is perhaps beyond human control but is essentially inert, neither distrusted or 
held in reverence. The utopian/dystopian binary positioning of technology begins to seem 
irrelevant in this context.
As discussed previously, there is a link between digital aesthetics and materialist 
ontology. The music goes some way to stepping outside of a representational aesthetic if it 
avoids representing concepts or universal form, by focussing instead on its own conditions 
of production. It presents itself as non-figurative, science-fictional notions of what digital 
technology sounds like are absent. It is precisely because Seven Tons For Free is not 
superficially such a 'digital' sound (signifier of digital-ness), that it is in fact more faithful 
to a digital aesthetic and side-steps the trappings of a 'high tech' aesthetic. Rather than 
adopting a machine aesthetic in the traditional sense, it is closer to the Industrial Records 
maxim 'industrial music for industrial people'—-a music of its time, both technically and 
culturally, that nonetheless manages to avoid simplistic reference to 'industrial' (or in the 
case o f Seven Tons For Free, 'digital') technologies and sounds. Rehberg in fact cites 
Industrial as a major influence in his work and for Mego in general [4].
This is a music which becomes very difficult to describe, since it has no visual 
analogue allowing source bonding (because it does not 'evoke' a factory, or 'evoke' 
dataflow etc.) The use of metaphors such as 'grains', 'dust' and so on, or resorting to a 
reification of'data', as if data itself makes a sound, is inadequate. The interpretation of data 
may result in sound, but this sound could have any one of infinite characteristics depending 
on the interpretation. The music ultimately depicts none of these things, it is merely the
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sound of sound making equipment, engaged in various processes. It is literal; forms are 
avoided which might allow narrative or symbolic meaning to be inferred through metaphor. 
The musical object is presented as a physical entity itself, not as carrier or medium for 
abstract content.
Techng
For Rutsky the high tech aesthetic represents a return to something closer to Heidegger's 
conception o f techne (hence his phrase 'high-techne'). But what does Heidegger mean by 
techne? He describes it in relation to poiesis—artistic production, which he defines as a 
revealing of 'being'; it is concerned with the 'truth' of being (Heidegger 1993). Techne is 
traditionally defined in opposition to poiesis, as a kind of making that is not artistic. 
Heidegger comes to a different conclusion, however, that techne is the knowledge required 
for poiesis\  He considers the 'essence' of technology, beginning with the idea that 
technology is functional or instrumental, i.e. a means to an end. He claims that although 
this is correct for instances of technology, searching deeper, instrumentality is more 
fundamentally to do with causation—changing the world, and therefore revealing some 
aspect of it that was previously concealed. It is, like poiesis, a revealing or 'bringing-forth' 
of being. This essence of technology, although a corollary of its instrumentality, is not itself 
instrumental. He therefore paradoxically proclaims a non-technological essence of 
technology. We should only superficially regard technology as a means to an end.
While the poietic aspect of techne, for Heidegger, 'unsecures' the world (being is
revealed through constant productive change), he goes on to claim that modern technology
based on science creates a type of revealing that actually 'enframes' the world and Fixes it
in place. It secures the world in instrumental terms. Rutsky's claim is that high tech
presents a return to an unsecuring non-instrumental techne, because it outgrows
instrumentality. Function becomes secondary and it is almost autonomous in the
reproduction of its own style (in his taxonomy of philosophies of technology, Borgman
refers to this type of position as 'substantive' (Borgmann 1987), it to some extent reifies
technology, treating it as an autonomous entity somehow separated from human activity).
But as we have seen, high tech is laden with latent meaning. As such it represents a
potentially dangerous process of enframing: it secures the world in terms of elitism (high 4
4 As will be discussed in later chapters, Dewey even more radically collapsed the ancient Greek divisions 
of types of knowledge; for him, everything was techne. Theoretical knowledge is merely a special type of 
practical knowledge, and practical knowledge is nothing if divorced from actual production. Furthermore 
the artifacts produced by techne are not limited to tangible objects-—scientific or philosophical inquiry 
produces theories, for example.
tech products as status symbols), control (the subject mastering and dominating the object 
world) and so on. In relation to + /-1 described this as a result of its representational nature, 
standing symbolically for cutting edge technology.
Heidegger famously summarizes an anti-mimetic, anti-depictive approach to art by 
exemplifying a Greek temple that 'portrays nothing' (I leidegger 1993). So bringing-forth 
happens here not through interpretation (intended in a work of representation) but through 
a literal aesthetic. In Heideggerian terms then, a work such as Seven Tons For Free 
provides this bringing-forth, a revealing of the 'truth' of its being, as a result of techne—an 
engagement with the essence of technology.
Blackest Ever Black'. The institutional and brute facts of UPIC
Russell Haswell and Florian Hecker, after a number of releases separately, mainly on Mego 
— Ich SchnittMich In Den Finger (Mego 022,1997), IT  1SOI61975 (Mego 014, 1998),
Live Salvage (Mego 012,2001), Sun Pandamonium (Mego 044,2003), PVTrecks (Hec2, 
2004)— began working together in 2004, on a project based around Xenakis' UPIC 
machine. They were able to secure a residency at CCMIX in Paris (thanks to an 
endorsement from Curtis Roads) where they recorded material that has since been used for 
Blackest Ever Black (Warner Classics and Jazz, 2007), UPIC Warp Tracks (Warp 
WAP239CD, 2008), and various live multichannel diffusion sessions.
The point is often made that the availability of certain kinds of technology enabled 
the scene represented by labels like Mego, technology that was previously only available to 
institutions and academics (Cox & Warner 2004, Cascone 2000). However this generally 
refers to the potentially restrictive cost of computing power, and new (often commercial) 
software—sequencers, software synthesizers, and so on. Blackest Ever Black is interesting 
in that it was the result of an opportunity to work specifically with the same technology 
that was once considered the domain of institutions and academics (this is ironic in the case 
of UPIC— it was intended as a pedagogical tool, to democratize music creation, but never 
succeeded in this aim, only seven were ever built). As such it allows a fairly direct 
comparison between the way it was used by its creator, Xenakis, and the way it was used 
by Haswell and Hecker thirty years later.
Haswell and Ilecker
A curatorial impulse is central to Haswell's practice. Projects like Or Some Computer 
Music have brought together figures that are important in the development of electronic 
music, and placed them in a contemporary context. Pieces by Trevor Wishart, Curtis Roads 
and Stephen Travis Pope sit alongside Aphex Twin, Kevin Drumm, Jim O'Rourke, Farmers 
Manual and General Magic. He was also, for example, instrumental in organizing the 
supporting acts for Autechre's 2001 tour, which included Curtis Roads in Los Angeles; 
demonstrating a similar approach to curation that he developed in the Disobey series of 
experimental club nights. These things bring together w hat could be seen as two separate 
worlds: institutional or academic electronic music and the commercially sustained 
experimental electronic music that became widespread in the 1990s. Haswell's interest here 
is in curation that he describes as 'multi-faceted' [5]; curation that looks beyond the choices
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that appear obvious, to draw parallels and contrasts between work that previously may not 
even have been considered related in any way. This is a major part of his work: 'I realise 
that I spend a lot of time trying to make things happen, rather than necessarily always 
fabricating pieces of work'(Haswell 2007).
In his own practice, Haswell tends to use disparate pieces of equipment, sometimes 
new, but sometimes obscure or assumed to be outdated (for instance playlist editors, 
analogue synth modules etc.), exploring their possibilities and limitations, as will be 
discussed below in relation to the UPIC. He has stressed the importance of his artistic 
development in Coventry, with its legacy of conceptual art and early computer art, 
particularly in the Art and Language movement (Howard 2009). His interest in the history 
of electronic music and its tools and theory, can also be traced back to this period, where he 
encountered technology such as the GRM tools (from Schaeffer's Groupe de Recherches 
Musicales) at the Mute records studio. His background in plastic and conceptual art is an 
important factor in his approach to computer music; he has stated a desire of 'not wanting 
to be restricted by the categorization “music”' (Haswell 2007). The term computer 
musician is perhaps not appropriate, he could instead be thought of as an artist who takes 
computer music as his subject.
Since Blackest Ever Black, Hecker has released the album A d d  In The Style O f 
David Tudor (eMEGO 094,2009), the title of which plays on bringing what are seen as 
two separate worlds together; the western art music tradition exemplified by David Tudor, 
and the commercial experimental electronic music that owes some influence to acid house 
and the associated underground rave scene of the late '80s and early '90s. Similarly, the 
release o f Blackest Ever Black, which might be termed noise music5, on Warner Classics 
and Jazz, represents two very different worlds colliding. This also reiterates the point that 
an integral part o f Haswell's practice is in 'making things happen'—disseminating the work 
in interesting ways, in an attempt to build an audience that extends beyond existing 
followers of this kind of work [5],
Hecker's Acid In The Style O f David Tudor shares similar sound material with his
Rotating Psychoacoustic Tuning Curves for Matthew Ritchie's 48 speaker sculpture The
Morning Line (TBA21,2008). 1 his piece, according to Hecker's programme notes,
includes 'an “improved” version of the Xenakian technique of dynamic stochastic
5 Although, as Haswell says of'noise' in general: 'I wouldn't even consider it noise, it's the most beautiful 
sound I've ever heard in my life' [6]. This seems to be an opinion shared by other 'noise' artists; Masami 
Akita (Merzbow): 'there is no difference between noise and music in my work. I have no idea what you 
term “music" and “noise”. It's different depending on each person. If noise means uncomfortable sound, 
then pop music is noise to me'(Keenan 2000).
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synthesis', and also 'threshold equalising noise'—based on a technique in psycho-acoustics 
(Moore et al. 2000). Adding to the eclecticism of influences, the spatialization is 
determined by tracing an ambisonic panning trajectory over Heinrich Klüver's 'form 
constants'—geometric patterns that occur during hallucinations (Kliiver 1966). These 
forms certainly cannot be 'seen' by listening to the spatialization, yet their inclusion is 
clearly important to Hecker's practice.
This approach that disinters old or obscure techniques, technologies or research, 
fundamentally seems to involve a misuse or deviation from the intended function of the 
objects. Translating Klüver's form constants to traced spatial trajectories of sounds deviates 
from their original purpose by translating between different media in a very contrived way 
(from static image to movement and duration). A similar kind of deviation from intended 
function is seen in other kinds of technology in Haswell and Hecker's practice, such as 
taking psycho-acoustic research tools out of the context of psycho-acoustics, and instead 
emphasizing their aesthetic value. I will argue that this is the result of an approach that 
treats technology in a literal way, as what it physically is, rather than coming to it with 
preconceptions of its function. For example 'DAT feedbacks... just finding out that those 
things happened and using them consequently as a source. It was about bastardising stuff
[6]. The use of the UPIC in Blackest Ever Black is another case that supports this claim, 
but for comparison we must first understand Xenakis' intention for the UPIC, and its use in 
his own compositional practice.
UPIC and M ycenae A lpha
Xenakis formed CEMAMu (Centre d'Études de Mathématique et Automatique Musicales) 
in 1972, with the aim of'making it possible for composers directly to transplant scientific 
thought and mathematics into music' (Varga 2003). The UPIC (Unité Polyagogique 
Informatique du CEMAMu), completed in 1977, was created to realize this aim. It consists 
of an electromagnetic drawing table connected to a computer. Users can draw onto the 
table in various modes, creating waveforms (pressure against time), or trajectories for pitch 
(frequency against time) and dynamics (amplitude against time).
Metastaseis was Xenakis' first major work that made the breakthrough of working 
mainly with glissandi. After this, the desire to create a machine like the UPIC is 
understandable. The score for Metastaseis is the depiction o f ideal forms, ready to be 
translated into sound. The orchestra can only be seen as an imperfect but necessary 
medium for this. As mentioned above, Xenakis' aim is to directly transplant mathematics
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into music (as quoted above, in Varga 2003).
According to Xenakis, the UPIC 'makes it possible to establish direct contact with 
music, without any programming and notation' (Varga 2003). The implication is that 
'music' is something we do not ordinarily have direct contact with. It must be abstract or 
metaphysical; pure form. Xenakis in fact makes explicit his conception of the immateriality 
o f music by stating that 'music is basically outside time and time only serves for it to 
manifest itself (Varga 2003). But if we accept that this is what music is, then why does the 
UPIC constitute direct contact? Surely the drawing is a representation of the abstract 
music, in the same way as the sound is. The drawing serves the same function as any other 
notation. It is then translated to a different medium (sound) through a convoluted process 
o f mappings between various parameters. So despite Xenakis' desire to move away from 
the notation of the Western musical tradition, a notational centricity remains— it is merely a 
different kind of notation. The score is still rei fied, in the sense that it is seen as the music, 
and sound merely as a way of making it physical. The isomorphy Xenakis sees between 
architecture and music also points towards this belief; neither the architecture or the sound 
physically are the object of contemplation, but the abstract forms that they share. It is 
reminiscent of the well known Schelling quote 'architecture is frozen music' (and the 
anonymous (possibly Zappa) rebuttal:'you can't dance to architecture').
The first piece Xenakis created exclusively on the UPIC system was Mycenae 
Alpha, for his Polytope de Mycenes in Greece. The score is a series of dense groupings of 
frequencies, that often slide together to a single frequency, resulting in an oscillation from 
various noise timbres to sustained notes and back again. These transitions are sometimes 
sudden, but often gradual. Mycenae Alpha has striking similarities to Metastaseis in this 
movement from stable single notes through glissandi to chaotic dissonance. Xenakis here 
has composed on the UPIC in much the same way as he previously composed Metastaseis 
on paper. The UPIC is therefore seen very much as an enabling medium, in much the same 
way as the orchestra before it, but presumably with less imperfections, hence a 'direct' 
channeling.
Xenakis once claimed that 'music is a domain where the most profound questions of 
philosophy, thought, behaviour, and the theory o f the universe ought to pose themselves to 
the composer' (Lohner 1986). Pieces like Mycenae Alpha and Metastaseis communicate 
such ideas at a very abstract level. The music is a representation of abstract forms which 
communicate on a figurative level, the concept o f  movement between chaos and order, or 
continuity and discontinuity; the movement between high-level states, as the title
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Metastaseis suggests.
This idea of musical activity as a channeling of abstract ideas finds its most 
comprehensive and revealing description in Denis Smalley's spectromorphology. Xenakis 
is not associated with this thinking, but there are certainly similarities; Smalley claims that 
the music of Xenakis 'can be approached spectromorphologically' (Smalley 1997), and 
others have seen works like Mycanae Alpha as fundamentally morphological in character 
(Squibbs 1996). Smalley describes gesture as the fundamental means by which 
psychological experience is communicated in music, 'using the sense of touch or an 
implement to apply energy to a sounding body'. Why then should the same theory be 
applied in music that does not rely on a human application of energy to sounding bodies? 
Smalley suggests that 'sound-making is linked to more comprehensive sensorimotor and 
psychological experience', and in such sounds 'we detect the humanity behind them by 
deducing gestural activity'. There appears to be an anxiety associated with the 
incomprehensibility of music which does not provide this reassuring link with other areas 
of human experience (i.e. when one cannot detect the humanity behind the sounds 
(Smalley 1997)). Computer music is in fact particularly suited to creating this 
incomprehensibiliy, asserting the material nature of music.
According to Smalley, 'spectromorphological ideas can help perceivers to focus on 
the imagination and craft of the composer'. This is predicated on a model of music as 
transcendent communication of'intrinsic meaning' with 'some shared experiential basis 
both inside and behind the music'. It also implies that we only properly appreciate the 
music if we appreciate the virtuosity behind its production.
The real purpose of spectromorphology is as an aid in listening, and Smalley 
describes a process of abstraction in which a score or graphical analysis is produced by 
deciding what is perceptually 'pertinent'. Analysis is in fact necessarily reductive, but it is 
interesting to look at what the analyst chooses to reduce to, and consider what this tells us 
about the music on which the analytic technique is being applied. In the case of 
spectromorphology, what Smalley is claiming is perceived in a practical sense (what is 
pertinent) are the gestural, 'human' forms being notated, this is where the music is located 
in spectromorphological theory. It begs the question: what's the point of all the other detail 
in the sound that is not 'pertinent' for analysis? Sound is understood only as a medium for 
music, music being the more pure and abstract forms that the sound roughly corresponds 
to.
This is compounded by his skepticism of'technological listening', which 'occurs
when a listener 'perceives' the technology or technique behind the music rather than the 
music itself, perhaps to such an extent that true musical meaning is blocked', (italics mine) 
But Smalley concedes that musical meaning must ultimately rely on extrinsic reference 
Why then is 'it sounds like something falling' preferable to 'it sounds like a filter sweep'? 
The former is an illusory layer of depiction obscuring the reality o f sound production. 'The 
music itself is actually nothing more than the result of technological processes, not 
necessarily a channeling of narrative meaning. Contrary to this, Smalley explicitly states 
that 'ideally the technology should be transparent', in line with acousmatic performance in 
which 'the sources and causes of the sounds are invisible ... [becoming] blurred even 
further in a CD recording where everything becomes invisible' (except presumably the CD 
player, amplifier and loud speakers), leaving pure 'intrinsic' symbolic meaning. Likewise 
with the UPIC, to be a 'direct' interface to 'the music itself, it must be a 'transparent' 
medium. The impetus here is best summarized by Schaeffer's statement: 'what we are 
aiming a t ... is the most general musical situation that exists' (Schaeffer 1966).
The UPIC is described by Xenakis as a pedagogical tool (or more precisely 
'polygogical' (Varga 2003)). It was an effort to break away from the elitisms of avant-garde 
music at the time, providing, instead of complex theory and rigorous systems, a certain 
kind of freedom and a more universally understandable interface ('everybody can 
understand a line' (Lohner 1986)). By providing what was intended to be a blank sonic 
canvas, allowing a student of music to start from scratch without preconceptions of how to 
compose, the UPIC would in theory induce a kind of auto-pedagogy, in which the student 
discovers for his or herself what is musical. This utopian intention is commendable, and 
would be the UPICs strongest aspect if it weren't for a surprisingly fundamental 
misconception of the nature o f music. If the music is seen as an abstract entity, existing 
outside of time, it engenders precisely this desire for technology that can act as a medium, 
allowing direct access to the music; the composer can have a musical idea, and 
immediately transcribe it. But this does not allow for the fact that the medium constitutes a 
material process, a material process that not only 'has an effect on' (distorts) the composers 
idea, but is actually the source of the idea itself. In this case, the UPIC encourages the 
composition of music as a series of lines and trajectories, glissandi of various basic 
parameters.
Philosophies o f technology
For some, technology is seen fundamentally as a means to an end, functionality in fact
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being almost synonymous with technology. In Borgmann's taxonomy of philosophies of 
technology, this view is referred to as instrumentalist (Borgmann 1987). It could be argued 
that the approach typified by both Xenakis and Smalley is instrumentalist in this sense. An 
'end' is defined (for Xenakis the direct translation of a mathematical idea into sound, and 
for Smalley the communication of intrinsic meaning), and then some 'technology' is 
employed to achieve these goals. 'Technology' in this context refers to tools with a well 
defined function.
Dewey's understanding of technology provides an alternative view of this process. 
Confusing matters, Dewey refers to his own position as instrumentalist. But as argued by 
Hickman, it is far removed from Borgmann's definition of naive instrumentalism, and is 
perhaps better labelled as a pragmatism (Hickman 1990). Dewey sees technology not 
merely as a means to an end, but as an ongoing type of inquiry in which 'ends-in-view' 
appear from  the material means. Therefore, insofar as means and ends are separable at all, 
they are characterized by a constant interplay. For Dewey, means and ends are really part 
o f an analytical exercise that takes place after technological production. This analysis, 
itself a kind of technology, then feeds into later inquiry, forming new ends-in-view or 
projected ends. Ends-in-view are also referred to by Dewey as ideas in certain contexts, i.e. 
an idea does not come from nowhere, it is never a pure metaphysical entity without 
grounding in the world, but rather a technological abstraction from the world.
Implications follow from this regarding the perceived value neutrality of 
technology. If the ideas we have when using a technology in fact derive from  the 
technology, then there is certainly no such thing as a transparent medium. All technology 
is, according to Dewey, laden with values. This means that any use of technology will have 
political or ethical implications. Certain technologies, for example democracy, are 
obviously very explicit in their values. A gun on the other hand, can be used equally 
effectively by a fascist or a communist. But of course this is not to say that a gun does not 
also have values embedded in its function, it certainly affords a particular kind of action in 
the world.
It is important to note that such values are not inherent in the physical object itself, 
but in its functional properties. Searle calls such properties observer relative; they are not 
intrinsic to the object, they are socially, or using terminology he takes from Gertrude 
Anscombe, 'institutionally', constructed (Searle 1996). It is these extrinsic properties that 
make a gun a gun, and not just a mass of metal in a particular form. Therefore it only exists 
as a gun to an observer who understands it as such—devoid of any observers, it is merely a
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mass o f metal. However, Searle argues not for a universal (strong) constructionism— i.e. 
reality as far as it can ever be experienced is entirely socially (or institutionally) 
constructed—but for a weak constructionism in which constructed facts rely ultimately on 
'brute'facts, objective aspects of reality:
It could not be the case, as some have maintained, that all facts are 
institutional facts, that there are no brute facts, because the structure 
of institutional facts reveals that they are logically dependent on 
brute facts. To suppose that all facts are institutional would produce 
an infinite regress or circularity in the account of institutional facts.
In order that some facts be institutional, there must be other facts 
that are brute. This is the consequence of the logical structure of 
institutional facts. (Searle 1996)
The functions assigned to objects in general belong to that category o f th ings that are 
institutional constructs, but the brute facts of the world are still a determining factor. Searle 
distinguishes between a number of different basic types of function assignment. The type 
we are interested in here are 'causal agentive functions', that is, functions that are assigned 
to an object that was deliberately intended for such use (hence agentive), which is useful 
specifically because of its physical properties (there is a causal relationship between 
function and brute facts regarding the object). Such objects are often referred to as 
technical objects. The point is that we could not arbitrarily decide that any object is a gun, 
or conversely, use a gun as a car.
Regardless of this, since function is constructed, there exists the possibility for an 
artist to find new ways to make an object function, a different way of understanding its 
brute facts. This is not as trivial as it first sounds; institutional facts regarding the function 
of technical objects become very quickly entrenched—a CD player is clearly for playing 
back CDs, a drum machine is for making drum sounds— it is the exception rather than the 
rule to experiment and find new functions. This brings to mind Yasunao Tone's concept of 
'paramedia':
You have to deviate. I call that kind of art paramedia. The 
manufacturers always force on us to use a product their way. A 
medium always has some telos; however, people occasionally find 
a way to deviate from the original purpose of the medium and 
develop a totally new field. Photographic technology had telos to 
make the image solid, to make shadow and light solid, so the
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photograph was invented and it's constantly being refined in order 
to be as accurate as possible. But, artists do not want to just imitate 
nature. When Man Ray invented solarization, it was a failure in the 
view of photographic technology, but of course artistically it's much 
more interesting. Or, musique concrete. As soon as the tape 
recorder was invented, people like Pierre Schaeffer found that by 
splicing tape and changing its order he could get a different sound 
than what was originally recorded. So, it's natural for artists to 
deviate. (Marclay & Tone 1994)
A medium or technology that is seen to have some telos, is used in a way that deviates 
from this original function. Tone often achieves this by translating between different 
media, from text to image to sound for example, to complicate the process of 
representation to such a degree that the original purpose of transparent representation or 
communication is lost. In Musica Simulacra, he draws Chinese characters from Man'yoshu 
(the oldest surviving book o f Japanese poetry), and also intermittently substitutes them for 
etymologically related photographs, depicting their pictographic origins. These 
photographs are then projected onto a screen with light sensors, that control parameters in a 
synthesis algorithm. Any meaning in the original text surely has no bearing on the resulting 
sound after this process.
This deviation of media technology amounts to a new way of seeing and using it, it 
is not a case of breaking the technology (Tone has expressed a disagreement over the 
categorization of his music as 'glitch', c.f. for example, (Sangild 2004a) and (Prior 2008)). 
He refers to it instead as a 'disavowal of representation'— in his practice he is primarily 
interested in dispelling the view of technology as a representational medium. This is a 
disavowal o f simple mimetic representation ('artists do not want to just imitate nature' 
(Marclay & Tone 1994)) but also of almost any kind o f communication through 
representation in his artistic practice ('what I have disavowed is [that] the work works like 
language-as-signs, means of communication' (Davis 2008)).
In a residency conducted as part of the New Aesthetics in Computer Music project, 
Tone developed a system for the disruption of MP3 files. Interestingly this revealed that 
not only was fidelity to the original audio disrupted by introducing errors, but in addition 
any kind of fidelity to the actual errors produced was also somewhat disrupted (Blake et al.
2010). A work faithfully representing a process of error introduction to a format would still 
have been a work o f representation, perhaps communicating some conceptual aspect.
Against communication, he has stated: 'my whole principle is, I don't want to represent 
myself in sound' (Friedman 1998).
The relationship between representation and repetition is important for Tone in this 
context:
A sign which would take place but 'once' would not be a sign.
When I use words as signs I must operate within a structure of 
repetition whose basic element can only be representative. For me, 
that means the work is an event, an irreplaceable and irreversible 
empirical particular. So, disavowal of representation also entails 
disavowal of repetition. My strong tendency to avoid repetition is 
also rooted in this context. Even use of language can be disavowal 
of representation if the language in use is a material without 
signification. That is the case [when] Chinese characters are 
converted [to] pictorial images—decoding the character is return to 
a phenomenon from a sign. (Davis 2008)
Tone thus defines signification in opposition to phenomenon. We are able to experience 
something on a phenomenal level when we do not experience it as representation. Rather 
than perceiving what a thing stands for symbolically (i.e. what it means), we see/hear the 
thing itself. Brandon LaBelle draws similar conclusions from Tone's work:
As Tone proposes, the text is now no longer about delivering a 
message but about producing an addition, for'when you play the 
CD what you receive is not images as messages, but sound which is 
simply an excess'. This excess functions to strip away the original 
referent (text) so as to arrive at pure noise, for there is no longer 
any message ... The play with pure noise for Tone is always in 
relation to information, messages, codes, and meaning— in essence 
to the hierarchy of language that values message over material, 
communication over noise, meaning over code ... Tone's 
disinforming projects harness noise as a potential for other forms of 
communication, not o f messages but of pure drive, not of content 
but of form ... Recalling Tone's involvement with Group Ongaku in 
the late 1950s and 1960s, along with his surrealistic leanings, noise 
may be paralleled with methods o f collage, which break 
conventional readings of images, words, and objects. Here,
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techniques of 'making strange' the familiar leads to rupturing the 
seemingly natural world o f signs. (LaBelle 2006)
An interesting reference point for discussing the importance o f an approach like this is 
found in the work o f the Russian formalists. Theorists like Shklovsky defined literature as 
a process of continuous 'defamiliarization', making reality strange by subverting the 
dominant codes and conventions o f the time (Bennett 2003). A work of literature is 
therefore primarily a formal innovation, 'content follows technique. As new techniques 
quickly become familiar, so for further defamiliarization new forms are then needed to 
again overturn the previous ones. This leads to an ongoing 'negation of the negation' type 
o f process. Tony Bennett, discussing Schlovsky, summarizes this: 'at the risk o f 
simplification, literature might be thus construed as a mode o f discourse that constantly 
maintains “No, the world is not like that” in relation to dominant forms of discourses 
which maintain that it is’ (Bennett 2003). Dominant ('sub-literary') forms are concerned 
with 'recognizing'—the repetition of well understood devices and signifiers, where 
literature (as the formalists conceived it) is concerned with 'seeing'—becoming more 
acutely aware o f certain aspects of reality by showing them in an unfamiliar way. More to 
the point, on a formal level, literary techniques themselves can be defamdiarized, thus 
creating an awareness of modes o f representation that have become naturalized. We 'see' 
the work itself (as part o f reality), having been made strange, rather than merely seeing a 
strange depiction of reality.
Though the distinction between high and low culture (literature and sub-literature) 
may be questionable, the similarities between this aspect of literary formalism and the 
description o f Tone's work above are clear. Defamiliarization appears to be o f fundamental 
importance not just in literature but in artistic practice in general. It could be seen as a 
basic artistic impetus—to induce seeing the world in a different way to our ordinary 
experience of it. This can be done on the level of representation, by depicting the world in 
a new way. But perhaps more radical is to do it literally, engaging with the world in a new 
way, formal innovation, subverting the tools of representation. For example in Tone's 
Wounded CD, CDs are prepared by making small holes in them, or sticking small pieces of 
tape on them. They are then played in specific models of CD player that have a particular 
kind of error correction algorithm, which alters the output drastically. So the CD and CD ; 
player are seen not as a devices for the faithful playback of previously recorded sound 
material, but as a means of creating new sound material. The aleatoric process combining 
error correction algorithms with prepared CDs results in a reorganization of the sound that
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is characteristic of the CD player itself (or more precisely, its error correction software). Of 
course, since Tone first performed Wounded CD in 1985, the CD skipping sound has 
become more commonly incorporated into electronic music (even if it is not actually the 
result o f a CD skipping, see for example Oval's Systemisch, or Before I  Leave by Fennesz, 
or Djed by Tortoise) to the point where it is a 'known' technique and functions on the level 
of recognition, losing to some extent its subversive aspect.
Despite the possibility to side-step the'institutional'use of an object, the 
implication is not total freedom from the constraints of the technology, i.e. a transparency 
of the medium. Quite the opposite—the re-assignment of an object's function requires a 
sophisticated understanding of its 'brute facts', its physical properties. As shown in the 
majority of examples throughout this thesis, this normally requires an experimental 
approach in which the constraints of the technology are explored. In accordance with 
Dewey's conception of'ideas' as ends-in-view, in Tone's work the ideas come from the 
(brute, material) means, and moreover it constitutes a response to those means that refuses 
acquiescence to its institutionally accepted function.
In contrast, the institutionalized use of most mediums is to approach them as if they 
are ideally transparent—as representational devices; as in dominant film practice, 
television, everyday use of communication technology and so on, and also as discussed 
earlier in relation to the UPIC. The UPIC makes a very specific kind of music (in its 
institutional use it has inherent values regarding the nature of music) but is positioned as a 
totalizing general music composition system. This perhaps contributed to its failure to 
catch on as a pedagogical tool.
Blackest Ever Black
Haswell & Decker's use of the UPIC in Blackest Ever Black however, does not appear to 
share such contradictions. They approached the UPIC as a found object, and experimented 
with its innate physical characteristics and limitations. Nine hours of audio material was 
generated in this process to be evaluated and edited later, immediately suggesting a very 
different method to the intended'direct'transcription of musical ideas.
The experimentation consisted of processes such as tracing pictures onto the UPIC's 
drawing surface. Source material for tracing included erotica, the mushroom cloud of an 
atomic bomb, photographs of the Madrid train bombing, of food (kebabs, French desserts), 
and close-ups of molecular structures, including the molecular structure of nickel- 
phosphorous developed by the National Physics Laboratory to be the blackest ever black
material, from which the album takes its name. However the pictures themselves are in a 
sense arbitrary, aesthetic judgement takes precedence: 'there's pictures we put in that 
sounded shit, there's pictures we put in and went 'fucking great'... if you did the 
sonograms you would end up seeing that there's only a small piece [of the picture], because 
we've taken all that other bit away because we didn't actually like what it sounded like. So 
you can't actually do a sonogram and see all the pictures, that's not there. That's why in a 
way it doesn't matter what the pictures are' [6]. More abstract techniques were also used, 
such as 'the Surrealist technique of real-time automatic drawing' (Roads 2007). The 
judgement on whether to keep or discard any given material is described as being based on 
two criteria: a) 'not having heard that before from other existing UP1C material', and b) 
simply 'that pleases my ear, 1 like the sound of that' [6],
The entire album consists of two tracks of audio, split to left and right channels 
with no panning, again treating the two channels of audio offered as literal. 'You click on 
the arcs and then you can say this is left or righ t... so you consciously have to do th a t... 
we can throw the right channel around and we can throw the left channel around and so 
even if they start going around together, following each other there's actually different 
things going on. But you can still listen to it in stereo, so it was trying to do something that 
could exist in stereo but could also be taken away and used in a different way' [6]. There 
was also no overdubbing. Working in this way reduces the temptation o f composerly 
expression; the material gathered cannot so easily be built into narrative structures6.
The album is split into four movements. As Curtis Roads describes in the sleeve 
notes: 'From the onset, the sound palette of the UP1C is singular, and Blackest Ever Black 
is a celebration of Xenakis' sonic universe. Movement 1 explores the melodic and 
harmonic eccentricities o f the UPIC, where the glissando is the rule, not the exception' 
(Roads 2007). It begins with near silence, low volume slices of high pitched glissandi 
separated by gaps of a few seconds. After 1:45 of this, the material is suddenly at a higher 
volume and slices of output are longer, with immensely varied types of sound: long 
glissandi converging and diverging in pitch, sustained tones, short punctuated inharmonic 
tones, narrow-band noise, intricately complex rapid patterns o f modulating pitches,
6 I use the word narrative in the broadest possible sense; Byron Almdn describes narrative trajectory as an 
unfolding of relationships between 'musical agents'—themes and motives. Narrative is present in an 
abstract sense, even in entirely non-programmatic music; the balance of change and repetition, structures 
that build tension or lead to a climax, metaphorical and dramatic constructs. Musical narrative is often 
seen as merely reflecting literary narrative, with its referential specificity removed. But Alrnin argues that 




rhythmic chattering impulses, low-frequency textural rumbling and harsh waveforms with 
pronounced higher harmonics. Although the output ot the machine is characteristic and 
singular (it is limited—most sounds are in practical terms impossible to make on it), it still 
nonetheless offers (technically) infinite possibilities within its limited sound set. The range 
of sounds is far greater in Blackest Ever Black than in pieces such as Mycenae Alpha, and it 
presents these sounds in a fragmented structure. Sections often sound as ii they are 
beginning to develop in a narrative manner, only to be cut short and interrupted by silence 
or very different section in juxtaposition.
Figure 3:
74
Movement 2 continues with a more deliberate contrasting of different behaviors and 
sound materials. In particular, stable states are contrasted with apparently chaotic states. 
Being the exposition of different sections of output from experimentation with the 
machine, in listening this accordingly does not seem to function on a metaphorical level. 
Mycenae Alpha contains the same kind of contrast but presented in a flowing, narrative
manner, implying that it is a piece about the relationship between stability and chaos 
(narrativity is inherently representational). The fragmented structure of Blackest Ever 
Black could also of course be described as a narrative structure (a splice could be seen as a 
gestural, compositional device like any other). However the experience of listening to it 
confounds such a reading—the interruptions and incongruity of materials continually 
frustrate and undermine any attempt at narrative identification, there can be no 
comprehension of an overall structure that has direction or is revealing themes and 
patterns. The listener cannot find meaning within this noise and is therefore at every turn 
jolted into awareness of the physicality of the sound rather than its semiotic content.
As if to undermine even the semblance of coherent structure in fragmentation 
(consistency in inconsistency), movement 3 features much slower, longer sections of UPIC 
output, with gradual development. A slowly shifting pattern of medium length tones 
occasionally sliding in pitch build to a dense mass before falling apart. Then a fluctuating 
sine is punctuated by distorted noise bursts. The (by now familiar) glissandi follow, close 
in frequency causing difference tones to appear. Finally rapid high frequency patterns bring 
the movement to a close. Movement 4 is a return to the strikingly contrasting sections of 
movements l and 2, ending with a plateau of very dense chaotic material, it 'expounds a 
joyful mayhem' as Roads puts it (Roads 2007). The abruptness of this material coming to 
an end is almost comical, feeling like a parody of climactic structure.
Haswell sums up the difference between Blackest Ever Black and UPIC pieces by 
Xenakis and others by pointing out a particular detail: 'he's drawing these things and where 
the lines kind of finish at the end of the page he's then going to start the next page at the 
same po in t... and he's drawing these things before', it's almost like he actually made the 
score before ... we just wanted to experiment more, we wanted to kind of push it' [6]. The 
institutional use (in Searle's terms) is to continue drawing the score attempting to ignore 
page breaks. But recognizing page breaks as a fundamental characteristic of the machine, 
Haswell and Hecker treat each page as an entirely separate entity. Another characteristic 
feature of the machine is the ability to copy and paste images. This makes the multiplied, 
offset patterns seen in figure 3, and was a technique adopted by Haswell and Hccker to , 
create interesting combinations of tones at set harmonic intervals (shifting in the Y axis) 
and delays (shifting in the X axis), and also to simply generate busier material. "Draw as 
many lines as you can' and 'can we draw three thousand lines in the box?' There were these 
kind of experiments going on' [6].
Befitting the focus on process and technology, the album closes with an'appendix';
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a recording of the physical machine itself, 'the sound of the UPIC synthesis hardware 
processing a particularly dense page' (Roads 2007). Again, a deviation of function—the 
sound of interest is supposed to be its audio output not its acoustic properties. 'Once there 
was the notion that we’re in the studio and we're using the UPIC, I had no fixed or closed 
ideas. I was prepared to try anything on it and do anything with it to try and create a sound 
and then, when you hear it back, do we like it?' [6]. Calling this track an appendix also 
suggests a desire to document. Again this is a kind of curation concerned with the history 
of computer music—preserving aspects of the UPIC while it still exists. It is already being
superseded by a software version which does not require the specialist hardware and 
therefore does not make this sound.
The approach is experimental in a very literal sense of the word; trying a multitude 
of different things, and simply keeping the results that sound interesting. As in Tone's 
work, using the technology as a found object treats it as itself (reducing to ils 'brute facts'), 
and explores its possibilities. This avoids the unimaginative approach of working with a 
pre-conceived idea of its function (its ’institutional' use). The UPIC epitomizes an attempt 
to make a generalized music system. In line with Xenakis' central interest in formalization, 
it formalizes music by parameterizing it and providing a framework for its realization.
If  it were possible to make a totally general music system, it would in theory be : 
more or less useless. It would allow the reproduction o f any existing forms, but itself could 
offer nothing new. One cannot work with pure form, simply because form is always 
material, it is defined by the materials and technology shaping it. Haswell and Meeker 
show that UPIC is useful, but specifically because it is not general. Its output is 
characteristic and limited, most tracks made with the UPIC are clearly identifiable as being 
such. Limitations are productive, not restrictive, as will be explored further in chapter 4. ;
Due to the nature of the UPIC, the same kind of sonic material is found in Blackest 
Ever Black as in pieces such as Mycenea Alpha. They share similar trajectory/gestural I 
information in some form. However this does not imply something like a 
spectromorphological approach in Blackest Ever B la c k y  is difficult to imagine Haswell > 
and Hecker channeling a musical idea in the process described-what is the musical idea ; 
when a picture o f a kebab is traced? There is an idea, perhaps, in Dewey's sense of the - J 
word: it is the idea o f a process, informed by a technological inquiry based on a given set ? 
of materials. It is a process that is clearly suggested by the UPIC, its interface being a 
drawing table (evidenced in an interesting way by the fact that this is the approach a child 
tends to take when confronted with the UPIC, as Xenakis describes: 'we're visited regularly
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by schoolchildren of seven or eight years o f age, accompanied by their teachers. They draw 
fish, houses, trees—and you can hear the result. (Varga 2003)). The idea is thus not 
conceived prior to the technological inquiry, it is a response to the means available.
Haswell's background in the visual arts rather than in music is a contributing factor 
to the approach ia Blackest Ever Black. It provides a different way of looking at musical 
production. Prior to their own residency, Haswell notes that contrary to Xenakis’ 
polygogical intention, 'everyone that was going to CCMIX was conservatory educated’. For 
Haswell’that didn't matter, why shouldn't I get to use it? ... I could go and destroy things' 
[6]. ' '
Process
The approach is something like Process art, in which Haswell has previously shown an 
interest in his practice; influenced by Richard Serra and Fischli/Weiss among others [6]. 
Serra’s Splash Piece (1969) is archetypical o f this kind of process based work, in which he 
threw molten lead against the walls and floor of a gallery space. In Serra’s words: 'the 
evidence of the process can become part of the content. Not that it is the content, but it is 
discernible for anyone who wants to be involved with that aspect’ (Serra 2002). Traces of 
the process fundamentally constitute the work; this is more or less true by definition—what
is the finished work other than the result of the process of its creation? Process art
comprises various techniques for the emphasis of these traces, however what they signify 
is not itself the point of the work—eschewing the idea of a piece documenting its own 
creation.
Works like Splash Piece of course owe something to action painting, or
superficially perhaps even abstract expressionism. But both the'abstract'and
'expressionism' aspects of abstract expressionism are absent. The work is focussed on the 
material used and on industrial processes, in later pieces sometimes involving many 
different people: 'I rely upon the industrial sector to build my work, upon structural and ; 
civil engineers, upon surveyors, laborers, transporters, riggers, construction workers,
etcetera'. The potential for gestural expression is therefore reduced. 'The fact that the
technological process is revealed depersonalizes and demythologizes the idealization of the 
sculptor's craft'(Serra 2002).
Similarly, overtly geometric shapes are avoided in this kind of work. Robert Morris ; 
claimed that in the 1960s ’it [was] not especially surprising that art driving towards greater 
concreteness and away from the illusory would fasten on the essentially idealistic imagery ;
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of the geometric' (Morris 2002). We see this for example in De Stijl—a radical break from 
figurative or mimetic art, which nonetheless remains representational in a neo-platonic 
way. The idea is that there is an ultimate reality behind accidental appearance; Mondrian's 
paintings, in his own words, 'unfold to us a world o f universal beauty (Banham 1980), 
Morris saw process art as a development that works towards the removal of this remaining 
idealism, where 'the method o f working does not demand pre-thought im ages... pre­
thought images are neither necessary or possible. Alongside this approach is chance, 
contingency, indeterminacy—in short, the entire area of process’ (Morris 2002).
Haswell refers to his The Brutal Truth (2002, for David Falconer's Frass exhibition 
at the UBS Bullion Vault in London) as a process based piece owing something to this 
tradition. He placed live cockroaches on large sheets of paper and painted them with top- 
of-the-range Chanel nail varnish. They then left trails of their route and eventually 
suffocated as the varnish dried. The end result is a panel with dead cockroaches and 
various trails of nail varnish, but this object is described by Haswell as a ’byproduct' [6],
He also made a film o f the process. Both the film and the finished panel are essentially : 
documents of an event. Much the same could be said of his Live Salvage releases on Mego, 
being entirely comprised of found recordings by others o f his live performances.
Haswell's live work has a similar focus on process, using the laptop as a means to 
do this, with an intentional disregard for overloading the CPU causing glitches and audio 
dropouts. The computer could ultimately even determine the length of performances; often 
he simply played until the laptop crashed. 'Silence occurs when the computer breaks' 
(Haswell 2007), ’sometimes I did a reboot and then there would be the reboot sound, 
everybody would laugh' [6]. The technology therefore imparts its own specific and peculiar i 
character on the event in much the same way as discussed with the UPIC. This perhaps 
goes some way to explain the fascination in Haswell’s practice with legacy technology; 
because it is often more peculiar in its characteristics (it is less effectively’transparent’), it -  
offers more scope for experimentation. In a fundamental way then, material process is  ^
allowed to pervade every aspect o f the work.
However for Haswell (perhaps in contrast to Morris) this is not to say that the 
process is somehow more 'important'than the end product. It provides aleatoric elements, 
opening up the form of the finished work to complete contingency. In contrast to what we 
could call a contrived aleatory in music—random numbers and stochastic techniques; the W: 
intentional use o f randomness in composition (Xenakian stochasticism for example)—  ? |  
process art is based on the realization that this is unnecessary in the face of the absolute
contingency of matter. To return again to Tone briefly, he has stated a dislike for the word 
'randomness', and refers instead to 'indeterminacy' in his work [7]. This rather enigmatic 
polarization of what are usually taken to be synonyms is perhaps explained by the above 
contrast. He is not interested in using high level, planned stochastic techniques, and yet he 
does base his work around processes that introduce immensely complex indeterminate
elements simply through the basic materiality of their operation.
Contingency
Contingency refers to the state of a given situation's dependence on other things; it carries 
with it an implication of arbitrariness in such relationships, and as such is useful in 
describing artistic processes which are not random in a probabilistic way (limited to certain 
outcomes), but embrace a more radical indeterminacy by allowing this arbitrariness to 
participate in the work.
The same distinction has been made in contemporary philosophy: 'The ideologies 
of probability and of chance ... hallucinate a universe in which—at least—the parameters 
within which events may take place can be circumscribed. But an event, real contingency, 
is precisely something that overflows this compartmentalization and management'
(MacKay et al. 2011). Contingency cannot be planned for or controlled, 'it is an event that 
happens to us, that comes from outside'. In light o f this development in materialist 
philosophy, literalism in art is understood as the response to an increasing awareness of 
contingency:
[Figures of contingency] signal the impossibility of a certain 
conception o f the work o f art: the work as a block of matter ordered 
and organized to present an autonomous, intentional, controlled 
experience. Artists were able at one time to maintain the illusion of
confining the audience's attention entirely within the representative 
space of the work; subsequently, they became, let us say, painfully
aware of the contingent nature of the material supports of painting
and sculpture, thematized these traditional supports and exhibited to 
us their limited lifespan. At the dawn of contemporary art, the 
recognition that these formats were historical artifacts, contingent 
factors, finally caused the work to explode beyond them, or rather, 
to acknowledge its always already having been complicit in with
what fell outside o f them. The work opened up explicitly and
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radically to new materials. (MacKay et al. 2011)
Reza Negarestani's concept of'complicity with contingency' takes the theory one step 
further. I have been arguing that an openness to materials and a focus on their affordances 
is the way to engage with contingency. But Negarestani claims that this is precisely what 
propagates a'restricted concept of materiality';
'What is com m on to those artists who embrace the contingency o f  
the materials they work with?' The link between such artists is their 
'complicity' with contingent materials. It might be thought that 
'com plicity'is synonym ous with an 'openness'to contingent 
materials. But this is not the case. For if  w e consider art as a 
material-driven process o f  production, these anonymous materials 
enjoy an autonomy o f  their own; and such autonomy continuously 
interferes with the artwork itself regardless o f  the decisions o f  the 
artist-—that is, whether or not the artist determines to b e'open 'to  
their influence. In other words, the contingency o f  the artist’s 
materials cannot be the strict subject o f  the artist's openness.
Contingent materials cannot be directly embraced. (Negarestani 
2011)  .
The concept o f contingency is to some extent reified here, as an autonomous force that acts 
on the artist as subject ('it is an event that happens to us, that comes from outside'). 
Negaristani determines that the most effective way to be complicit with such a force is, in 
contrast to the aforementioned openness, to attempt a total closure' of the artwork. Since 
contingency has its way regardless of any openness towards it, it is at its most effective and 
noticeable when the artist attempts to close it off. The artist in this approach is thus secretly 
in league with contingency, 'complicit' in its game.
Despite its apparent anthropocentricity (contingency appears to be defined as any 
non-human agency), this theory is compelling. 1 lowever if we consider it in relation to 
concrete examples of artistic practice it begins to make less sense. It could be said that any 
work of art prior to the development of reflexive movements in the 20'h century attempts a 
closure in the way Negaristani describes. Such works are clearly contingent, in the sense 
that anything is contingent: it is this way, but 'it could have been different' (MacKay et al.
2011). And yet they are not generally taken to be foregrounding their materiality through a 
complicity with contingency (although it is interesting to consider them in this light). 
Ultimately, it seems that a certain kind of closure is very possible, and is not in fact
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frustrated by contingency in most cases—perhaps contingency is not as strong a force as 
suggested, its most interesting effects do require an openness towards them. This can be 
thought of as the artist participating in contingent processes; the artist is not an entity
removed from materiality who has materiality act upon them.
Since Blackest Ever Black, Hecker has continued this line of inquiry. As a 
collaboration with Robin Mackay, Elie Ayache and Quentin Meillassoux, Speculative 
Solution (eMEGO 118,2011) states in the supporting literature that the music is constituted 
by 'truly “literalist” marks which have no reason to be as they are, and which could have 
been—and still could be, at every moment-—otherwise' (MacKay 2011). As was already 
evident in Blackest Ever Black (inheriting the materialist aspects o f Haswell’s practice), 
'with Speculative Solution Hecker proposes that the concepts of absolute contingency and 
hyperchaos offer a rigorous new alternative to the employment of chance and randomness
in avant-garde composition'(Mego 2011).
Xenakis famously used stochastic techniques, but also noted the indeterminacy 
inherent in the movement of the hand (Varga 2003). This is a concession that although the 
hand may be 'the organ of the body that is closest to the brain' (Lohner 1986), it cannot act 
as a perfectly transparent medium in the expression of an idea. The artist's own body is 
itself a medium of contingency. Movements of the hand, even when unintentional, could be 
seen as expressive and gestural, as bestowing the work a human warmth (as opposed to 
the 'cold' perfection of a machine). But this does not constitute expression, it just happens 
to be an aspect o f the material process. The careful tracing of pictures in particular plays
any expressive or communicative aspect down.
Materiality and Presence
Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht's work in literary theory is based around questioning the 
dominance o f a 'meta-physical' approach to aesthetics, by which is meant the interpretation 
o f meaning in analyzing a text (Gumbrecht 2004). One of the starting points for this is 
Derrida's claim that logo-centrism begins with the denial of the exteriority of the 
signifier'—-whatever is external to symbolic meaning (the actual material that makes up the 
words on a page, the paper, the ink and so on). Gumbrecht's interest is in how different 
media or different 'materialities' affect the meaning that they carry, which avoids the 'meta­
physical' view because it does not conceive of meaning as something separable from 
material form. We can begin to see how this theory allows for the way in which technology 
is entirely implicated in art. That technology is responsible for a work of art or music
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ending up how it ends up may seem obvious, but the previous discussion o f Xenakis, and 
particularly spectromorphology, demonstrate the opposing viewpoint; a view o f  technology 
as merely enabling, providing a smooth uninterrupted channel from the composer's 
imagination to a musical result—the utopian dream of a technology capable o f creating 
'any sound you can imagine' (Theberge 1997).
This desire for a technology which does not interfere or is transparent, ultimately 
battles or works against the technology. On the contrary, we are concerned here with music 
or art in which the characteristics o f the technology and materials used are at the forefront 
o f the work. The artist can allow this to happen, by acting in a kind of'fidelity' to the 
technology; understanding its brute facts and basing the creative process around working 
with/against its limitations. Even if  the process o f creating the work is wrought and 
difficult, the materiality o f  this process can remain the focus in this approach, not the 
making-invisible o f technological aspects to create a transcendent experience. This way o f  
thinking about technology begins with the understanding o f music or art as material. There 
is not a pre-existing idea in the artist's mind that needs to be communicated but the work is 
something resulting from material conditions. The most important aspect in the 
development o f new aesthetics is therefore found in the relationship to technology.
Haswell has stated that his main aim is to create 'physical qualities' (Haswell 2007). 
Referring to his live shows as 'temporary public sculpture', he attempts to create sound that 
feels like 'a physical presence, like there was some fucking piece o f steel in the room that 
was going to drop on you' [6]. The influence here is Serra again— a rigger was crushed to 
death by a steel plate during the installation o f a Serra piece in 1971.
But what is meant by 'presence' in this sense? And how does it relate to physicality? 
Gumbrecht talks about the possibility of'presence effects' in opposition to 'meaning 
effects'. Note that this could be confused with Derrida's ’metaphysics o f  presence’ in 
logocentrism— the search for a transcendental signified— but this is not the sense in which 
Gumbrecht uses the word. Presence is precisely something that is not meaning; this 
perhaps retains a certain kind of transcendentalism, but it is not a search for any kind o f  
signified, rather the absence o f signification.
It could be seen as an opportunity for the construction o f new meaning, and it is 
important that meaning is seen as a construction in order to do this. As with Searle's 
construction o f technological function, nothing is natural or inherent or pre-given. The 
construction o f meaning, however, is secondary to the experience itself according to 
Gumbrecht. With reference to Heidegger, he describes the experience o f a work o f art as an
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unconcealment o f being, which specifically 'is not something spiritual or something 
conceptual. Being is not a meaning. Being belongs to the dimension o f things' (Gumbrecht 
2004).
The 'thingness' o f something, its being, though, is no longer being once it is 
perceived; it becomes interpreted meaning instead. Thus this experience is liminal, we can 
only perceive being as a constant 'bringing forth' and 'withdrawing' from this threshold. 
Crucially, this can only happen when we 'abandon any transcending imagination and 
projection'. It is not to do with any interpretation o f the world, but o f being in the world. 
This brings us again to Heidegger's Greek temple that 'portrays nothing' (Heidegger 1993); 
its presence brings forth its materiality, and the materiality o f the situation o f the encounter. 
This could be seen as the state that literalist art aspires to. Instead o f a depicted expression 
o f universal meaning, experience is kept in the 'real' world, open and specific. Because, 
'unlike the Platonic ideas, Being is not supposed to be something general or something 
metahistorical 'below' or 'behind' a world o f surfaces' (Gumbrecht 2004).
The material recorded for Blackest Ever Black was also used later in UPIC Warp 
Tracks (Warp 2008, WAP239CD). The sleeve notes by Dave Falconer describe the effect o f  
art as entrancement: 'thought hooked on a vibration'— excited matter. '[Art] is an involuting 
of complication: a fixation on the material '¡n-itself, letting matter ’be".
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apPatch and G et D ow n
In 1999-2000, Andy Pieper developed a series o f modules for sequencing, synthesis and 
processing in Supercollider 2 (McCartney 1996), running on Mac OS9. A patch called 
apPatch brings these modules together and allows dynamic routing between them. This 
patch became the primary tool not only in Pieper's own work with Ramon Bauer as 
General Magic and Sluta Leta, but also in Peter Rehberg's work at the time. Albums 
involving its use include Rechenkonig by General Magic (MEGO 032,2000), Showroom 
Dummies by Rehberg and Tujiko Noriko as DACM (MEGO 056,2002), Semi Peterson by 
Sluta Leta (MEGO 073, 2003), and Pita's Get Down (MEGO 049,2002) and Get Off 
(Hapna H I9,2004). Rehberg also continued to use it occasionally in later works, including 
his collaboration with Stephen O'Malley as KTL, for instance in the bass line o f  
Paratrooper (IV, eMEGO 089,2008).
In interrogating the relationship between music and its means o f production, this 
patch is o f particular interest because we can observe the similarities between a small but 
well defined set o f  works that were created in the same software environment. The creation 
o f the software environment itself is also o f interest. Pieper and Rehberg describe the patch 
as the result o f an iterative development process, with continuous experimentation by users 
leading to suggestions feeding back into modifications or the development o f new modules 
[1]. Pieper describes the impulse behind its development:
I wanted to answer the question of'how does digital sound sound 
like?' Most o f the professional plugins at that time tried to simulate 
old hardware while removing limits like number o f oscillators, 
ability to store settings, removing awkward sequence programming 
etc., eventually ruining it. It was rare to find something that 
sounded and felt genuinely 'digital'. [8]
The desire for something 'that sounded and felt genuinely “digital”' is perhaps a desire to 
get away from the symbolic high tech aesthetic discussed in chapter 2.
Superficially the development o f the patch appears to place it at the intersection o f  
the two fundamentally different approaches to music discussed throughout this thesis— it 
has elements o f an idealist approach ('I want to do X, so I will make or find technology that 
makes X possible'), and a materialist approach ('I have this technology, what can I do with 
it?'). By examining the music created with it, we will see how the former is misleading, 
and that this description o f the process as sitting between binary opposites can be replaced
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by an understanding of pragmatic philosophy, 
a p Patch
First the functionality of the patch should be analyzed in some detail. On its execution, a 
window displays all of the available modules, and number boxes for the user to select how 
many of each module they want to create (Figure 5). The modules are divided into three 
types: a sequencer, lfo and 'dust trigger' send triggers and control messages to various 
parameters; an oscillator, sample player and so on generate sound; and effects modules 
(shaper, comber and resonix) process sound. SuperCollidcr distinguishes between control 
rate data and audio rate data, so the first type of module has a control rate output, the 
second type has a control rate input and audio rate output, and the third type has audio rate 
input and output. This allows easy routing between modules, by allowing any parameter in 
a module in the second group to be linked to any module from the first group, and inputs to 
the third group of modules to be any combination of outputs from the second group.
Figure 5: apPatch initialization
Figure 6 shows a typical configuration of modules, including:
• Sequencer: an 8-step sequencer outputting triggers and pitch/amplitude values, with 
a variable portamento. The bottom row of numeric values sets the number of 
triggers in that step, so a '3' would make three equally spaced triggers in the space 
of one beat—in this way simple combinations of odd numbers lead to very 
rhythmically complex patterns. In addition, the length of the overall sequence can 
be set in the two number boxes above the steps such that, for example, only the first 
five steps are looped. Changing this dynamically can again lead to very unusual
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rhythmic patterns. The speed is set in relation to a tempo that is global to all 
sequencer modules (i.e. T  means play at the global tempo, '0.5' means play at half 
the global tempo). Patterns across multiple sequencers can be moved in or out o f  
phase with each other by changing these speeds. There are various options for 
altering the pattern as a whole, such as shifting pitch values up or down, and 
rotating, reversing or scrambling the sequence steps. Sequence steps can also be 
played in a random order rather than linearly.
• LFO: a basic low frequency oscillator with its frequency, as with the sequencer, set 
in relation to the global tempo. This is one o f a number o f  modules that uses the 
wavetable editor in the top right o f the window; selecting 'edit waveform' links the 
displayed wavetable to the LFO, which can then be edited in a number o f ways.
The wave can be directly drawn, or it can be generated by setting frequency domain 
values for the phase and amplitude o f each individual bin. It can also be filled with 
white noise, shifted up or down for 0Hz offsets, and broken into segments by 
inserting random short gaps o f silence.
• DustTrigger: the dust trigger is based on a SuperCollider 'unit generator' called 
dust, that generates randomly spaced impulses, with a parameter controlling the 
density o f impulses. This module converts these impulses into triggers for the 
TrigOsc and TrigSample modules.
• TrigOsc: an oscillator with an envelope that can be triggered by one o f the control 
modules. The oscillator wave can be set using the wavetable editing functions, as 
can the amplitude envelope, with the length o f the envelope set by the length 
parameter. It also has a simple filter. Pitch values and filter cutoff values can be 
controlled by different control module outputs to the triggering; for example, a dust 
trigger could randomly trigger notes, but with the pitch values set by a sequencer 
pattern.
• TrigSample: much the same as TrigOsc, but with an audio file instead o f the 
wavetable. The audio file is selected when the patch is first initialized and cannot 
be changed dynamically.
• Roessler: this is a chaotic algorithm noise generator, generally creating bass drones. 
It is based on a ROssler attractor (Rfissler 1976). This again is essentially an 
interface to an existing SuperCollider unit generator, called Rossler. It creates three 
of these generators, and each has one parameter called chaosParam, which
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represents the variable c in the RQssler attractor equations: 
rate o f change o f x = -y -  z 
rate o f change o f y  = x + ay 
rate o f change o f z = b + z (x -  c)
The standard bifurcation analysis o f  the Rossler attractor uses a and b set to 0.1, 
and varies c. Low values o f c produce periodic behaviour, but it quickly becomes 
chaotic as c is increased. The choatic behavior is within a limited range though, so 
the result is pitched, like narrow-band noise. Changing the value o f c changes the 
perceived pitch o f the sound. This is combined with pitch values from a control 
module for each attractor, to create chaotic oscillations around a given pitch.
• Shaper: combines a delay, comb delay, granular pitch shifter, and waveshaper. The 
waveshaping can be edited with the wavetable functions.
• Comber: also has a waveshaper, followed by a reverb and a 
compressor/expander/limiter/gate (a Supercollider unit generator called 
'compander').
• Resonix: a waveshaper and delay again, this time combined with a large bank o f  
resonators creating very ’musical’ resonances. This is a result o f note values for the 
frequencies o f the resonators hardcoded into the patch, at octaves, fourths and fifths 
and so on.
Global functions include a single band EQ on the final audio output, and a random 
parameter walk. The latter takes the radical action of sporadically picking random 
parameters across all modules at a regularity determined by the ’task probability value’, and 
makes alterations within a range set by the ’random range’ value, with very unpredictable 
results.
The modules were introduced by Pieper based on his own experimentation in 
Supercollider, but also on requests from other artists: ’“we want a sequencer and 
something that plays a file” ... very basic ideas' [1]. The reasons for decisions such as 
making the sequencer 8-step, rather than 16 or 32 for example, were generally due to 
technical limitations; too CPU intensive, taking too much o f the screen and so on. These 
limitations would turn out to be important. There are a also a lot o f failed experiments 
remaining available within the patch— 'APMeierChord', 'APDrums'— modules that did not 
end up being used on any releases (therefore not discussed in detail here). This is 
compelling evidence o f the experimental nature o f the development process. When 
development began, there was no overall design. Tellingly, the unused modules are the
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more complex modules that attempt to do more than the low level DSP that SuperCollider 
immediately affords.
In the modules that were actually used in releases, the vast majority of the controls 
are direct manifestations of the parameters available in SuperCollider unit generators, 
giving a very 'raw' interface to the possibilities offered by the various DSP and sequencing 
functions on offer. There is little distinction between the underlying system and the patch 
interface; the interface does not for the most part abstract to provide higher level control. It 
should also be noted that all control parameters are immediately visible on one screen. The 
exception to this rule is the wavetable in the top right, for which a separate window can be 
opened displaying an editable frequency domain representation of the waveform, with 
sliders for each phase and amplitude bin. Other than this, after selecting the modules, an 
entire piece is determined by a single screen of parameters. This may seem superficially 
very limiting, but I will argue that such explicit limitations are necessary to create a space 
for experimentation, as opposed to a goal driven teleological decision making process.
DAWs
If it were possible to create an audio production system without limitations or particular 
characteristics and affordances, as discussed in relation to the UP1C, this is what would be
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referred to as a 'transparent' medium. In this theoretical situation there is no 
experimentation to be done— empirical investigation is impossible without something to 
investigate. We are left only with the possibility o f a rationalist approach in which ideas are 
not derived from sense data but exist a priori. Hence the link between a desire for 
technological transparency and rationalist, idealist approaches to composition, which are 
necessarily goal driven. However, this ideal system is nothing more than theoretical. If we 
consider the infinite ways to create audio, it is impossible to imagine a system that covers 
all possibilities equally without prejudice or favour. Certain systems, such as advanced 
digital audio workstations, initially appear to be general, without favouring any particular 
sounds or structures, but in fact represent a very specific way o f thinking about music 
(derived originally from the concept o f  a score— graphic representations o f time moving 
from left to right, and so on). This has o f course become naturalized and is generally taken 
to be universal— music is a series o f events ordered on a timeline. The perceived generality 
o f a DAW is a result o f this naturalization.
The apPatch interface in contrast cannot be seen as general or universal, it offers 
unequivocally limited choices. The routing is very basic— it is not possible to route a signal 
through more than one effect module in series; the inputs to effect modules are simply 
represented by a series o f checkboxes to select which sound generator module outputs 
should be used. Similarly, the control inputs for sound generator modules are selected with 
a dropdown box. The user is explicitly given a choice between two or three options for 
each input. However, it is precisely this limitation that gives it a tendency to create 
interesting results. For example, in two mouse clicks the possibility exists to switch the 
routing for a generator module to the output o f a sequencer, for setting either its pitch or 
triggering, while the sequencer in question is simultaneously used for an entirely different 
purpose, controlling a separate generator module. This kind o f sharing o f control modules 
is in fact a necessity in many cases, since only two or three control modules are generally 
available due to limited screen space and processing power.
Experimenting with a different option in a routing dropdown box often results in 
radical and unexpected changes to the sound and patterns produced. My claim is that in 
instances like this it would not have otherwise occurred to the composer to link elements in 
that way. I.e. it is not something anyone would be likely to do in a DAW, even if it is 
technically possible. A DAW has its own particular affordances, the fact that it would be 
extremely unusual to set up this kind o f triggering in Cubase (Steinberg 2011) or Logic 
(Apple 2011) is sufficient to justify this statement—an affordance that is negative (it does
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not afford the re-use o f sequenced triggers) is still an affordance, demonstrating that it has 
certain characteristics and is in no way transparent. Pieper explains his intention in 
developing the patch, and highlights the paradox o f being limited by what appears to be an 
open and unlimited DAW:
it's all about experiments and embracing limits. Thats one o f the 
first things learned when working with digital media, the 'anything 
is possible' notion is a curse ... the patch never was meant to be 
used as a DAW-Iike tool. DAWs (at least at that time) mimic the 
classic multitrack studio production with non-linear editing thrown 
in. I found that those lend you to endlessly tweak details, lose focus 
and get drowned in a sea o f possibilities. There was not much there 
in terms o f supporting the 'creative process' as well, the software 
always got in the way. [7]
Rationalism and pragmatism
In the use o f  the apPatch, it does not seem to make sense to describe the process as goal 
driven (and though latent this is also the case in the use o f a DAW). In as much as goals do 
exist in the process, they are not predetermined but arise from experimentation within the 
limitations o f the system. Again, we return to Dewey's 'ends-in-view'; goals as transient 
tools in a process o f empirical technological inquiry. The word empirical in this context 
could be controversial, since Dewey's project was often couched explicitly in terms o f  
overcoming the traditional divide between empiricism and rationalism. But this is in 
reference to epistemology— empiricism and rationalism as fundamentally opposed 
descriptions o f the way in which we discover truths about the world. Dewey's position, and 
the position o f subsequent pragmatists, is that truth is not something that exists objectively 
in the world to be discovered. The truth o f a statement or theory is better defined by its 
usefulness in a specific situation. This is not inconsistent with a weaker empiricism in the 
sense that it is used in this thesis: technological inquiry proceeds empirically, but this is not 
to do with discovering truth. For instance, empirical data is surely the means by which 
ends-in-view are formed. Webster Hood is one Dewey scholar who believes that a 
philosophy o f technology 'requires a more comprehensive empiricism than Dewey's 
instrumentalism permits' (Hickman 1990). Hickman however claims that the empiricism 
Hood describes is in fact already part o f Dewey's method— as described above, inquiry 
undeniably is in some aspect empirical.
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So the difference appears to be merely in the terminology; Dewey avoids the word 
empiricism perhaps because o f its baggage in the history o f epistemology. But there is also 
a desire to avoid the implications o f a naïve or total empiricism, which assumes experience 
to provide something like 'raw' sense-data— colours, shapes, sound as pure vibration etc.—  
from which all knowledge can then be derived. For Dewey, and William James before him 
(James 1950), sense-data can never be 'raw', because experience as it exists is due to 
millions o f years o f biological development and a lifetime's exposure to thousands o f years 
o f cultural development. This context cannot be disregarded. Sense-data is therefore 
already infused with more complexity than the word 'raw' would imply, in order to be 
sense-data. It only exists as something that can be called sense-data because it has been 
interpreted by an organism, an organism that has evolved and developed to deal with input 
to the senses in a particular way. The empirical basis for technological inquiry should be 
considered in this way; the selection o f ends-in-view is informed by biological makeup and 
previous experience, including all o f the music the composer has ever heard and so on.
The knowledge gained by this kind o f empirical investigation is called 'honorific' or 
'vital' by Dewey— it is not final or complete; it is not knowledge o f objective truth. Inquiry 
based on this kind o f knowledge is fundamentally experimental. 'Experience in its vital 
form is experimental, an effort to change the given; it is characterized by projection, by 
reaching forward into the unknown' (Dewey et al. 2010). Ends-in-view are therefore also 
referred to as projected-ends. As we will see later, this applies to the creation o f  the 
apPatch software itself, and also to the process o f using it to make music.
To re-iterate an earlier point, it is the fact that goals are formed in this way that 
leads to the conclusion that technology can never be transparent. As Hickman describes: 
'Dewey did not treat tools and instruments as value-neutral but rather as teeming with 
values and potentialities that form the basis for intelligent selection o f ends-in-view, or 
things to be done' (Hickman 1990). Due to the impossibility o f the ideal transparent 
technological medium, a final goal driven approach can only be a fantasy. Nevertheless the 
implied neutrality o f DAW-like systems suggest that a composer should proceed as if they 
are engaged in such a process. A question then arises: where do the ideas or goals 'come 
from' that are to be communicated via the transparent medium? Received wisdom might 
describe it as 'inspiration', pure creativity. But according to the arguments outlined above, 
the process is better described as one in which the ideas the composer has are in fact a 
product o f continuous technological inquiry, iterative feedback from empirical 
investigation. If the composer is unaware o f this, there is a danger that, while using a DAW
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for example, the technology is in fact surreptitiously determining many characteristics o f  
the music. In a system that purports to be general, these characteristics will be related to 
the previously mentioned naturalizations. For instance a composer might begin arranging 
events on a timeline, layering different elements and so on, without considering any 
alternative approaches. So although the perceived process is one in which the composer is 
free from constraints, the result is likely to be only the repetition o f previous or existing 
forms.
Coyne makes this point regarding information technology as a whole: '[information 
technologies] promote the illusion o f differentiation, choice, and freedom, thereby masking 
their promotion o f conformity. This is evident in the promotion o f the computer as a 
universal machine, able to do our bidding when instructed through the medium of  
programming. At best the computer only calculates and so further instills the primacy o f its 
own logic and organization, while outwardly promoting a sense o f control' (Coyne 1995). 
This 'sense o f control'— domination and mastery— is important; the rationalist approach by 
definition involves objects yielding to the will o f the subject. Technology is seen as an 
'empty container', responding to the user. Bear in mind that we are still concerned with two 
different stages o f technological production here— first the design and implementation o f a 
software audio production environment, and second its use.
Coyne describes a pragmatic approach as one where the principal characteristic is 
an understanding that technology fundamentally alters being. Me draws on Heidegger for 
this. Time is the essence o f Heidegger's conception o f being; in opposition to a Platonic 
ontology in which something underlying reality is eternal, being, according to Heidegger is 
historical and contingent. This distinction may appear inconsequential, but the alternative 
is an understanding o f historical difference (or difference in general) as 'merely' cultural, 
underlying difference is a universal kind o f being. This is what Coyne calls the 
conservative theme, it promotes the idea that human activity is only facilitated by 
technology, and activity is therefore goal driven. A given technology does not 
fundamentally change circumstances, it only performs its task better or worse than another 
technology. 'It presupposes our ability to declare needs, wants, and intentions ... 
technological artifacts conserve the intentions and meanings o f their originators. The 
conservative view presumes that designers can control, and are in control of, what they 
produce', This can also involve 'the romantic conception o f the designer as the creative 
individual, battling against opposition, preserving his or her creativity' (Coyne 1995).
It is clear to see how the understanding o f being as eternal engenders idealism in a
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field such as music. The means by which the music is being made is the facilitation o f  an 
activity which would have existed otherwise, the means can only vary in its effectiveness 
at performing its function— conserving the intention o f the composer. A concrete example 
o f this would be the aforementioned DAW-type software; various DAW systems exist 
(Logic, Cubase, Sonar etc.) and arguments rage regarding the relative merits o f  each. But 
these differences tend to be superficial, they all ultimately produce music in more-or-less 
the same way, i.e. arranging either sound files or notes (MIDI) on a timeline. There appears 
to be an underlying assumption that there exists an ideal piece o f music production 
software which all o f  these instances aim to embody, with varying degrees o f success. The 
user o f such software must already know what they want to produce, and they are looking 
for something that will allow them to produce it.
Alternatively, Coyne explains that 'for pragmatism, design is not so much 
addressing needs as projecting expectations'. The choice o f words shows a clear influence 
from Dewey. Linking this to Heidegger (he states that 'Heidegger's being is thoroughly 
pragmatic'), since being is historical and specific rather than eternal, projected expectations 
depend on the technological context in which activity is taking place. For Coyne 
'technology is implicated in how we see ourselves, and therefore, in our being ... there is 
no underlying truth to our being beyond our seeing ourselves to be under a multiplicity o f  
influences'. He claims, for instance, that 'the technologies o f writing and print have 
contributed to how we see ourselves as originators and authors o f ideas, as beings with 
minds capable o f abstract thought—minds analogous to sheets o f paper able to hold 
symbols'. If this is the case, it therefore should not be surprising that computer technology 
might fundamentally change our conception o f  what music is. Music is not a fixed concept, 
it is a human activity (Dodd 2007).
Once the radical specificity o f technology is recognized, a design process, or 
technological inquiry in general, becomes the continual identification o f new requirements 
during the process, based on exploration and a reaction to the results o f  experimentation 
with the possibilities o f the material means. 'For pragmatism, design is a kind o f “reflection 
in action”— needs are commonly identified in retrospect or during the development o f  the 
design rather than at the outset o f  the design process. Design is an exploration, but one that 
is already in progress prior to any particular design situation' (Coyne 1995).
This brings us to another important conclusion o f pragmatic philosophy: theory 
does not come prior to practice. To a rationalist, engineering is applied science— theory is 
demarcated as knowledge at a general level, which is then applied in more specific
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situations; a hierarchical top-down approach where experts pass on knowledge to those 
lower down the hierarchy. The functioning o f a technological artifact is therefore already 
determined before it is used. Coyne gives essentially a functionalist account o f rationalism; 
it 'affirms that the physical presence o f a technology is subservient to what it contains or 
accomplishes'. It does not allow for the idea of'practice as participation', o f  end-users 
participating in technological inquiry. Means are subservient to ends7, and thus the context 
in which the means occur is generally not taken into account.
However to a pragmatist, the distinction between theory and practice is usually 
considered erroneous, theory is a type o f  practice. Furthermore, non-theoretical practice 
generally comes first. Theory is a reflection on previous practice, as a working hypothesis 
that acts as a tool aiding further practice. For Dewey, thought is a technology like any 
other. In order for theory to underpin practice, there would need to be a theory on how to 
apply theory to practice. But then there would need to be a theory on how to apply that 
theory, and so on to infinity. In the tradition o f hermeneutics, following pragmatism, theory 
is replaced with phronesis— a less absolute, practical judgement.
This leaves us open to the idea that technology at all levels o f inquiry cannot be 
defined by its theoretical function, it is always situated in a context o f human praxis. Coyne 
uses the example o f a car (Coyne 1995, p.30). It gets us from A to B, yet it clearly holds 
more significance than this, it is a status symbol, it represents a certain kind o f freedom, 
and the act o f driving itself is often considered pleasurable— the means o f getting from A to 
B are an end in their own right. The means/ends dichotomy is therefore, like 
theory/practice, collapsed. Another example is the way in which digital technology is 
developed as a means for dealing with the vast amounts of data we increasingly have to 
deal with— it appears to be a means to an end in this sense— but digital technology itself is 
implicated in creating this vast amount o f data in the first place!
Coyne sees the recognition o f these kind o f ideas reflected in a (relatively) recent 
'pragmatic turn’ in IT design methods, where there is only lip service paid to theory. 
Practice is generally made to fit theory in hindsight, for the purposes o f appearing to have 
followed 'proper' methodology. Design methods should in fact follow this trend, he argues; 
they should only be loose guides that allow sensitivity to context and the specificity o f the 
situation in which the technology will be used. This will inevitably involve an
7 Alku's IMBECIL project is an interesting exploration of means and ends in software design, in an artistic 
context: a project for 'useless, obfuscated, surreal, pointless computing' (Alku 2002, see 
http://personal.ilimit.es/perkele/evol/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/Imbecil). Including programs that delete 
themselves, games that are impossible to play, 'user-non-friendly interfaces' and so on.
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intermingling o f  end-users and designers, or end-users as designers, and an openness to 
continually shifting requirements.
In order to follow this approach, Coyne asks: 'has [a technology] been designed 
with the presumption o f cause and effect from designer to user, or has its design 
appropriated the involvement o f the community that uses it? Has the design been created 
assuming the technologist knows best and that users should conform to some technological 
model o f  behavior, or has it been tried and adapted within the arena o f situated human 
praxis?' In each o f these questions, a DAW represents the former options (with small 
exceptions— perhaps the tokenistic inclusion o f feedback from users suggesting minor 
modifications).
The apPatch in contrast is designed without distinction between user and designer, 
through continuous and pragmatic experimentation to find the best results. The outcome is 
a system which highlights the ability o f technology to suggest radically new forms, rather 
than seeing technology as closing off and limiting 'creativity' due to its opacity.
Get Down
We can see the result o f this process in Pita's Get Down (MEGO 049,2002). The album 
opens with the track We don't need no music built around a low drone, making use o f  a 
frequency at the liminal point where discrete perceivable events become continuous— a 
rasping chain o f microsounds. However each o f these microsounds itself has pitch. Figure 
7 shows a spectrogram o f this sound. The frequency o f occurrence o f the sounds that are 
almost perceivable as separate events is a peak right at the bottom end o f the spectrum, but 
various strands o f evenly spaced harmonics, though low in amplitude, are also spread 
throughout. The multiple nature o f these harmonic patterns means that the result, though 
vaguely pitched is also very noisy. The most pronounced harmonic series has a 
fundamental at ~38Hz, and the next most pronounced has a fundamental at ~26Hz; they 
are not themselves harmonically related.
Research using the apPatch reveals that sounds like this are achievable using the 
Roessler module. Figure 8 shows a RSssIer attractor with typical parameters setting it in a 
chaotic state. The sonification o f the attractor in Supercollider is in fact the values o f all 
axes summed together, with any resulting DC removed. The density o f the lines shows how 
the attractor tends to stay in one plane, with occasional leaps into the third dimension that 
are often large in amplitude. With three such attractors added together, we can begin to see 
how this results in the periodic and pitched, yet also noisy material seen above. In
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experimentation to reproduce this sound, the very low frequency rasping comes from the 
contribution of the axis that only occasionally sees sudden value changes.
Figure 7: Logarithmic scale frequency analysis of excerpt from
We don’t need no music
Figure 8: Rossler attractor visualisation (generated with 3D Attractors
(Restrepo 2011)). Parameters are set to a = 0.2, b = 0.2 and c = 5.7.
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The interface for the roessler module provides controls that afford a kind o f timbral 
composition that results in sounds like this. The three chaos parameters (erroneously 
labeled 'rand' in the interface) provide the means for an exploration, which, from research 
(both observation and experimentation), was found to tend towards a search for the kind o f  
liminality discussed above. One explanation might be that such sounds are simply more 
interesting to listen to; putting it in terms o f information theory, both pure noise and pure 
repetition can be shown to provide minimal entropy. I.e. huge recordings o f constant white 
noise on the one hand or a sinewave on the other could both be losslessly compressed to 
almost nothing— they have very little information content. Something Iiminal between the 
two, on the edge o f chaotic behaviour, cannot be reduced in such a way. It has no 
redundant 'information'.
An alternative interpretation in the reverse engineering o f this drone sound is that it 
is the result o f a trigosc oscillator being triggered very rapidly. A similar sound can be 
achieved this way. High frequency switching (high frequency in event triggering terms) 
between two or three pitches would also account for the spectrum in figure 7. Later in the 
track, the drone is replaced by a bassline sequence that has a similar quality to the drone. 
This could be a sudden alteration o f the tempo slider in a sequencer module, from very 
high, where rhythm becomes texture, to a more conventional tempo for a sequencer.
Whichever its source, after 35 seconds o f the drone, an arpeggiated sequence 
appears. The sound in contrast to the drone is very clean, a single oscillator with gentle 
harmonics. This is most likely one or two TrigOsc oscillators with a waveform drawn into 
the waveform window, and the filter reducing any harshness o f the resulting harmonics. 
Due to the repeating nature o f the phrase, it is likely to be controlled by a sequencer 
module. There is also portamento on the frequency changes o f the sound. The sequence is 
sporadic and fitful, it beats a regular time and repeats in a regular way, and yet manages to 
avoid a kind o f musicality that would allow a listener to easily count time to it. For 
example, no preference or emphasis is given to notes that fall on 1/1 or 1/2 or 1/4 
measures.
Values for the parameters that determine the sequence are set as numbers in a series 
of anonymous looking text boxes, there is no higher-level graphical representation to give 
an overall impression o f the pattern being composed. This makes it difficult to approach in 
a rational way since one cannot easily visualize a pattern and transcribe it. In addition, it 
initializes with random values, and allows re-randomization, as well as various functions 
for scrambling the existing pattern. These options make experimentation engaging. Such
98
operations give absolutely no preference to patterns that adhere to traditional musical 
norms, such as limiting to a key, or having any kind o f tonal centre or preference in 
rhythms for the down beat. During this experimentation, the composer, through the 
formation o f  ends-in-view, may work towards patterns that have some resemblance to 
musical norms, since the composer's history o f listening is a part o f the way in which 
sense-data becomes experience and ends-in-view are formed. Yet at the same time the 
composer can be open to shifts in those norms suggested by the technology. Such 
deviations would not likely be found in the (theoretical) rational approach, since by 
definition, they are something unexpected or unanticipated.
Despite the randomness and unknown elements, the situation is not one in which 
the patch is 'out o f  control'. Rehberg states that he is in control o f the software ('ninety 
percent of the time' at least [1]). It is possible not to know the exact results of any given 
action, but to have an intuitive feel for the type or scale o f the response, learned from 
previous experience. The fact that the patch contains indeterminate elements does not carry 
the implication that this pushes the system as a whole beyond the user's control. Quite the 
opposite appears to be true— they are the elements that form the basis for interaction. They 
bring about a deeper, more productive type o f control; interaction rather than merely 
action, abandoning any top-down patriarchal type o f control.
This deeper relationship formed with the technology is important. Rehberg has 
continued to use the same software for a number o f years, despite the technological 
advances in computing that have occurred in that time. He has emphasized the importance 
of mastering just a few tools, rather than immediately making use o f the latest available 
tools [1], Learned through years o f  practice, his intuitive use o f the apPatch software is in 
many ways like the use o f a traditional instrument (but in other ways very different as will 
be discussed later).
The majority o f the tracks on Get Down make use o f almost all o f the modules in 
combination. For instance We don’t need no music, as well as using the sequencer, trigosc 
and roessler modules, also makes extensive use o f the effects modules. All o f the sound 
material has a large amount o f reverb throughout, from the comber module. Then towards 
the end o f the track, all o f the material together becomes subject to extreme distortion and 
sporadic gating. At this point we also begin to perceive the characteristic effect of the 
resonators from the resonix module. The sounds become gated to such a degree that they 
begin to approximate impulses, to which the resonators give a short pitched tail.
The second track, titled 43353, features noisy material sequenced into repeating,
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gradually shifting patterns. This could be the result o f  a technique often used by Rehberg, 
in which material originally generated by the patch is recorded, and then used as source 
material in the patch using the sample player. He explains that this feedback process often 
happens multiple times, such that he builds a vast collection of sound files that have been 
used and reprocessed so many times that their original source (for instance a roessler drone 
or a trigosc sequence) is barely recognizable [1]. This refers not only to timbral processing; 
any phrasing through sequencing or other kinds o f triggering becomes material to be re­
sequenced, creating immensely complex patterns within patterns. Extreme pitch shifting 
also allows rhythms to become pitches and vice-versa.
43353 begins with the random triggering o f a slurred double pulse o f granular- 
sounding harsh timbres. Assuming this is a sample, each triggered sample is shifted to what 
appears to be a random pitch, but is actually a repeating sequence o f pitches. They appear 
to be random since the sequence is long enough for its repetition to not become apparent 
immediately, and the durations between them are sporadic. This type o f pattern can be set 
up in the patch using no randomness at all— the sequence o f  pitches can be set in the 
sequencer, and altering the tempo parameter o f the sequencer periodically, unrelated to the 
sequencer's base tempo, will cause every iteration o f the pattern to have very different 
timings.
Time in the patch— or rather the various representations o f time (represented by 
tempos, durations between events and so on)— can be slowed down, sped up, interrupted, 
scrambled and reversed. In contrast to a sequencer found in a DAW (inheriting from the 
idea o f a score) which depicts or prescribes the timings o f events in a given duration as a 
linear representation, the representation o f  events in time in the apPatch sequencer module 
bears little resemblance to the sound results that tend to come out o f it. Its primary purpose 
is therefore not to represent time at all, along very pragmatic lines, the representation o f  
time is seen not as fixed and immutable but as a technological tool for practical activity. 
Because o f the technological approach then, there is no possibility of'the reification o f the 
score' in this music— a confusion between representation and reality (Whitehead called this 
'the fallacy o f misplaced concreteness' (Whitehead 1997)).
Due to the unusual approach to determining timings and pitches, the impression is 
one o f events occurring 'accidentally'. Rather than merely being 'accidental' though, this 
preference for jarring rhythms and mostly atonal pitches could be linked to Rehberg's 
stated 'dissatisfaction with the status quo' [1]. There is a generally oppositional stance in 
Mego. There seems to be a desire in Rehberg's work to challenge listeners by distancing as
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far as possible not only from existing musical vocabularies, but also the basic expectation 
that recognizable patterns will emerge.
At 1:05 into track 4, Our pen!, a repeating percussive rhythm becomes 
instantaneously distorted with the addition feedback and other extreme effects, severely 
changing the character of the sound. This happens suddenly at a point in the pattern that 
bears no relation to its perceived beginning or any whole subdivision of a measure within 
it. This is the manifestation of an innate characteristic of the routing in the patch—changes 
to the routing of signals cause large sudden transformations like this, while changes to the 
parameters within modules tend to be more gradual.
We can see similar structures in Rehberg's work prior to Get Down. In particular, 
the untitled third track of Get Out (MEGO 029. 1999) consists of a looped sample from 
Ennio Morricone's Come Maddalena from the soundtrack to the 1971 film Maddalena. The 
loop is progressively subjected to a variety of different distortions. Coming before access 
to software like Supercollider, this was done with various distortion pedals, which can be 
turned on or off (or bypassed), giving the system a similar means of instantaneous routing 
switching as above. The distortions are introduced suddenly, again, at points within the 
loop that sound particularly 'unmusical', l.e., in their timing they do not tie into the 
phrasing of the sampled sound. Coming from a separate process external to the loop, they 
are undisguised interventions on what has become a unified mass of material underneath.
Figure 9: Get Out track 3. Changes in distortion are marked with vertical
lines. The distribution of harmonics is different at each change.
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When patterns emerge in Rehberg's work they always retain this arbitrary feel. For 
instance, as 43353 progresses, the initial granular sounds become lost in a chaos of 
overlapping rhythms, one o f which features the LFO modulation o f a filter pitch, moving 
in and out o f phase with other rhythmic and LFO-like elements. Importantly, this is without 
the teleology that tends to be associated with phase based pieces in the model o f Steve 
Reich, for example. In such pieces the phase relationships are very much the point o f the 
work, creating a tension that usually leads to an in-phase resolution (Piano Phase, It's 
gonna rain etc.). In 43353 the possibility for elements working in different timings is 
simply allowed to affect the result in the same way as any other characteristic o f the patch; 
structures like this are reached through experimentation rather than the deliberate intention 
to compose a phase based piece.
In general, the patch makes it difficult to form clear musical intentions for the 
resulting sound, prior to creating that sound. This o f course is paradoxical if we hold that 
the formation o f intent is fundamentally the way in which we act in the world. But the 
patch very quickly forces one to abandon such models o f action in favour o f a playful 
experimentation periodically directed by transient goals and projections that tend to be 
fugitive. The attempt to realize them results in something very different, and the previous 
goal is then discarded to follow a new projection suggested by the unexpected results.
This also has consequences for the structure o f pieces made with the patch. Each 
track in Get Down has some movement— from one set o f materials to another, or an 
alteration in parameters that change the distribution o f events etc.— but lacks an overall 
teleology, structural aspects that we might refer to as narrative. They do not tend to lead 
anywhere, either to a climax or a deconstruction and exposition o f materials. We do 
sometimes glimpse moments where it feels as though this is beginning to happen though; a 
change will often be from a simple configuration to a more complex configuration 
(because this is the pattern that a session using apPatch takes, as routing complexity 
gradually increases). For example track 6, Acid udon, begins with a looping melody that 
builds gradually with various distortions and delays, only to be abruptly replaced at around 
1:40, before it has found any kind o f resolution, with a more heavily processed ambient 
section, perhaps using the same basic material. The transition in this instance is not so 
sudden that it is itself a gestural climax to the building section. It lasts about 10-20 
seconds, attention is not drawn to it, leaving an unceremonious impression. This new 
section is then cut to silence in an arbitrary manner roughly a minute later, and an 
apparently completely unrelated section then lasts for the remaining one and a half
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minutes.
Simplifying, one way o f seeing the structure is as a series o f plateaus; system states 
that have been found to have aesthetic value or interest. We sometimes move between these 
states, but the structure o f the work as whole has a kind o f flatness, when one track (or one 
state within a track) has run its course, it is turned off and the next is turned on. Movement 
within these plateaus is transitory— i.e. when two states are related (state B is state A with 
some parameter changes). The album is o f course edited, so the 'turning o ff and 'turning 
on' is in reality an edit point in most cases. Track 8, facetiously titled Track 7, is 
characterized by what sounds like slightly busier editing; introducing new behaviours fairly 
rapidly, and sometimes overlapping different states. It is difficult to effect such a variety o f  
qualitative changes this rapidly using the patch in real-time.
The album in general manages to avoid referencing other kinds o f music it does 
not borrow from, combine, or subvert existing genres, but perhaps can be seen as their 
negation. This is partly a result o f the aforementioned persistent contrariness regarding 
notions of'musicality', since our understanding o f musicality is situated in the context o f  
existing genres. In a clear exception to this rule, Get Down closes with a track called Fine 
swex that evokes metal guitar sounds (prefiguring Rehberg's later work with Stephen 
O'Malley as KTL). Rehberg has said o f metal and rock music that he was always drawn to 
certain formal aspects o f it ('I liked the volume of it'), and wanted to do something similar 
but without the extra-musical aspects—the posturing and the decoration [1].
Bearing in mind the exception o f Fine swex, the argument in this chapter is that Get 
Down is very much a result o f the characteristic affordances and idiosyncrasies o f the 
apPatch software; using these technological aspects as a means o f distancing from existing 
music. Even in the Fine swex example, it is likely the case that experimentation began to 
suggest the metal-esque sounds, and this combined with Rehberg's knowledge o f metal 
resulted in the formation o f a goal to refine and work towards this type o f sound. The point 
is that the music therefore does not represent non-material iiieai that exist prior to, or 
separate to, technological inquiry; an inquiry in which both the material means o f  
production and the context o f  the encounter (previous inquiry) are integral.
Continuing to focus on the means o f  production, there are three main traits that 
characterize the patch and therefore also characterize Get Down', the use o f randomness, 
the interconnectedness o f signal routing, and anti-gestural control mechanisms:
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Randomness
Low-level randomness (the dust module, filling a wavetable with noise, and so on) is at a 
higher level perceptually predictable. It can be used in a directed way in composition, 
because the composer knows more or less what the result will sound like. Stochastic or 
aleatoric music is an example o f this, the composer defines the overall structure o f the 
piece, but details are left to statistical probabilistic processes; randomness within composed 
limits, as discussed previously with respect to Xenakis, and certain Cage pieces such as 
Music o f  Changes. This is in fact the meaning o f the word 'aleatory' as Werner Meyer- 
Eppler defined it: randomness within controlled limits ('alea' is a latin root meaning 'dice', a 
die having a limited number o f  sides).
There are numerous examples in the use o f the patch o f invoking randomness 
within limits, with a very complex relationship between indeterminacy and control, a 
strange overlapping o f the two: triggering from a dust module but taking pitch from a 
sequencer module, to create a series o f randomly triggered notes which nonetheless are 
controlled by the composer, or routing a dust module to set the tempo o f a sequencer, or 
using the 'r' button on a sequencer module to move randomly around a defined sequence, or 
a random parameter walk starting from something carefully defined.
Progressing from strategies like this, the patch allows randomness to very quickly 
become higher level. It is not so much a material to be composed, but a compositional 
strategy itself, and can be used to move away from a composed sound. Also important are 
strategies that do not make use of actual pseudo-random number generators, such as the 
contingency o f running the mouse pointer over phase and magnitude bins to create a 
wavetable, or simply moving sliders whose function has become unclear due to immensely 
complex signal routing. So the higher level randomness is often necessarily built on lower 
level elements, which are either not random or pseudo-random, but it is also sometimes the 
result o f  more radical contingency.
Cage distinguished between 'indeterminacy with respect to composition' and 
'indeterminacy with respect to performance' (Cage 1973), but in the case o f this patch, the 
two are indistinguishable—the patch is used in the same way for creating recorded works 
in the studio, or playing live performances. As with Haswell and Hecker's use o f the UPIC, 
it is also a very different kind o f  indeterminacy to Cage's indeterminate works which are 
arguably a precisely planned invocation o f randomness. The indeterminacy, contingency, in 
question here is much more informal, it often comes from clicking around the patch 
interface without knowing in advance what the result will be. Another way o f
104
understanding this is as a Bayesian model o f indeterminacy— probability not as a statistical 
phenomenon, but a measure o f knowledge regarding a situation. This gives a more holistic 
model o f  the use o f indeterminacy in music, taking into account any unknowns in the 
approach taken.
The way one instinctively uses the patch evidences the way in which it encourages 
an approach making effective use o f  this holistic view o f indeterminacy. But also, perhaps 
even more fundamentally, not just in the use o f the patch but in the development of the 
patch itself, this approach allowed the (arbitrary, contingent) affordances o f  the currently 
available technology to determine the system and therefore the music. Most o f the modules 
are essentially wrappers for existing SuperCollider unit generators, which are themselves 
in most cases the processes that most readily suggest themselves given the technology o f  
digital signal processing. The technological approach is axiomatic.
Interconnectedness of signal routing
Even in its default state, all o f  the outputs from generator modules are routed to all effects 
modules. Parameters o f effects modules can therefore be changed to affect one sound but 
others are affected similarly. They can of course be disconnected, but they must go through 
at least one effects module, there is no direct output. It is necessary in most cases for 
signals to share effects modules— due to the limited CPU power and screen space, it is 
unusual to have one or more effects modules for each output.
Likewise with regards to the control modules— the same sequencer or dust trigger 
module usually controls a number o f different things, linking elements o f the piece in 
surprising ways, connecting aspects that are thought o f as being categorically different 
things. For example the values from a complicated sequencer pattern could control the 
chaos parameters o f a Rfissler drone, but at the same time also set the speed o f playback in 
a sample player loaded with rhythmic material.
So although it may appear initially that the patch affords composition by parts (a 
sequencer playing an oscillator, then the introduction o f a drone ... etc.) in reality the 
interconnectedness o f the signal routing means that very quickly one ends up with a 
complex tightly interwoven system, in which each part affects most o f the other parts. They 
cannot therefore be considered separate parts in a process o f composition, to be added or 
taken away without fundamentally altering the entire system. The compositional process is 
more like the definition o f a limited system (within a limited system), followed by an 
exploration o f its different possible parameter states.
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In addition to the user defined routing, there is also the fact that each effects module 
has a multitude o f different processes combined into one unit, which cannot be individually 
turned on and off. Why not have each o f these processes as a smaller module, so that they 
can be combined in any way the user desires? This would be much more flexible, but it 
would be missing the point. Flexibility does not appear to be the goal in the design o f  the 
software. The complexity o f each effects module, not despite but because q /its limitations, 
encourages non-rational experimentation.
Adding to the complex interconnectedness is Rehberg's technique o f  re-using 
material generated in the patch by loading it into the sample player and 
triggering/processing it further. This feedback is potentially infinitely recursive. It 
introduces another level o f  interconnection between parts, for instance with a sequencer- 
triggered pattern being re-triggered by a new sequencer.
Anti-gestural control
Nothing in the interface affords gestural control. The widgets are largely either fiddly 
sliders or typed values. Even if they could be moved in a gestural way, the sound result of 
changes to the types of parameters available is often very subtle and gradual on the one 
hand, or too low-level on the other. Also, the complexity which is quickly reached in the 
signal routing means that a parameter change has a very indirect and counter-intuitive 
result on the sound. Furthermore a lot o f the controls are discrete, stepped.
SuperColIider
All o f the above could be said to result from acquiescence to the affordances o f the 
underlying Supercollider framework.
• The indeterminacy results from either the use o f SuperCollider unit generators that 
comprise a simple interface to some kind o f psuedo-randomness, or unknowns that 
arise in the complexity o f their combination.
• The signal routing mechanism is a basic representation o f the way in which 
SuperCollider unit generators are linked, and the interconnectedness is due to 
limited screen space (a result o f  using the default SuperCollider GUI library in a 
straightforward way, without dynamic redrawing to hide/show different modules) 
and CPU power (the processing capability o f SuperCollider running on specific 
hardware).
• The difficulty o f gestural control is due to the use o f the default GUI widgets.
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The music then in some sense remains 'true' to its means of production; it does not force 
upon the technology ideas inherited from elsewhere— other musical traditions. However, 
things are not quite so simple as this, there are important exceptions. The 8 step sequencer 
bears a resemblance to the Roland TB-303, leaving a trace o f the techno influence. Also we 
can see vicarious influences, where a musical tradition has had an impact on related 
technologies. For example there is no indication o f the note name for pitches in the 
sequencer (or a piano roll etc.), so traditional harmony clearly appears to be unimportant. 
However it does use MIDI note numbers, which do o f course translate to frequencies 
determined by an equal tempered scale, usually mapped across a standard 88 note piano 
keyboard.
A graphical keyboard or even just note names give a sense o f symmetry and an 
intuitive indication o f how notes will harmonize (indicating the distance between octaves 
at the very least). But MIDI note numbers lack this immediate symmetry— octaves are 12 
numbers apart, but are shown as base 10 numbers. This has no bearing on harmony; two 
notes ten numbers apart give an unusual interval (a minor 7th— e.g. C to Bb). This is a 
good example o f arbitrariness and strange contingency in the system— the decimal number 
system, probably developed due to the fact that humans have ten fingers, is used to 
represent something that has nothing to do with fingers and would be more 'naturally' 
represented in base 12. Even a basic non-logarithm ic representation o f pitch, in Hz, would 
give more o f an intuitive understanding o f harmony than this— double the number to 
increase an octave and so on. So the choice to use MIDI note numbers is an interesting one. 
It indicates an ambivalence towards harmony, pitch is almost seen as an arbitrary 
parameter. This is not to say that pitch is unimportant, but that pitch values must be arrived 
at empirically. A composer is unlikely to rationally compose a melody using a 
representation based on MIDI note values. This prompting o f an experimental approach is 
reinforced by the way in which a sequencer module defaults to random pitch values, giving 
a starting point for experimentation.
Eidos
The experimental approach described is in opposition to an approach which is perhaps best 
described by Heidegger, in discussion of 'the eidos' in Greek thought: 'the potter forms a 
vase out o f  clay. All forming o f  shaped products is effected by using an image, in the sense 
of a model, as a guide or standard. The thing is produced by looking to the anticipated look 
o f what is to be produced by shaping, forming. It is this anticipated look o f the thing,
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sighted beforehand, that the Greeks mean ontologically by eidos, idea’ (Heidegger 1988). 
The thing then produced is thus seen as a imperfect representation o f  the originary eidos. 
The link with Platonic idealist thought is clear. Heidegger claims that this model o f  
artisanal production leads to the idea that all things have an eidos, an essence (God as 
'super-artisan' (Blattner 2006)). Dewey's concept o f ends-in-view provides a different way 
o f thinking o f artistic production, in which goal formation is an ongoing process, informed 
by arbitrary material realities.
In terms o f  the approach to technology, the eidetic approach requires a theoretical 
knowledge o f the tools being used, whereas an experimental approach requires embodied 
knowledge. This concept o f embodied knowledge is perhaps the most striking similarity 
between Dewey and Heidegger: they both elevate the kind of'knowing' that is not 
theoretical, is not o f the kind that can be articulated. DJ Pierre and Earl Smith in Pump Up 
The Volume: The History of House Music (Hindmarch 2001) describe their first encounter 
with the Roland TB-303, that led ultimately to the invention o f a new genre. Their 
innovation was predicated precisely on their lack o f theoretical knowledge regarding the 
technology they were using. The acid house they pioneered was not imagined prior to the 
process o f experimentation:
He said 'I cant figure how how to work this thing, it's still doing this 
weird sound, I don't know how to program i t ... maybe you can 
figure out how to program it because it ain't come with a book.' And 
so instead o f trying to program it I just started turning knobs ... and 
he was like 'what are you doing?' I said 'I don't know just turning 
these knobs,' he said 'keep doing it!' I'm turning the knobs and we're 
just sat there for 30 or 40 minutes just turning knobs going 'I like 
that, I like that...'(Hindmarch 2001)
Similarly in the apPatch, the experimental use o f the modules is more important than 
having a technical understanding o f them, even for Pieper, who developed the software and 
therefore can't help but have a technical understanding: 'after a while you don't question the 
inner workings o f a module any more, you just live within the things it can do' [8].
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Evol and algorithmic composition
Evol is a music project started by Roc Jiménez de Cisneros and Anna Ramos beginning in 
1996 with CD-R releases on their own Alku label which, despite appearing to exist in 
commercial territory, is described by Jiménez de Cisneros as 'an exercise in masochistic 
economics'; not non-profitable but 'anti-profitable' (of course, this is somewhat 
paradoxical). Releases are not only in unusual formats but are also produced in small runs, 
with many copies given away for free. The first Evol performance was at the 1996 
Barcelona Sonar festival. Peter Rehberg was present at this event, a meeting which led 
eventually to the release o f Principio on Mego in 1999. Jiménez de Cisneros cites exposure 
to the work o f Rehberg and Farmers Manual as the main influence that led to his 
involvement in computer music [3].
Evol releases, though often containing collaborative elements, continue to consist 
mainly o f work by Jiménez de Cisneros. He has gone on to release material on a variety o f  
different labels, for instance the Punani series ('I was playing lots o f Jamaican dancehall 
music at the time, the word kept coming to me and I thought... that's a fantastic word for a 
really long electro-acoustic series' [3]) spans five different labels— Mego, Falsch, 
Scarcelight Recordings, Alku and Entr'acte. His work has become primarily focussed on 
algorithmic composition, and as with most artists on these labels, he is operating largely 
outside o f an academic context, therefore exhibiting an approach to the use o f  algorithms in 
music which remains fairly undocumented. His background and the origin o f his 
involvement in computer music is not the result o f an exposure to academic discourse on 
electronic music (although he does have a full awareness o f this history, from recordings o f  
Ligetti, Stockhausen, Xenakis etc. in a Barcelona public library archive). It's more an auto- 
didactic approach, and as such differs in some fundamental ways to the majority o f  
academically documented algorithmic composition. The purpose o f this chapter is 
primarily to discuss this approach to algorithmic composition taken by Jiménez de 
Cisneros. However, for comparison, I will first give an overview o f other approaches.
Algorithmic Composition
Surveying the related literature, the impression one gets is that the majority o f activity in 
this area is based on corpus analysis for the automation o f composition. In their 
'Introduction to Evolutionary Computing for Musicians’, Husbands et al discuss whether 
the evaluation o f  algorithmic composition systems should be based on musical theory or
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concrete examples o f musical practice. They opt for the latter, claiming that the aim is for 
an algorithmic composition system to produce 'something paralleling an end product that 
significant composers actually produced' (Husbands et al. 2007). They proceed to focus on 
sonata form, but emphasize its actual use by composers rather than any textbook theory.
But they still retain the principal assumption that the goal ultimately is to imitate existing 
('human') composition.
Later in the same paper, it is stated, paraphrasing Cope, that 'throughout the history 
o f Western Art Music, composers have used algorithms as part o f the creative process'.
This is reminiscent o f Koenig's remark: '1 have composed algorithmically before I ever saw 
a computer' (Laske 2011). If musical practice is fundamentally an algorithmic phenomenon 
(a convincing claim), then what differentiates 'algorithmic composition' o f the kind being 
discussed from any other kind o f musical creation? In particular, why should it now be 
evaluated based on its similarity to archaic composition? Algorithmic processes used in 
said archaic composition were not themselves devised to imitate previous composition. 
Consider the way in which algorithmic techniques such as the fugue evolve over time, 
developed by composers, not by people wishing to imitate other composers. This is 
something that does not escape the attention o f Husbands et al: 'The problem arises with 
Cope’s unstated but implied assumption that significant composers at all periods in the 
development o f Western art music did indeed adhere strictly to established musical forms 
in their most original work'. So why then introduce this imitative, fundamentally 
conservative change in approach?
A likely response to this question, is that the kind of corpus based approaches it 
applies to should be thought o f as more a type o f musicology than composition: 'an attempt 
to verify a musical analysis by resynthesis' (Nierhaus 2008). Encoding a musical form into 
an algorithm would surely represent the ultimate mastery and understanding o f it. This 
indeed is the aim in approaches such as the evolutionary computing discussed by Husbands 
et al. Hsil and Hsii adopt a similar approach, and provide an interesting description o f it; 
their aim is to utilize analyses o f Bach pieces to build 'an alternative score, according to the 
theory o f music harmony', the end result o f  which 'will not be Bach's, but it could be 
comparable in quality if  it has been constructed on the basis o f a correct understanding o f  
the mathematic structure o f Bach's music' (K. J. Hsii & A. Hsll 1991).
The ultimate purpose o f this type o f practice tends to remain unclear, often with 
vague notions that it might somehow have pedagogical value ('designing computer 
programs that will recognize and reason about human musical concepts enables the
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creation o f applications for performance, education, and production that resonate with and 
reinforce the basic nature o f human musicianship' (Rowe 2004)). Regardless, its purpose is 
clearly not to devise systems for the creation of'new' music. However I will argue that the 
impulse to imitate previous musics can also exist in algorithmic composition that is not 
explicitly corpus based. Manifestations o f this include attempts to discover techniques that 
optimize 'pleasantness' (Manaris et al. 2005), or 'musical intelligibility' (Pecquet 1999); 
searching for a universal encoding o f music in an effort to completely understand it.
Going all the way back to Hiller and Isaacson's original work in computer music, 
the four experiments o f the Illiac Suite provide some useful archetypes for approaches to 
algorithmic composition. They begin with the idea that a computer can compose music as a 
human does, apparently following basic musical rules. They state that 'computer-produced 
music which is 'meaningful' is conceivable to the extent to which the laws o f musical 
organization are codifiable' (Hiller & Isaacson 1979). Note the term 'laws o f musical 
organization'; the assumption that such laws exist take the composition inevitably towards 
imitation. If we do not take such 'laws' to be universal, then they can only refer to the rules 
and processes that previous musics have used in their composition. In the case o f their first 
experiment this includes first-species strict counterpoint.
Music is perhaps always built upon previous music, based on gradual shifts in 
aesthetic judgement. But the point here is that a process involving aesthetic judgement is 
different to the explicit (and rational rather than empirical) evaluation o f algorithmically 
generated new music based on its proximity to existing music. The latter has the effect o f  
closing off the work to any influence that the technology being used might have on the 
result. The 'technology being used' here could refer for example to the devised algorithms 
themselves— perhaps deviating from their intended function, not performing their task o f  
imitating previous music efficiently— or even basic characteristics o f the platform for the 
automation o f those algorithms. The aspects o f the Illiac Suite that present interesting 
original composition are exactly the aspects in which it fails in some respect to imitate 
'normal' or 'good' composition: the incessant, overtly stochastic barrage o f notes in 
experiments three and four, or the not-quite-right harmonization in the droning adagio o f  
experiment two. This represents a shift in Hiller and Isaacson's goals as they proceeded 
through the experiments. By the time they get to experiments three and four, the interest 
moves towards showing 'that computers might be used in highly unusual ways to produce 
radically different species o f music based upon fundamentally new techniques o f musical 
analysis'(Hiller & Isaacson 1979).
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Heinrich Taube sees algorithmic composition as opening up an explicit metalevel 
in composition; an opportunity to work at the level defining how the composition proceeds, 
the rules that govern it, 'the composition o f the composition' rather than merely doing the 
composition itself (based on implicit rules that already exist). Crucially, in describing the 
discovery o f this possibility, he explains the importance o f its opposition to an analytical 
approach: 'the realization that this new (to me) level was essentially devoid o f any 
preconceived notions o f “musical correctness” and so offered me an attractive alternative 
to the symbols and glyphs o f  Common Practice music, which I increasingly felt were too 
tied to historical tradition' (Taube 2004).
He states that the main reason for being interested in computer composition is to 
think about music and to write music differently than one would without using a computer. 
This is linked to the idea that composition is 'an essentially empirical activity, one in which 
the composer experiments with ideas and rapidly tests them out as they develop from an 
initial curiosity into their final compositional form ... changes in the metalevel can lead to 
unintended or unanticipated consequences that trigger new compositional ideas or take the 
compositional process in a totally new direction'. Computer composition like this may not 
be categorically different to any other kind of composition, but when a quantitive 
difference is large enough it becomes qualitative: 'metalevel compositions can explore 
domains too complex or too large to imagine doing without a computer'.
The aim in many cases though, appears to be to suppress this, and retain the 
humanity in composition (or more accurately— encode and automate the humanity in 
composition), attempting to prevent the intrusion o f the soulless material world. It is to 
create a music that is as close as possible to what is taken to be existing aesthetics; 
importantly, there is an implication here that the reason for doing this is that certain aspects 
of such aesthetics might in fact be universal. As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, there is 
a difference between romantic idealism and classical idealism; music is seen as an 
expression o f the self or o f humanity, or as an expression o f universal formal harmony (but 
also often both at the same time).
Hiller and Isaacson discuss the ways in which aesthetics can be understood and 
encoded. Regarding the classical, they point out that 'the earliest writers saw in music an 
imitation o f  a fundamental divine harmony o f  universal significance', claiming that 
accordingly, music has often been classified as a form o f  mathematics (Hiller & Isaacson 
1979). They go on to discuss the romantic: 'the still popular concept o f music as a direct 
emotional expression and an explicit and subjective communication from the composer is,
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in fact, largely a consequence o f  the rather extreme views developed during the period o f  
the nineteenth-century Romantic tradition'. When music is seen as emotional 
communication like this, it must again be merely a portrayal. The point is that both the 
classical and the romantic involve fundamentally seeing music as representation. Th 
can begin to see how these issues in algorithmic encoding are related to the central issu 
the thesis. Formalization is based on the conception o f music as imitation; a representation 
of ideal form (abstract and therefore formalizable).
So by encoding and understanding specific aesthetics, the idea is that we get closer 
to some underlying rules o f aesthetics, based on universal formal beauty, or the universa ty 
of the human condition and its expression. There is for instance the ongoing popularity o f  
investigations into 1/f distributions, usually referencing the corpus analysis done by Voss 
and Clarke (Voss & Clarke 1975). The idea is that both pitch fluctuation and amplitude 
fluctuation spectra for all kinds o f music (and speech) exhibit a relationship where power 
inversely proportional to frequency. This is a pattern also found in countless examples 
nature (coastlines, heart beat patterns, electronic devices and so on). U is in fact a man’ 
property o f  self-similarity— in the case o f music this is self-similarity through time.
Keshner’s description o f  1/f noise is useful in understanding how it is linked to self­
similarity: he describes it as the result o f  what can be reduced to a simple state based 
system which 'condenses its past history into the present values o f  its state variables, o 
which represents an average over the most recent 1 unit o f  time, one for the last 10 tim 
units, 100 units, 1000,10000, and so on. Each such state variable has an equal influence on 
present behavior' (Keshner 1982). So we can see how a self-similar system inherently 
produces 1/f spectra in a logarithmic manner. Given this relationship, the discovery that al 
different kinds o f  music show a 1/f spectrum led Voss and Clarke to the conclusion that 
music is essentially self-similar and therefore can be described by fractal geometry. Many 
since them have continued this line o f  inquiry (for more examples see (Dodge & Jerse 
1997)).
It is however the case that not only music, but more or less any phenomenon sh 
aspects o f self-similarity. It is hardly surprising that whatever processes determine structu e 
on one level will be similar in character to those determining structure at any other level. 
Take for instance the erosion and deposition by waves, tides and currents that creates 
particular types o f  coastline patterns on a scale o f a few metres. S ince the process is very 
similar at a higher-level (again, erosion and deposition by waves, tides and currents) the 
same kind o f patterns will be seen on a scale in the order o f hundreds o f metres and so on.
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In the same way, self-similarity in time, in music for example, seems natural given that at 
any level it is a phenomenon based on frequency; rhythm is subject to the same harmonic 
relationships as pitch and so on.
1/f noise through time thus appears simply to describe the way 'things in general 
tend to change; a basic property o f physical systems very dependent on their mo 
state (causally, or at least related in some way) and exponentially less dependent on the' 
previous states as we look back in time. It produces a balance between repetition and 
change: ’The observations on music suggest that 1/f noise is a good choice for stochast’ 
composition. Compositions in which the frequency and duration o f each note were 
determined by 1/f noise sources sounded pleasing. Those generated by white noise sou c 
sounded too random, while those generated by 1 /f2 noise sounded too correlated (Voss & 
Clarke 1975). This balance between repetition and change is linked to aesthetics perhaps 
simply through its familiarity, being present in almost all physical processes.
But for some researchers the relationship is more profound, music is said to have 
innate links with nature (Fitch et al. 1995). Musical structures seem to exist to give a 
to a more fundamental or deeper essence. The music in this sense acts as a conduit from th 
sensible world to an abstract realm o f ideal form. This conceptual scheme is manifest in 
technical sense by placing emphasis on the connection or mapping between the two, 
between the mathematics and the material result. This is usually expressed as a desire t 
find the 'correct' mapping from the output o f a process to sound parameters (Doombu 
2002). Without explicitly stating the fact, this approach belies a transcendent understanding 
of the nature o f  music, with the composer as mediating entity between the physical and th 
ideal. Algorithms used tend to be derived from natural processes— ftocking/swarm 
algorithms, cellular automata, L-Systems etc., the implication again being that there is 
something 'underlying' the sensible world from which beauty derives, the sublime as 
emergent complexity in nature. As Dominique Richard puts it: fractal music, markovian 
music, cellular automata, chaos and catastrophe theories fall under that same category o f  
musical formalisation which assumes a universal isomorphy between all natural 
phenomena'(Richard 1996).
More generally the idea is that music is a manifestation of some form of 
mathematical perfection. The importance attributed to the use o f phenomena such as the 
golden ratio in Chowning's Stria is another example (Meneghini 2007). A search for 
universality therefore pervades a lot o f  algorithmic composition, through mathematical 
abstraction even if  corpus analysis is avoided.
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For Hsü and Hsü, self-similarity brings about a hierarchical understanding o f the 
nature o f music. They perform a mathematical process o f smoothing out on Bach s 
Invention no. 1 (BWV 772), first to halve the number o f  notes, then to quarter it, and so on 
down to 1/64, which leaves only 3 notes: 'the foundation upon which the whole 
composition is built’ (K. J. Hsü & A. Hsü 1991) (this is very reminiscent o f the 
Schenkerian concept o f a background 'ursatz', fundamental structure). The lower level 
aspects o f the piece are then shown to be self-similar fractal elaborations on this 
foundation. In this process there is the sense o f a reductive search for essence. Hsü and H 
pose the question: at what point can a piece o f music still be considered the work o f the 
composer when the number o f  notes in it is reduced in this way? I.e. is the 3 note 
fundamental structure o f  BWV 772 still Bach? This essentialist reductivism epitomizes a 
view that Nierhaus, in outlining the historic development o f algorithmic techniques, tr 
back to early enlightenment rationalism: 'Proponents o f  the theory o f rationalism 
their assumptions on postulates such as metaphysics (the world is logical and 
constitutionally ordered) or epistemology (the world should be fathomed only by 
rationality, independent from human experience). These theses favor the presumption o f  
the principal feasibility o f  all things'. He draws parallels between latter algorithmic 
composition and fantasies o f  rationality like Liebnizs lingua universalis (an all 
embracing representation o f  knowledge'), Lullus' 'Ars Magna, or the concept o f a 
books' found in various forms in Mallarmé, Lasswitz, Borges and others (Nierhau 2 ),
attempts to systematically encode knowledge.
More closely related, we could also identify systematic approaches such as 
serialism as a precursor. Approaches like this according to Georgina Born are concerned 
with displacing the aesthetic onto other discursive systems (Bom 1995). She identifies in 
institutions such as 1RCAM a denial or avoidance o f issues concerning aesthetics. Such 
issues are replaced by an apparently scientific approach to music science is the study of 
nature, these are attempts to understand and rationalize the 'nature o f  music. Within this 
there is always a 'claimed or implied' universality, a 'standardization o f  m usic. Bom claim 
that this overdetermination o f aesthetics is ideological, it allows IRCAM to formulate the 
terms o f its own legitimation'.
The standardization tendency is particularly present in AI-based approaches to 
composition. Curtis Roads describes the systematic nature of AI composition:
The germ idea o f organizing musical compositions around a set o f  
systematic procedures contains within it the implication that these
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procedures could be made automatic. The inverse notion, gaining 
ever more significance, is that these procedures and syntactic 
structures can be recognized automatically. Indeed, one o f the 
fundamental notions o f any AI application is that it can be 
characterized as rule-structured. Certainly one o f  the major tasks o f  
composition is creating a rule system. (Roads 1980)
Bom takes issue with this position: Roads later gives a brief admission that composition is 
not just formalism ('clearly, creative composers do not simply execute a fixed set o f  
instructions'), but the implications o f this admission in fact undermine the entire AI project, 
and these implications are not pursued further.
Dreyfus' arguments concerning the fundamental flaws o f  AI research are relevant 
here (Dreyfus 1979). This is somewhat beyond the scope o f the thesis, but briefly, the 
psychological assumption (that the mind operates according to formal rules) and the 
epistemological assumption (that all knowledge can be formalized) are shown to have no 
basis. This seems particularly relevant to situations involving the type o f knowledge 
involved in what we call aesthetics, which appears to be capricious, and specific to any 
given situation. A representation o f knowledge is just that— a representation. It involves an 
abstraction away from context. Dreyfus however emphasizes the importance o f context, 
following Heidegger; i.e. we are in the world, the world is not an external thing 
symbolically represented in the mind. More recent AI research has given credibility to 
Dreyfus' arguments. Rule-based or goal-based approaches have generally been abandoned. 
Roads' statement— 'the fundamental notions o f  any AI application is that it can be 
characterized as rule-structured'— is therefore antiquated, yet the impulse to rationalize and 
formalize still appears to persist in much algorithmic composition.
Rule-based approaches tend to be based on analysis o f extant music, or at least on 
notions to do with the proximity o f  certain systems to 'inherent musicality'. Bom states that 
in systems that 'derive from the 'nature' o f  music itself there is 'the view that domains o f  
knowledge purportedly analogous to or derived from the analysis o f music can become the 
basis for new music' (italics mine).
Thus, in texts written from this perspective one finds a constant 
elision or movement between computer-aided music analysis and 
computer-aided composition, based on the assumption that refined 
analysis can be used to generate compositional ideas. Or,
continuous with modernism in general, there is simply the
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assumption that the 'aesthetics' o f  science will also translate into, 
and provide, an aesthetics for music— the notion underlying ... 
arbitrary conceptual foraging from science (genetic biology, fractal 
geometry) as a basis for composition. (Born 1995)
Ultimately, approaches that naturalize or universalize music, for Bom, represent an 
attempt to provide an ahistorical, acultural and, paradoxically, nonaesthetic basis for 
musical aesthetics'. The study carried out in IRCAM presents evidence o f tension between 
this rhetoric and the reality o f the situation: composers, technicians and theoreticians 
express skepticism about the idea that scientific knowledge (e.g. from research into 
psychoacoustics) can be somehow translated into a systematic aesthetics; there is arbitrary 
and forced relationship between theory and practice.
Attempts to generalize music in this context become particularly problematic when 
applied to the design o f new music technologies. According to Bom's study there is always 
an 'aesthetic bias' inherent in any given technology. In IRCAM such biases tend to be 
swept under the carpet, again, evading aesthetics by maintaining a purely scientific 
approach.
'Displacing the aesthetic' onto formalized systems results in a circular reasoning, as 
Nierhaus describes: 'an idea is elevated to an axiom on whose basis a model of 
composition o f unchallengeable validity may be asserted. As soon as a 'primary principle 
of musical creation is formulated, the quality of musical structure becomes explainable due 
to this principle; compositions meeting the highest quality criteria will virtually produce 
themselves through the application o f rules that have once been accepted as valid 
(Nierhaus 2008). He refers to Shillinger's system (Schillinger 1977) or again, twelve-tone 
technique (as practiced by Hauer in this case (Lichtenfield 2001)) as examples. The idea is 
that a piece o f music is considered successful if it conforms to the system that was used to 
produce it (which it does, by definition). There is no reference to anything outside o f  the 
system in determining aesthetic value. Di Scipio summarizes this issue succinctly: purely
formalized procedures are not in themselves composition'(Di Scipio 1990).
Superficially in contrast to formalized methods, for algorithmic composition 
practitioners such as Husbands et al., music is concerned with human expression and 
creativity, hence the emphasis on imitating music created by actual composers and not 
basing it solely on musicological theory. They choose Sonata form as a basis for their study 
because of'its potential to encompass so many elements that inform the creative process 
exploration, contrast, development, transformation, motivic mutation, etc' (Husbands et al.
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2007). It is again an attempt to encode creativity in what would essentially amount to an 
artificial intelligence; trying to replace the composer with an algorithm. Bruce Jacob claims 
that the aim o f algorithmic composition is to work towards an AI where 'an algorithm 
faithfully represents an artist's creative process' (Jacob 1996). The spectacular failures that 
are the results o f this type o f investigation speak for themselves. It may not be the case that 
they tried to model 'creativity' and have so far  failed, but rather that such attempts can 
never succeed, because they appear to be based on what appears to be a misconception o f  
the creative process.
If we take a Markov chain based approach as a typical example, it creates pastiche 
in a very literal sense o f the word: it can only output sequences o f notes that are found 
somewhere in the input. Even with a hidden Markov model, the unobservable state 
transition probabilities must still be known and fixed, based on some kind o f input. 
Likewise, evolutionary techniques search for an optimum, but this optimal result must 
already be given to the machine in some manner, in the form o f an evaluation or fitness 
function. So the corpus based approach attempts to automate creativity, and yet ironically 
the rational top down aspect o f the approach itself closes the possibility o f  any creative 
potential in the automation, it can only re-create. There are important exceptions to this, 
notably Hiller and Isaacson's use o f Markov models in their experiment four, and similarly 
in Xenakis' Analogique A. In these examples the input is neither directly from the corpus 
nor derivedfrom the corpus, even informally. The music therefore specifically makes use 
o f the characteristics o f the algorithm itself rather than using it as a medium for the 
automation o f an idea external to it.
Attempts to formalize the evaluation o f music in general tend to have the effect o f  
closing off creative potential, yet those writing on algorithmic composition often seem to 
be convinced o f the need for such a formalization. Simoni asks 'how do we decide if  a 
composition that uses algorithms has aesthetic merit?' (Simoni 2003). One would have 
thought the answer to this would simply be to listen to it. But for Simoni, 'to answer this 
question, one must separate the process o f composition from the product o f composition, 
e.g. the music'; i.e. which aspects o f a composition should be considered 'when 
determining aesthetic merit'? Should the beauty o f the algorithm itself be considered 
(perhaps as per Knuth's criteria o f simplicity, elegance etc. (Knuth 2011)), or just the 
musical result regardless o f its implementation? This appears to be an attempt to determine 
how to do something that we already know how to do— we make aesthetic judgements all 
the time without recourse to a formalized system.
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The immediacy of aesthetic judgement in fact implies that it is somehow 
categorically opposed to formalization. Aesthetic judgement is surely not a rational 
process; it seems clear that when a rationale is attributed to an aesthetics it is in hindsight 
— the judgement has already occurred by this point. Knowledge regarding an artifact is 
bound to change the perception o f it, but this is an inextricable part o f listening, we cannot 
consciously choose on which aspects to base our aesthetic appreciation. In other words, no 
satisfactory answer is found to questions regarding which aspect o f a composition to base 
judgement on, because it is misleading to 'separate the process o f composition from the 
product o f composition' in the first place.
Another example o f the formalization o f aesthetics is found in Pearce and Wiggins' 
technique for evaluating machine-generated music, a procedure similar to the Turing test.
In it, participants are asked to identify which in a group o f pieces o f  music are machine 
generated and which are human composed. Interestingly this technique very explicitly 
involves 'a displacement o f the aesthetic onto other discursive systems': they claim that one 
of the benefits o f  the technique is that 'questions such as: “Is this music good?” are being 
turned into statements such as “People cannot distinguish the machine composed music 
from human composed music” which may be refuted through empirical experimentation' 
(Pearce & Wiggins 2001). This o f course, as they note, is only useful if  the aim o f the 
system under examination is precisely to imitate 'human' composition. There is however an 
unstated further assumption: that music fundamentally is either composed by a machine or 
by a human; see also papers that pose questions such as 'who or what is responsible for the 
music produced' (Jacob 1996). Such questions only arise if we retain the assumption that 
there is such a thing as machine-composition: surely a human created the machine in the 
first place? And is this so different to human composition? Is it not generally understood 
that all music is composed, at least to some degree, using rules, systems, algorithms, 
representations, and so on? In short, is music not fundamentally a technological exercise, 
always involving both human and technical artifact? The human composed/machine 
composed distinction is perhaps more to do with context— if a computer scientist writes an 
algorithm for making music it will probably be considered an exercise in machine- 
composition, whereas when a professional composer uses an algorithm it is more likely to 
be seen simply as a part o f their practice, it remains in the domain of human-composition.
The creative process as described in this thesis so far, could be summed up as a 
phenomenon o f aesthetics in the context o f technical investigation. Given this, the aim of  
creating systems that imitate 'human' composition seems slightly absurd. If human
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composition necessarily involves goals determined by technical investigation, then the 
technology we are creating to replace the composer would need to be open to results that 
were unforeseen by the designer o f the system. This problem is sometimes addressed by 
those working with this kind o f algorithmic composition by dividing a program into two 
separate parts: one to create material, and one to give aesthetic judgement ('listener', 'critic' 
etc.). Genetic algorithms already work in this way, or for example Bruce Jacob's 'composer' 
and 'ear' modules (Jacob 1996). This very clearly abstracts aesthetics from the rest o f  the 
system. But it can only base its judgements on mathematical criteria, formalisms, that were 
determined before the investigation began. The aesthetic cannot be abstracted from context 
like this, since technical investigation appears to guide the aesthetic as much as the 
aesthetic guides technical investigation. Therefore what is actually modeled in these 
approaches bears little relation to 'human' composition. But the modeling process itself is 
composition by a human; the composition was merely done at a different level— by the 
algorithm designer, prior to the machine's excursion into 'the creative process'.
Without somehow subverting the process, this type o f approach contributes nothing 
to original composition, but can it can yield anything o f interest in musicology? If an 
algorithmic composition passes the 'Turing' test then this really just tells us that the 
algorithm manages to approximate an existing style o f music, using perhaps a more 
automated process than composers who were previously implicitly working with that 
algorithm (or at least a similar algorithm). To an idealist, discovering this successful 
algorithm might represent a step closer to seeing the underlying essence o f the music, the 
metaphysical properties that make it beautiful, or that reveal the workings of the creative 
process and so on. Otherwise it is just an arbitrary representation o f that specific style o f  
music.
Two possible approaches to algorithmic composition are recognized by Nierhaus: 
algorithmic composers create systems 'that are either applied for the generation o f “style 
imitations”— the generation o f musical material according to a given notion o f a musical 
style— or as a means o f implementing compositional strategies for the creation o f a new 
piece o f art, which may be called “genuine composition”' (Nierhaus 2008). Similarly we 
find the distinction 'empirical style modelling' and 'active style synthesis' in Ames' survey 
(Ames 1992). Style-imitation appears to dominate the field, but this is perhaps due to the 
fact that the literature represents mainly computer scientists, musicologists and so on, 
simply because they need to publish for their profession. Nierhaus claims that composers 
on the other hand publish writing less frequently. He also makes the point that the
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separation between the two categories is not as clear as we might like it to be. Much of  
what appears to be 'genuine composition', as described earlier in fact bases itself on 
techniques that are inherently geared towards style imitation, and therefore rely on some 
kind o f input that somehow represents or defines what is musical. Nonetheless there are 
certainly examples o f  algorithmic composition which result in something strikingly 
original.
One way o f  understanding this possibility is to see nonhuman intrusions as the 
focus o f  the work, as aspects that might contribute to changes in a (contingent) aesthetics.
It is precisely this intrusion by the technology that marks what Nierhaus calls 'genuine 
composition'; i.e. something new has been introduced beyond the imitation o f previous 
musics. The new thing is a result o f  technological inquiry— the development o f  
compositional techniques, processes and so on, and their effect on the outcome, maybe 
resulting in a shift in aesthetic sensibilities. This is perhaps the case in all 'genuine 
composition', but in what is currently thought o f as algorithmic composition we are 
concerned specifically with computer automated algorithms having the potential to 
introduce new sounds, forms and structures.
In 'genuine composition' there is no attempt to automate what the composer was 
already doing; the composer remains, but algorithms are nonetheless used as part o f the 
compositional process. This is actually more in line with the description given by Cope and 
others o f the historic use o f algorithms in music (’throughout the history o f Western Art 
Music, composers have used algorithms as part o f the creative process' (Husbands et al. 
2007)).
So it is not the case that all algorithmic composition represents an attempt to 
'displace the aesthetic'. For instance, Bidlack, in discussion o f the use o f chaos in 
composition, states that 'rather than viewing the output o f chaotic systems as music in its 
own right... it is probably best to consider such output as raw material o f a certain 
inherent and potentially useful musicality. Clearly there will be as many ways to apply 
chaos to musical decision as there are composers interested in doing so' (Bidlack 1992). 
This position is close to the approach 1 want to describe below, yet it still retains the idea o f  
an 'inherent musicality'. In contrast, Jiménez de Cisneros quite unambiguously states: 'I do 
not think there is anything inherently musical in algorithms' [9]. He claims that judgments 
of aesthetic value cannot be reduced in this way, we cannot bracket out 'cultural 
background, context, personal interest, perception, etc.'. There cannot be anything 
inherently musical in algorithms, simply because there is no such thing as inherent
121
musical ity.
Nierhaus describes an approach that is along these lines: 'here, the algorithms 
formulated for the compositional concept do not have the validity o f  axioms— on the 
contrary, the results o f  the generative process may need to be critically examined during 
the creative process. So in this case, the algorithmic procedures become a compilation o f  
useful tools that are used deliberately for the generation o f a composition. Here, a large 
part o f the creative work is not determined by algorithms— individual human intervention 
and original ideas remain essential aspects o f this approach' (Nierhaus 2008). But the 
concept of'original ideas' seems problematic, as if it is in opposition to mechanical 
determination. Surely in such an approach that involves aesthetic judgement, the point o f  
working with algorithms is that they do determine the creative work; not in the sense that 
they replace the composer but as part o f the composer's practice they are implicated in, and 
are a source of, creativity.
To conclude from this overview o f algorithmic composition, we can identify a few 
broad streams o f activity:
1. Corpus approaches that look to automate a particular style, perhaps with the 
implication that universal aspects o f the nature o f music will be revealed.
2. Experiments in AI, attempting to automate the creative process; the computer 
apparently replaces the composer.
3. Mathematical idealism. The belief that there is a nature o f music, inherent 
musicality, found in algorithmic patterns such as fractals.
The first o f these would fall under Nierhaus' 'style imitation', and the third perhaps under 
'genuine composition', the second seems like it could be either. But the point is that all 
three are interrelated. They overlap for instance when the creative process is modeled using 
corpus analysis, or when particular styles are investigated in relation to the inherent 
musicality o f fractals, or when mathematical formalisms lead to experiments in the 
automation o f creativity (Xenakis: 'the automation o f creative action is a natural 
consequence o f the attempt to formalize musical thought' (Varga 2003)) There is an idealist 
tendency underlying all o f these approaches.
However, a further type o f algorithmic composition was identified which seems to 
be categorically different: a pragmatic approach, where algorithms are simply a part o f the 
compositional process— in the way a brush stroke is used by a painter. This in fact comes
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closer to describing the way in which algorithms have been used implicitly throughout the 
history o f music prior to the identification o f a separate stream of activity called 
'algorithmic composition', and does not relate to any o f the approaches in the bullet points 
above. It o f  course also applies to non-western music (an obvious example being the way 
in which a raga is defined not as a fully notated score but as ascending and descending 
sequences within a set number o f pitches (Grove & Sadie 1988)).
The work o f Jiménez de Cisneros as Evol provides us with the exemplary instance 
of this alternative approach which we will examine in more detail in the remainder o f this 
chapter. This is a use o f algorithms or formal systems that resists attempts to systematically 
fix music in place; either a particular style o f music (as in corpus-based approaches) or 
music as a whole (cf. Xenakis 1992). The purpose o f the algorithm here, in contrast, is not 
to describe something that is thought to already exist, rather quite the opposite— to suggest 
new forms that the composer would not otherwise have discovered, new ways o f  
organizing sound.
Principio
The release notes for the first Evol record Principio, on the Mego website at the time, 
suggest a fundamental similarity in approach with other Mego artists: 'Why? No reason, 
really. No concepts behind it'. The material, recorded in 1997, is the result o f sound design 
experimentation with a Yamaha RY30 drum machine in collaboration with Miguel Ferré, 
creating high pitched short envelope sounds, arranged and edited into complex patterns 
using a Yamaha MD4 minidisk four-track editing station. This process led to an 
experimental approach far from the paradigm o f a predetermined score written into a 
sequencer. The patterns and structure o f the album appear to be determined by the 
possibilities o f  the equipment and the results o f experimentation. The interesting point here 
is that this prefigures later algorithmic composition in Evol, highlighting the way in which 
algorithms are perhaps employed as merely another means o f introducing a process aspect.
The album consists o f  18 untitled tracks, the first o f which contains a single 10ms 
sound with silence on either side. The sound (shown in figure 10) is a 12kHz tone in the 
left channel, and 10kHz in the right, shaped by what appears to be a 4-stage amplitude 
envelope. The RY-30 allows this kind o f sound design through various voice editing 
functions with parameters set using what is normally considered an unintuitive text 
interface. Each voice consists o f up to two waveforms layered, with separate parameters 
for each waveform controlling level, panning, pitch (±3600 cents), decay time, filter
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(highpass or lowpass with resonance and cutoff controls) and various envelope generator 
options. This sound is typical of the sound materials found within more complex structures 
later in the album.
Figure 10: Principio track 1 detail
The second track is the first of 3 silent tracks, demarcating different sections. Each track 
within these sections has an entirely different 'behavior', resulting for example from the 
MD4's manual editing capability, its looping, or its shuffle mode. I he album in total 
therefore has a very fragmented structure (see figure 11). This is a recurring strategy 
throughout the Evol project. Although obviously itself a global compositional structure, it 
avoids compositional intervention in individual sections, putting automated behavior at the 
forefront. It also avoids the sense of a global narrative working on the level of metaphor, 
instead suggesting a clear sequential presentation of materials.
Figure 11: Spectral analysis of Principio tracks 1-18
I he section bookended by the silence in track 2 and an even longer silence in track 10 is 
mostly a series of very short, sparse tracks featuring tonal clicks (as found in the first 
track), low frequency rumbles, and low amplitude noise bursts, arranged in irregular 
patterns. Also in this section are two repetitive tracks. Track 7 is a slow pattern of noise 
bursts, and track 9 is a fast metronomic repetition of clicks and very high frequency tones.
The section after the two and a half minute silence of track 10 begins with the most
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traditionally 'musical' material on the album: a three second phrase made out o f a number 
of different percussive sounds, repeating for two and a half minutes. Elements o f this 
phrase are then occasionally used in the following tracks but in randomized, not periodic, 
patterns. These are built from short minidisc tracks o f sound material from the RY30, put 
into shuffle mode on the MD4, resulting in sometimes rapid and sometimes sparse 
stochastic patterns.
As we saw in previous chapters a focus on process has the effect o f removing 
traditionally compositional aspects. But this is not a precisely planned surrendering of 
control to nondeterministic processes, rather an openness to the sounds and patterns arrived 
at through intuitive interaction with the technology at hand. Such realtime interactions with 
the drum machine and editing station tend to result in music centered on the characteristics 
and limitations o f the technology itself. This also has an effect on listening; there is little to 
draw us into an illusory sound world. It is difficult to fathom any communicative meaning 
in the sound, through gesture, or evocation, or symbolic association, or even source 
bonding ('it sounds like...'), other than perhaps a source bonding close to reality ( it sounds 
like an automated drum machine'). We become instead acutely aware o f the context of 
listening, the fact that there is a CD player often outputting near-silence, the arbitrary 
nature o f track marks, the frequency range o f the equipment used to both limits on the 
recording, and so on.
Though superficially not an exercise in algorithmic composition, the approach 
taken in Principio enabled Jiménez de Cisneros to experiment with forms and structures 
suggesting algorithmic processes— in particular a tension between machinic repetition and 
chaotic structures, which would later come to characterize his more overtly algorithmic 
music. Principio also shows the beginning o f an attraction to creating autonomous systems. 
'[Working with the MD4] was one o f the first cues that made me turn to computers, as I 
quickly understood they were an ideal tool not only for editing, but to generate and 
automate certain aspects o f the composition's structure' [9].
The use o f automation in artistic production is described by Ernest Edmonds as the 
artist raising their 'level o f  concern': 'generative art, the use o f computer technology and 
computation as a principle has enabled us ... to lift the levels o f  concern, as it were, in 
making work. You work at the level o f these structures and the realization of it is dealt with 
by these automatic systems that we've written ... we work at this higher level' (Fell & 
Gilmore 2010). As Fell and Gilmore point out, 'it is not so much a case o f the artist 
relinquishing control but instead a refocusing o f artistic concern according to the
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parameters and characteristics o f the system ... in this context creativity is not curtailed by 
the implementation o f formal systems, on the contrary, it is enabled by them'.
For instance painting with a paintbrush puts the artist's concern at the level o f a 
brushstroke, above smaller applications o f paint to the canvas. However it is important to 
note that this is more than merely labour saving—the brush imparts its character on the 
painting, in a way that would not have otherwise have happened, to the point where 
brushstrokes themselves can become the focal point (for instance to varying degrees in 
impressionism, pointillism, some abstract expressionism, etc.).
Automation in composition allows composers to raise their level o f concern to that 
o f the algorithm (Taube's 'metalevel'), freeing them from the painstaking arrangement o f  
individual elements, instead leaving higher level decisions for the artist the basic 
properties of the composition, the kind o f sound materials it will include and so on. But in 
the process o f doing this, the automated arrangement will almost certainly become quite 
different to the manual arrangement that would have resulted otherwise. The automatic 
properties o f whatever technology is being used becomes implicated in the composition. In 
Principio the patterns created by the shuffle mode o f the MD4 could have been 
conceivably arranged manually, but it is reasonable to assume that the result would have 
been quite different if the automation was not available.
For Jimenez de Cisneros this work therefore led naturally into the use o f  a computer 
as soon as possible, and experimentation with the algorithmic possibilities opened up 
through programming in Pd, Max and Supercollider, continuing a compositional process 
that in the 'creative' response o f the machine results in structures, patterns and sounds that 
would not otherwise have been found.
Punani
Super Punani was released as an mp3 for download on Falsch in 2003, followed by 
Punani Shell on Scarcelight Recordings in 2004. The second Evol album on Mego, Magia 
Potagia, was released in 2005, continuing the Punani series with the half hour long track 
Punani Potagia. This series is fairly uniform in its selection o f sound materials, with tracks 
generally consisting o f  a rapid series o f intricate structures built with the algorithmic 
modulation o f raw oscillator tones, mostly sawtooth.
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Figure 12: Punani Potagia spectral detail (three seconds of audio)
Figure 12 is the spectral analysis of a typical extract. It shows how the harmonic content ol 
the oscillators are arranged into various 'glissandi' patterns. 1 his is normally achieved using 
well known algorithms—fractal patterns, iterated chaotic equations, strange attractors and 
so on—to control very basic low-level parameters such as Irequency and panning, in cither 
Supercollider or Pd (Puckette 1996). It is precisely the directness and simplicity of this 
approach that makes it fairly unique, avoiding high-level concepts such as mapping to note 
values rather than the raw frequency.
The output of these very 'raw' systems is then edited, to take the most interesting 
results and order them in very' quick succession. In figure 12 we can see the same kind ot 
fragmented structure as in Principio; a series of very sharp cuts between different pieces ot 
material. Each fragment is autonomous, but they are brought together in a collage through 
aesthetic judgements made by the artist.
Jiménez de Cisneros refers to Robert May's investigation of dynamical non-linear 
systems (May & McLean 2007) as a point of interest which led to his frequent use of 
equations such as the logistic map in composition, being fascinated on an aesthetic level by 
the seemingly arbitrary contrast between chaotic and oscillating states, and patterns within 
islands of stability. In particular the possibilities for the infinite iteration ol these equations 
and the fractal self-similar structures they describe are important. Algorithms that have 
some physical or spatial analogue such as the Lorenz attractor also hold a lot ol interest tor 
Jiménez de Cisneros.
fhis fascination with mathematical processes may be part of a larger aesthetization 
(or fetishization) of mathematics in Evol and other Alku projects. Releases include titles 
such as (341 +27+91)-(154)-( 100x3)+( 1) (Fals.ch 02, fb50. Falsch, 2002) and others that 
are borrowed from papers on topology such as Each Absolute And Point Of An Atriodic 
Irreducible Continuum Is An End Point (ALKU 67, 2008), being something between 
homage and parody. Although not merely a joke, the evident humour here undermines the 
formalism we might otherwise associate with a mathematical approach.
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Although Jiménez de Cisneros's approach is partly a result o f  an interest in 
mathematics, this is not due to a desire for abstraction or universality. There is no sense of 
the purity o f the mathematics involved being held as axiomatic. The music is not seen in 
some abstract way as a transparent or direct presentation o f the algorithms and equations 
used. An algorithm that holds some interest is either found or developed, and is sonified, 
but the most crucial part o f the process is in making aesthetic judgments. The censoring or 
alteration o f the mathematics involved, even if this destroys its purity or elegance, is in no 
way seen as a problem. For Jiménez de Cisneros there is a fascination with these 
autonomous systems in themselves, but ultimately the musical result holds precedence. 
'What 1 want in the end is something that sounds appealing to me' [3]. For instance, in 
using the logistic map, alterations are made to suppress the chaotic states so that they 
remain but can be restrained, simply because they are less interesting than the non-chaotic 
states. In Xenakis' work, despite a rhetoric o f total formalization, he actually makes similar 
concessions— '1 realised that probabilities used wrongly could be boring, but if applied 
properly they could be interesting... it is important to break the rules and to change the 
specifications wherever it seems appropriate in order not to be trapped by machine logic 
(Varga 2003). Xenakis was 'criticised for both his indiscriminate use o f mathematical 
functions in music (Griffiths 1975) and for sullying by intuition the purity o f his algorithms 
(Vriend 1981)’ (Harley 2005).
So in Evol (and arguably for Xenakis), there is no intention to reveal an absolute or 
innate beauty in the mathematical object itself. Jiménez de Cisneros has described his 
contention with an audience member's claim to be able to 'see the fractal' in his music,
neatly summarizing and encapsulating the aesthetic implications o f these issues. The
appreciation o f this music is not reducible to the comprehension o f abstract beauty in the 
purity o f mathematics: 'You don't have to know about fractals to listen to this' [3]. It's not a 
conceptual approach, it concerns phenomenal experience; o f the forms produced by 
algorithmic techniques.
The difficulty in describing how algorithms are central yet not privileged in 
Jiménez de Cisneros's approach comes from the fact that they cannot be considered a 
separate entity to the music ('behind' the music). Algorithmic composition is often 
discussed in terms o f this algorithm/music distinction, with emphasis placed on the 
'mapping layer' between the two. Jiménez de Cisneros has stated: 'I'm not working on these 
algorithms to make something else, so they are part o f  the same system' [3], In other 
words, the mapping layer does not exist as part o f the compositional process. Clearly, the
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system could be analyzed in such a way that a mapping is shown to exist—there must be a 
point at which numbers resulting from an algorithmic process are assigned musical 
parameters, but this would be an arbitrary distinction, just one o f many possible ways to 
split the system up.
The belief that music functions in this way— as a material realization o f something 
abstract, transcendent rather than immanent— has wider implications. Central to this belief 
are ideas to do with subjectivity and creativity through expression. Expression in music is 
often described as a mapping o f  gestures to musical parameters, and algorithms in 
algorithmic composition have been assumed to take the role o f gesture creation in this 
scheme (Doombusch 2002). The Evol approach, in contrast, is to create semi-autonomous 
systems with some kind o f  aesthetic appeal or perceptual curiosity, which arbitrarily focus 
on fractal or chaotic processes as generators o f interesting material.
As might be expected, higher level aesthetic choices are influenced by this material. 
Evol live sets have a sense o f arbitrariness in suddenly switching from fast changing small 
intricate structures to silence or stasis in a sustained monotone, that mirrors the behavior o f  
(for example) the logistic map— which may be used in the set for less macroscopic 
structuring. 'I'm interested in the way these algorithms behave and the way they handle 
change and cycles, and so I'm sure after listening to the result o f these kind o f patches for a 
long, long time that incorporates in my aesthetic conception o f how I structure things on a 
larger scale' [3]. But this relationship could also be conceived in the opposite direction, i.e. 
the algorithms are chosen because there already exists an aesthetic sensibility concerned 
with these kind o f properties.
This question in fact addresses crux o f the issue: which comes first—the idea o f  
what constitutes something aesthetically 'good', or sense data, input that is then synthesized 
to form a judgement; i.e. is theory prior to practice? In the context o f a pragmatic 
collapsing o f the rational/empirical dichotomy we can see that the correspondence between 
aesthetic sensibility and algorithmic patterns should not be seen in such simplistic terms.
What we can say is that Jiménez de Cisneros's method is interesting precisely 
because it does not appear to approach the algorithms being used with any pre-conceived 
notion o f  what they should sound like, aside from a kind o f feedback in which properties 
learned in previous similar experiments are pursued or avoided (as per Dewey's ends-in- 
view). The judgement formed in decisions regarding what material to keep or discard and 
so on, is often described simply as a matter o f what holds interest. This is not the same as 
the pursuit o f  a pre-conceived idea.
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The nature o f the aesthetic judgment involved in Jiménez de Cisneros's approach is 
based on a desire to create visceral 'aesthetic experiences', music which is 'beyond just 
sound, and approaching something physical' [3]. As described, the focus is on the presence 
of the music itself as a material entity rather than the music as an opening to something 
more abstract.
In the search for 'interesting' sound, in addition to experimenting with processes 
which satisfy criteria to do with autonomy and physicality, Jiménez de Cisneros has 
commented on an attraction to 'aggressive sounds and structures'. It's important to note that 
the aggressiveness here is purely aesthetic according to Jiménez de Cisneros. As with his 
attraction to other genres normally associated with violence— death metal, black metal he 
emphasizes other ways o f hearing this aggression, appreciating instead formal properties, 
regardless o f deeply entrenched extra-musical elements. Not outside o f context but creating 
a new context, the possibilities o f humour in 'aggressive' noise for example, or its potential 
to be soothing.
Most Evol releases include the instruction 'Play loud!!!' on the liner notes, and sheer 
volume is important in creating this 'aggressive' sound, also being connected to the effect 
of suggesting something physical. But aggression is also related to the interest in chaotic 
structures— high level structural unpredictability as aggression in the same way that noise, 
unpredictability at a lower level, is easily associated with aggression. Jiménez de Cisneros 
sees a necessity to experiment with determinate algorithms ('controlled randomness' [3]) 
rather than simply using a series o f pseudo-random numbers for this purpose, because pure 
unpredictability, pure noise, is paradoxically predictable. There is a liminal tension in 
chaotic (not random) processes arising in the play between repetition and unpredictable 
change, stable states and chaos.
This tension does not manifest itself in structure according to traditional musical 
theory; i.e. dissonance to be followed by some kind o f resolution, but in systemic 
properties as something that arises from algorithmic processes; 'it's something I try to find 
and I try to shape the algorithms to make these patterns ... tiny structures like instances of 
constant iteration o f different functions' [3]. In describing his interest in algorithms such as 
the logistic map, Jiménez de Cisneros links this idea o f tension to the aggressive sound he's 
interested in. Figure 13 shows an example in which percussive sounds trigger at varying 
intervals balanced at the threshold of chaotic behavior. There is some regularity to the 
events, but it often lapses into a more sporadic pattern or a much faster stuttering, giving 
the impression that the system could at any point fall into complete noise (no
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comprehendible pattern or repetition).
Figure 13: Pus Pus Pus extract (from Magia Potcigia, Mego 2005)
Open/closed systems
Jiménez de Cisneros refers to the software he currently uses (Supercollider and Pd) as 
open systems, in contrast to the closed systems he previously used (drum machines, editing 
station etc.) Closed systems have (or appear to have) a well defined purpose such as the 
creation of drum sounds or a bassline, as opposed to the impression of much greater 
freedom in open systems and the ability to define custom constraints rather than work with 
the constraints given by a manufacturer. The use of a closed system is often characterized 
by an exploration of its limits and possible subversion of its intended use. In subverting the 
intended use of some technology there is a sense of going against the grain, forcing it to do 
something it isn't meant to do, but in reality it is often an intuitive, 'natural' exploratory 
interaction. Previously mentioned examples of this include Phuture's experimentation with 
the TB-303 to create acid house, the use of CD skipping/error-correction by Yasunao Tone, 
or Haswell and I lecker's use of the UPIC.
Effective use of open systems relies in some cases on uncovering a closed aspect, 
so that there is some distinctive material to respond to creatively, rather than being 
confronted with a void in which the task is to create something from nothing. In the case of 
SuperCollider in Evol, the open aspect—its ability to create 'any sound you can imagine' 
with elaborate GUIs etc.—is eschewed by Jimenez de Cisneros in favour of a more closed 
programming of (more or less) autonomous simple algorithms as code blocks which can be 
executed and then stopped, but nothing more, generally using default sawtooth oscillators.
This results in what Jiménez de Cisneros describes as an 'anti-climax structure' [3] 
—in the execution of each code block there arc structures in time as a result of algorithmic 
envelopes, but as a whole, meta-structurally or external to the algorithm, there is no 
change. Each section of a set or album is static, a fragment or snapshot of a system, 
separated by silence (the length of which is also determined in part by the way 
Supercollider works, as more or less the time it takes to highlight and execute the next
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block o f code).
Time
In earlier Evol work, the speed o f iteration within each section gave a greater sense o f  
stasis on a macro-structural level, but later work focused in more detail on these micro­
structures by 'zooming-in' on them, i.e. slowing them down. The manipulation o f time for 
perception to work at different levels is important in Jiménez de Cisneros. He quotes 
Dawkins in relation to this aspect o f his work:
Our brains have evolved to help us survive within the orders of  
magnitude o f size and speed which our bodies operate at. Our 
environment limits what we are capable o f  imagining. Middle 
world, the range o f  sizes and speeds which we have evolved to feel 
intuitively comfortable with, is a bit like the narrow range o f the 
electromagnetic spectrum that we see as light o f various colours.
We're blind to all frequencies outside that unless we use 
instruments to help us. Middle world is the narrow range o f reality 
which we judge to be normal as opposed to the queerness o f the 
very small, the very large and the very fast. (Dawkins 2005)
Jimenez de Cisneros:
In that sense my work is usually geared toward structures that 
replicate this queemess ... either very fast, very cramped or very 
hard to grasp in terms o f boundaries (of sound events). In the end 
it's all about structures that I find aesthetically appealing or 
interesting, but at the same time somewhat puzzling because there 
is something in them that makes them strange, even if  they're also 
familiar in other aspects. [9]
The relevant point here is that this zooming-in, slowing down the temporal interpretation 
o f the algorithms, has the effect o f  giving an illusion o f  structure or narrative within a 
section. But there is still generally no change outside o f the executing and stopping o f code 
blocks, a very explicit kind of'moment-form'(Kramer 1978).
For example in (341+25+91)-(154)-(100x3)+(l)+(l)+(8), released in 2002, the 
algorithmic behavior iterates at such a speed that there is only an overall sense o f texture, 
remaining constant throughout the track. However, listening tests after slowing it down in 
an audio editor reveal much the same kind o f larger macro-structures found in later work.
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PunaniXerrameca, released in 2009 uses algorithmic patterns that begin to imitate empty 
vocal utterances, and the slowed (341+25+91)-(154)-(100x3)+(l)+(l)+(8) has very 
similar characteristics. This demonstrates how Punani Xerrameca and similar pieces, 
despite elaborate structures at the level o f  phrasing, in terms o f their fundamental behavior 
remain static throughout tracks or sections— as the sequential discreet execution o f code 
blocks. Each 'moment' has a particular character defined by the algorithm in that code 
block.
Rather than inferring meaning through narrative structures, an approach to time as 
duration rather than movement is shown here. Continuity is disrupted by an overt splice, 
constructing a fragmentation o f  experience— a disjointed series o f musical objects are 
presented. 'I was sick with the idea o f flow and continuity [and] globalness; a long 
structure that develops' [3]. This is a process in which a technology is suggesting ways to 
approach composition. Clearly Supercollider can be used in any number o f ways but this is 
an uncontrived approach, allowing the way in which code blocks are executed to determine 
structure.
Performance
In line with the anti-climax structure o f the music and a focus on technology, Jiménez de 
Cisneros has stated that in performance he is 'in no way interested in interaction or 
expression' [3], The generally condemned idea o f a 'spacebar performance' (to be discussed 
further in chapter 6) is instead embraced. The performance could in fact be nothing more 
than playback o f  a sound file— 'some people have a moral problem playing sound files live 
but I really don’t understand that because for me it's all about how it sounds, so whether I 
play a patch or a sound file makes no difference' [3]. When code or patches are executed 
'live' in an Evol performance, it's for pragmatic reasons: triggering pieces in this way 
requires less effort than pre-recording it, and the set can be easily altered from performance 
to performance to make improvements. Experimentation does not often happen live 1 m 
not too concerned with the performance as a really creative act'— and when it does, it s not 
important that the audience knows this [3].
So there is no interest in the performance as a theatrical act, or using it for 
communicating skill or virtuosity to the audience. Nonetheless there is skill involved in an 
Evol performance, in creating the right experience, subtle adjustment o f EQ and other 
parameters. According to Jiménez de Cisneros, the mood, space, and PA all affect decisions 
regarding the sound. But a choice is made not to put this virtuosity or any personality in the
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foreground. The most important thing is how the piece sounds, I don't really care if  
someone is performing in real-time or not' [3]. Unpredictable algorithms and processes are 
avoided, so that intervention can be generally avoided during performance. But where 
necessary, a 'boring' algorithm is stopped short, or other alterations are made if needed.
This kind o f pragmatism is evident in all aspects o f Jiménez de Cisneros's work, including 
the length o f performances: roughly 20 minutes, because much longer and the audience 
begin to lose attention. The 3" CD is the best format in his opinion, for the same reason.
Algorith m/system/process
Sol LeWitt's comment, 'the idea becomes a machine that makes the art', is pertinent to 
process and system music, and algorithmic composition (Collins 2008). But in the work of 
Jiménez de Cisneros, an idea (the conception o f a system) does not appear to precede the 
making o f  a machine (implementing the system), since this 'idea' is clearly a response to 
the results o f experimentation with algorithms and the means o f implementing them; not a 
pre-existing abstract entity but the result o f a process. This leads us to a very different 
understanding o f  the role o f algorithms in composition, where 'the art' is not a reflection of 
'the idea' enabled by 'the machine', and in which it becomes difficult even to draw such 
distinctions. Jiménez de Cisneros's very direct approach to 'mapping' and 'sonification', and 
the clear sequential presentation o f different algorithmic systems encourage such a holistic 
non-reductive understanding.
This is clearly an algorithmic music, and it does not contrive any o f the material 
into forms or structures according to existing musical ideas. However the approach also 
suggests that there is no intended clear representation o f the abstract form o f any particular 
algorithm, only the audio result o f the entire system. This leads me to the conclusion that 
algorithmic composition here functions as a technique for the problematization of 
representation in the music. We are left with the physicality o f algorithmic sound without 
intrinsic meaning. Furthermore the algorithms are precisely the means by which a 
distancing from notions o f intrinsic meaning is achieved. Yasunao Tone once described his 
work in this way, summing up the central point here, claiming that the reason for his 
engagement with systems and processes was 'to get to new places, places beyond his 
imagination or intention'(Fell & Gilmore 2010).
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Farmers Manual and literal noise
Farmers Manual began making music together in 1995, comprising at the time o f Mathias 
Gmachl, Stefan Possert, Oswald Berthold, Gert Brantner and Nik Gaffney. As discussed in 
relation to other artists operating at that time, some kind o f affinity was felt with the techno 
scene, they initially sent demos to techno labels. But according to Gmachl it quickly 
became clear that this was not a good context for the work they were doing (Sjogren 1998). 
They approached Mego in 1996 with a demo, feeling there was some common ground: 
'They just worked in a similar way to ours. Nearly the same equipment and a related 
approach. So we just met them and saw them and started talking and they said: why don t 
you make a release on our label. We just did it' (Sjogren 1998). Rehberg describes this 
encounter in the same way [1]. So the question is: what is this 'similar way' o f working, or 
'related approach'? The rest o f  the chapter will explore what this approach might be, and 
look for similarities to the approaches described in previous chapters.
No Backup
The release o f Farmers Manual's first album No Backup (Mego 008) happened later in 
1996. Fairly typical techno equipment was used in its production, as evidenced in tracks 
like Biomagic I  with its central kick drum and bass line, the recognizable 808 kit in 
Perimeter 87. Laptop computers and DSP software, the technology that would later come 
to define the Mego aesthetic, was not readily available at this time. However we will see 
that a similar approach to their later work in software can be observed in their use of 
hardware in No Backup, an approach that focuses on experimentation with the technology 
being used, experimenting in particular with autonomous processes. As seen previously in 
relation to Evol, this tends to prefigure an interest in the possibility o f setting up 
autonomous processes in software. In the case o f Farmers Manual this led to algorithmic 
composition based on random triggering and processing o f sound files. But prior to this, 
when the technology consists o f hardware drum machines, synthesizers, sequencers, and 
effects units, these autonomous process have a very different character, and tend to be 
focussed in particular on looping and repetition.
Despite the technological and contextual associations with techno, it should be 
emphasized that the repetition in No Backup is o f a very different kind. The eponymous 
track Farmers Manual for instance, features a slow, meandering repetition. A complex, 
short sequence on a synth with large amounts o f portamento repeats through almost the
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entire track. But the sequence drifts, gradually changes. Notes are occasionally added or 
removed, or their pitch altered, which due to the portamento also changes the perception of 
the surrounding notes. Drum parts, mainly hi-hats, and a pad synth sound, also perform this 
same-but-different, drifting repetition; particularly with occasional pitch shifts in the pad 
sound. In addition to gradual changes in the looped sequences, there seem to be a number 
of effects involved, with changes to parameters happening in a similar meandering fashion, 
i.e. without teleology— the changes do not give the impression o f  leading anywhere. For 
instance at around 2 minutes a filter resonance increases and its cutoff frequency is 
changed. The change is not fast enough to be considered gestural, and not slow enough to 
build tension as if building to a climax.
The impression given is that, in contrast to a top down composed sequencing o f the 
entire piece, an autonomous system has been set up: a series o f loops going through 
various effects processors. Berthold confirms this impression: 'we were experimenting with 
“degradation” o f sound, up to the point where it provided an entirely different quality. This 
was done through feedback loops with processing elements in between (filters and such)... 
this also raised issues o f stability in generating processes / loops' [10]. The track seems to 
be an arbitrary duration o f the output of this system, with a walk through the parameters 
available.
Likewise, Biomagic I  is a series o f loops, with an occasional, disorienting pitch 
shift in the bassline. These tracks have what we could refer to as an 'undirected sound . 
Parameter changes are not used in an expressive way, they appear almost 'accidental. As 
discussed in chapter 4, perhaps the best way to explain these 'accidental' aspects is that they 
militate against 'correct' musicality— the events that we intuitively expect to hear given 
preceding events. In listening, this undirected and accidental structure has the effect o f  
confounding attempts to fathom narrative content. It seems to stand in polar opposition to 
what we could call a 'composed' sound, events that sound as though they were arranged 
with deliberate intention. In this sense o f the word composed, the 'composed' and the 
'accidental' are in fact opposed by definition— an accident is something that is not intended.
Two possible interpretations o f this undirectedness and accidentalness seem 8
8 My use o f the term 'undirected' here is related to, but more general than, Christophe Charles' use of it in 
his work. For him it refers to music that 'doesn't intend to tell’ anything to the listener, or to impose 
him/her to listen to a particular ordered development'; 'the music is not based on any kind of story board 
... The sounds appear independently from any global structure which should intentionally impose on 
them an arbitrary hierarchy' (Charles 2000). Incidentally, to achieve this, Charles sometimes uses a 
technique of numbering sound files and having this determine their composition, a technique also used in 
Explorers_We.
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possible. First, that these pieces are intentionally composed to sound undirected (a careful 
structuring to sound unstructured), with intentional accidents (accidents that are not really 
accidental). Or second that it actually is the result o f  a process that manages to avoid 
certain aspects o f  traditional composition (by which I mean the manual organization o f  
sound materials in time). Evidence for the latter is given by Berthold: ’1 was strongly 
interested in fully automatic composition ... unwanted, unanticipated results, things you 
just wouldn't do as a human.' [10], and Possert: 'there is no basic concept at all we can 
follow. It's just going there and start and see what's happening' (Sjogren 1998).
This is o f  course not to say that there is no concept to the project at all, there is in 
fact a deep conceptual rigour which we will see throughout the examples in this chapter. I 
claim that the concept is manifest perhaps in the approach to technology. But the 
implication is that the work is not conceptual -  its purpose is not to convey a concept or 
idea. It is merely sound resulting from a process o f technological production, the result of 
experimentation with materials; technology as material not as a medium. The affordances 
o f the looping system set up in hardware define not only the low level elements o f the 
music (the drum samples, the synth sounds and so on) but also the higher level structural 
aspects— in built sequencers lead to the repetition and variation o f short sequences, and 
additional variation is provided by effects parameters. Berthold states that he was 
interested in letting the technology
'do its own thing', within the confines o f the various environments / 
formalisms / systems. That is, you set up a system that can do 
something (in terms o f sound), but the entirety o f the 'something' is 
implicit. The actual realisation o f these processes is left to the 
machine ...  But there was a lot o f  probing, experimentation, 
reflection, new experimentation which left longer and shorter bits 
and stretches o f sounds which could then be assembled. The 
experimentation was intimately tied to technology, a quest to get to 
the guts o f technology. [10]
As discussed previously, being open to the contingency o f  the technology introduces some 
element o f nondeterminism, i.e. elements determined by the machine not by the artist. It is 
not so much that the machine is making decisions, but that there is an openness to results 
arrived at through processes that are intentionally beyond direct control o f the artist. As 
such it preempts later Farmers Manual work in software, representing a raising o f the level 
o f concern above manual composition.
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So as with the use o f hardware in early Evol releases, this is akin to algorithmic 
composition, but the algorithm, and mappings to parameters etc., are not designed in a 
rational way. The rational approach will tend to impose notions o f  received musicality—  
the designer of the algorithm and parameter mapping must encode what is and is not 
musical. So mappings will be chosen to result in the kind o f phrasing and rhythmic, 
melodic or harmonic structures that already exist (if we hold that ideas arise in the process 
of technical inquiry, not as inspiration out o f the blue). In other words the result is not 
much different to manual composition in this sense. The potential o f autonomous 
technology to create new sonic forms and expand ideas o f what can be musical is held 
back. The undirected approach exemplified by Farmers Manual however is another 
example o f a less rational and more intuitive process, relying on experimentation with 
machines that have some autonomy.
Certain aesthetic choices are more or less constant throughout the work o f Farmers 
Manual— for instance a tendency towards a 'raw', 'underproduced' sound, without cleaning 
up traditionally undesirable artifacts, such as harsh resonances. Despite consistencies like 
this, No Backup does sound different in many ways to later albums. But this is precisely 
because the approach to technology in general remains the same— the sound is defined by 
the technology, an exploration o f the materials used in production. No Backup therefore has 
structures and sound materials defined by hardware: drum machines, sequencers, 
synthesizers, samplers and effects processors, whereas later pieces created with computers 
tend instead to be characterized by more esoteric DSP techniques and algorithmically 
triggered soundfile playback.
So my claim is that since something like No Backup is so dependent on the 
technology used in its production, its sound is the result o f  experimentation, not the 
directed building o f a system or composition based on reaching musical goals conceived 
prior to production. The latter is found in work in which the artist approaches materials and 
technology with pre-conceived ideas o f what will be produced— reproducing existing 
genre forms and so on. The approach here in contrast appears to be used specifically to 
create distance from existing musical conventions. Therefore we can start to see that what 
links many o f the artists associated with Mego is not so much a particular sound; it is an 
attitude and an approach— an attitude oppositional to musical tradition and norms, and an 
approach that appears to be there to avoid lapsing into such norms.
The focus on the biases and limitations o f the technology means that when the 
technology changes, so does the sound. The changing nature o f technology (as well as the
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endless number o f existing technologies to explore) therefore also enables the avoidance o f  
becoming entrenched in any particular sound. We see this in the move from hardware to 
software with Mego artists in the late 90s (and also more recently in the shift o f attention 
back to older technologies— see chapter 7).
Fsck
The first Farmers Manual album to make use o f computers is named after the unix 
command for performing a file system check: Fsck, released on their own Tray label 
(TRAY 2, 1997). At this point it appears that the approach discussed above was not 
translated into software effectively, this came in their third album Explorers_We, released 
on Russell Haswell's Touch sub-label OR (SQUISH 4, 1998). Berthold describes the 
difference: 'Fsck was really arranged. We just took soundfiles and put them where they are 
now, and Explorers is not. Explorers is just defining a pool o f soundfiles and letting a 
program run across if (Sjogren 1998).
The word 'arranged' is key; what is meant by this? Clearly sound materials are 
arranged in both albums; the very least we can say about any piece o f music is that it is (to 
paraphrase Varèse) arranged sound. It seems obvious from the rest o f Berthold's statement 
that the difference lies in who (or what) does the arranging. Fsck was arranged manually, 
'by hand'— this is the 'composed' approach discussed above. The alternative is to make use 
of automation. Note that although this does seem to have the effect o f removing 
superficially 'human' aspects (the kind o f arrangements one would expect a human to make 
based on musical tradition; compositional clichés— gestures, climaxes and so on), the 
intention does not appear to be a Cagean removal o f the self from the work. Possert makes 
this point succinctly: 'If you push random, you push it because you want to' (Sjogren 
1998). Instead we should return once again to the idea that automation raises the artist's 
level o f concern. At this metalevel, there is the sense o f stepping outside o f existing 
musical theory or learned musicality, enabling instead the construction and exploration of 
new musical theories or musicality.
Berthold's description o f Fsck however, implies that it remains within the realm o f  
normal 'intuitive' musical thinking. In contrast to Explorers JVe, it is structured as a series 
of discrete tracks. Each track proceeds with the successive introduction o f different parts, 
rhythmically related and layered on top o f each other. Consider a typical dictionary 
definition o f composition— the arrangement o f different elements to form a whole. This 
layering approach epitomizes the composed sound.
139
Figure 14 shows the end of 371 Adv3, in which there are only a few distinct sounds: 
a high hat repeats regularly, while two high amplitude clicks and and two synthetic stab 
sounds in the left channel and right channel separately, move in and out of phase with each 
other. The way in which these sounds are taken out of the composition sequentially, leaving 
only one of the clicks at the end, demonstrates the layering of different parts be fitting a 
sequencer/score compositional paradigm. Fsck as a whole does not get beyond this 
paradigm, having an arranged or composed feel throughout. It has large dynamics, it is 
often gestural and expressive at the level of phrasing, and narrative or evocative of mood at 
a structural level, e.g. the tension of KloppOl.Proc (Mono) leading to the cathartic and 
aggressive release of Loop Der.II.Proc. There is also occasional adherence to genre 




Figure 14: 371 Adv3 waveform detail
So despite superficial similarities with ExplorersJVe, sharing similar sound materials,
Fsck embodies a very different aesthetic. The computer has been used as a medium for the 
communication of meaning; sometimes quite expressively gestural content, and existing 
generic ways of organizing sound etc. It does not use the computer as a source of meaning 
itself, even though the digital nature of the sounds and sound processing suggest otherwise. 
In other words, it is, as the album and track titles betray, closer to the high tech aesthetic 
discussed in chapter 2, albeit a particularly 'D1Y' lofi high lech; a 'Unix aesthetic'.
Explorers_ We
4 he first three tracks of Explorers_We consist of something close to silence—room 
ambience (w ith small events in the background) and the noise floor of a recording device.
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At some point in the fourth track, a synth or guitar sample begins to repeat at a very low 
volume, before the 'program' appears to begin proper. The room ambience section, like the 
rest o f the album, is a continuous recording, split into separate tracks at the turn o f each 
minute exactly, regardless o f what is happening in the audio at that point. The disparity 
between track marks and their contents suggests it is an arbitrary convention. The sixty 
tracks on the album are all untitled (although amusingly, on ripping the CD to MP3, the 
Gracenote database gives the tracks titles from a generic sample CD; the three almost 
identical tracks at the start, for instance, become Trail Blazer, Eurohouse and Trance 
Atlantic).
The erroneous naming o f the tracks is surprisingly fitting; Explorers_We is based 
largely on appropriation, but is far removed from the (literally) generic nature o f most 
music production that makes use o f sample CDs. It makes use o f generic samples 
samples designed for the reproduction and imitation o f existing genres, but the use o f such 
samples throughout the album subverts their intended use.
In track 27, for instance, we can hear something that sounds like it was originally a 
drum loop sample. Instead of being used as a loop, it is triggered just once, and is 
processed almost beyond recognition with various delays and distortions. At other points, 
in particular in tracks 46 and 47, very short fragments o f samples are triggered 
rhythmically. The fragments are short enough such that again, their source is unclear, most 
o f them having barely discernible vocal qualities.
It should be noted that, as we have encountered repeatedly throughout the thesis, 
there is a use o f stereo that eschews basic panning techniques. Stereo recorded sounds, 
particularly towards the start o f the album, are played back as is. But from roughly track 8 
onwards, we begin to get sounds placed either in one channel, or the other, or both 
together. The two channels are often related in various ways but generally treated as 
separate entities. For example in the triggering o f events in tracks 10 to 13 the two 
channels, though separate, have a rhythmic relationship.
In general there is an overwhelming barrage o f  sample sources and types o f  
processing throughout the album, put together in an apparently random fashion. It has a 
fairly 'flat' structure; despite massive short term variation, a meta-process or a second order 
process remains constant. The only movement at this second order level appears to be a 
change from arhythmically layered fairly long sounds at the start, to the rhythmically 
triggered shorter sounds towards the end. Regardless o f whether it is controlled by a human 
or not, we could refer to this change as a third order process, in turn governed by fourth
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order processes and so on to infinity. Gmachl describes this as a multi-layered instrument: 
'you can have more levels in an instrument. There's always a basic level which is the way 
the sounds are generated and structured, and then using and building this instrument you 
start to think o f a method to let the computer do what you do and you can make a second 
level which uses the instrument you used yourself before' (Sjogren 1998). So we have an 
instrument that chooses and controls instruments and so on recursively. This is the first 
time we've encountered such an explicit description by an artist o f  this raising o f the level 
o f concern. Furthermore it demonstrates how we should consider not just composition- 
level and meta-composition-level, but a complex multitude o f processes at potentially 
infinite different levels, which the artist can engage with at any chosen point. Each step 
moves more decisions from the composer to the machine.
However with the indeterminacy involved (pseudo-random numbers and so on) as 
already noted, there is still an initial decision to invoke any such process. 'The question is 
what is random. Random always has this part o f uncontrolled taste with it' (Sjogren 1998). 
It is seen by Berthold more as something like controlled randomness, o f the kind required 
in almost all stochastic algorithmic composition: 'to define a set o f ten states and you can 
randomly choose between ten predefined ways of things to work or so. That's the thing of  
not being totally random' (Sjogren 1998). This is followed by a constant monitoring o f  
output, and alteration to create changes. So what we are listening to in a work like 
ExplorersJVe is not simply a series o f indiscriminate random processes, but an 
engagement with technology that includes elements o f  pseudo-randomness as a 
characteristic o f  the materials o f production.
The process in Explorers_We is one approximating collage or montage in its use o f  
sampled material. The final track in particular switches to an 'instrument' that appears to 
select fragments o f different soundfiles, one by one— a monophonic use o f samples in 
contrast to the layering that occurs in the rest o f  the album. Each selection lasts a fraction 
o f  a second, and we're left with a only a vague impression of the types o f sound sources 
used: film dialogue, game shows, sports commentary and appropriated music. Figure 15 
shows a spectrogram of this track, highlighting its fragmented structure.
Chris Cutler writing on the use o f samples in music ('plunderphonics') observes that 
'a recording may be considered as no more than the anonymous carrier o f  a 'pure'—-which 
is to say non-referential— sound91 (Cutler 1994). But Cutler also posits the other extreme, 
the idea that sound might 'consist o f nothing but referentiality'. In a work o f 9
9 Again, the acousmatic, reduced listening (Schaeffer 1966).
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plunderphonics, with each sound divorced from its original context, he suggests that 
something special happens in the reflexive nature of the experience—the fragmented 
quality of the references brings to the fore signification itself; the apprehension of 
reference as reference: 'the recording—for instance a sample—may be no more than a 
fragment, a knowing self reference, a version, and may be used to point at this very quality 
in itself (italics mine). Referential sound in this context loses its original signification, 
being apprehended instead as a sample, as recorded sound. The suspension of disbelief, the 
illusory 'I am listening to a voice' is jolted more forcefully into 'I am listening to a 
recording of a voice'. The two extremes of nothing-but-reference and non-reference 
therefore slide into one another: 'plundered sound carries, above all, the unique ability not 
just to refer but to be\ it offers not just a new means but a new meaning'.
Figure 15: ExplorersJWe track 60 spectral detail
Unlike most work described as plunderphonics however, the focus in Explorers We 
does not seem to be on the samples, but rather on their processing. The effect of the 
extreme montage technique is perhaps better explained by drawing parallels with 
materialist film, which often used the technique of extreme montage, rapid cutting between 
an arbitrary selection of materials. In discussion of this kind of montage, Peter Gidal 
describes the viewer's response to barrages of appropriated material: 'A montage of shots in 
any film is a construction of duration and continuance in the face of the viewer's attempts 
to grasp and arrest the seen, attempts at making definition and meaning. When the film at 
hand refuses to fill those meanings with “truth" or “nature" or “the real," meanings are 
unmade as quickly as made' (Gidal 1989). This is precisely the way in which track 60, or 
Explorers_We as collage/montage as a whole operates. There is a refusal to engage with the 
meaning that might be taken to be inherent in certain sounds.
Much writing on the use of samples in music focusses on the idea of cultural 
recycling, playing with well established signifiers; Paul Miller for instance describes it as
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'remixing' in 'the age o f the infinite archive' (Miller 2008). But here the argument is that 
samples become empty raw material. 'The instrument is stronger than the samples. The 
instrument is the way that things are arranged or structured and it's more important to the 
music that comes out o f  the PA than the samples themselves' (Sjogren 1998). Any meaning 
that might come out o f the process, from the very eclectic set o f sound sources, is left to 
chance. The arbitrariness o f  sample selection is evidenced by Gmachl's technique o f  
numbering soundfiles, to allow an instrument to select them at random. Methods like this 
result in the incidental sound o f Explorers_We, contrasted to the more deliberate Fsck.
Arbitrariness
The importance o f arbitrariness cannot be underestimated here, as the obverse to 
entrenched meaning. In Gidal's words, 'since everything is constructed, no “nature” pre­
existent, the production process o f a film, and the production o f its meanings, can be 
recognized as arbitrary ... the concept o f “arbitrariness” is based on the political demand 
that nothing be seen as accepted or natural. This is not a denial o f meanings but rather a 
recognition o f the imposition o f ideologies' (Gidal 1989). He links this with the idea o f  the 
'empty signifier', an attempt to make identification in the work impossible. If there is 
nothing in the work that is recognizable in terms o f meaning content (the repetition o f  
signifiers naturalized in the dominant ideology), the viewers/listeners cannot position 
themselves in relation to it—the goal is non-identity. However, 'the problem for 
structural/materialist film is that the concepts o f arbitrariness and non-identity can not be 
simply applied; each work has its specificities. There is no overall aesthetic strategy which 
assures certain results or effects' (Gidal 1989). In Explorers_We some level o f  arbitrariness 
is achieved simply through the running o f random processes over a bank o f soundfiles.
It is important to note that arbitrariness, although the ideals it points towards might 
be the empty signifier and non-identity, cannot move a work outside o f ideology, or create 
some ideal space free o f meaning. All ideological constructions are in fact arbitrary, but the 
recognition o f this fact and the explicit use o f arbitrariness in a work, prevents anything 
from being presented as if it were something other than arbitrary. To clarify this by way o f  
illustration, overtly gestural music (with examples too numerous to mention— romanticism, 
rock music) tends to present the gesture as an expression o f feeling or emotion, on the 
assumption that it will be understood as such by the listener. The human condition and its 
expression is presented as universal and natural. Indeterminate music however manages to 
sidestep this kind o f imposition on the listener, leaving its reception more open; meaning
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can be constructed external to the work, rather than pre-determined and contained 'within' 
it.
Again we happen upon concepts associated with Cage. This time his ideas do seem 
appropriate to the situation and applicable to the work o f Farmers Manual:
When I hear what we call music it seems to me that someone is 
talking, and talking about his feelings or about his ideas of 
relationships. But when I hear traffic, the sound o f traffic ... for 
instance, 1 don’t have the feeling that anyone is talking, 1 have the 
feeling that sound is acting, and I love the activity o f sound ... I'm 
completely satisfied with that. I don't need sound to talk to me ...
People expect listening to be more than listening, so sometimes 
they speak o f inner listening, or the meaning o f  sound. When I talk 
about music it finally comes to peoples minds that I'm talking about 
sound, that doesn't mean anything, that is not inner, that is just 
outer. (Cage 1991)
So the move away from cultural meaning in samples, or meaning in sound in general, is the 
way in which this music begins to establish itself as literal. It is concerned primarily with 
material processes and phenomenological result, having the effect o f  not fixing any 
meaning in place. Possert states clearly: 'I feel that there's a big misunderstanding between 
the audience and us because they think that we're trying to communicate anything. It's just 
the music and the visuals ... there's no general message' (Sjogren 1998). Gmachl describes 
the situation similarly: “it often happened that people who listened to our music would 
have difficulty recognising certain elements that they usually expect in music” (Gmachl 
2002). It is a process and system based music, in which the process or system is not 
generally revealed to the listener. Its goal is not to represent something beyond itself (either 
narrative or systemic or documentary).
Failure
Farmers Manual, for Cascone (Cascone 2000), are one o f many groups o f artists 
exemplifying the 'glitch' aesthetic, an aesthetic o f failure. However it seems that the 
approach outlined above does not incorporate any aspect o f failure, only deliberately 
indeterminate systems, Once aware o f this, the sound o f Explorers_We does not signify the 
idea o f errors. The cut-up vocal samples in tracks 42 to 59 for instance, might be described 
as 'glitchy', but do not in fact sound like any error that might occur in digital sound
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reproduction (CD skipping for instance). Furthermore it could be argued that even works 
making use o f  techniques like CD skipping, such as Yasunao Tone's Wounded CD, still 
constitute an exploration o f technological processes, not an aestheticization of failure per 
se. This is perhaps implied by Cascone in his recurrent use o f scare quotes for the word 
'failure'. As Hegarty puts it: 'failure is only “failure”— it is not a judgement about badness, 
but one o f  a refusal o f  heroic success in the form o f musical mastery or mastery o f musical 
forms' (Hegarty 2007).
Cascone also describes the tendency to incorporate digital 'failure' into music as an 
interest in what was previously considered background sound, beginning (predictably) with 
Russolo's obsession with industrial noise, and continuing through Cage's 4'33', then 
jumping to what he calls the 'post-digital' music around the turn o f  the millennium. But 
taking Wounded CD as an exemplar o f  this approach manifest in digital technology, we can 
see that the impulse to experiment with all facets o f a new technology is there as soon as it 
becomes available to artists (it was first performed in 1985, only 3 years after the first CD 
player was commercially available). The same is also surely true for new technologies and 
materials in all art forms. This approach is nothing new, as Cascone in fact concedes. So 
we could say that experimental digital music was always 'post-digital' in this sense, or put 
more simply, it is music that is the result o f experimentation with digital technology.
The 'glitch', the unwanted sound, or more generally, noise, that comes out o f such 
experimentation, could be considered broadly any sound that is not in a very traditional 
sense considered musical. For example an overt splicing together o f two sounds will often 
cause a click, as the waveforms spliced together are not crossfaded seamlessly. The sharp 
vertical lines in the spectrogram in figure 15 are an example. In fact, any kind of temporal 
incongruity can be considered noise in this sense— two sounds put together that in previous 
vocabularies (musical, linguistic, acoustic) would not ordinarily follow. This will result 
from the kind o f indeterminate processes behind works like Explorers We, that do not 
follow the logic o f human rationality or language.
Noise
Noise is always negatively defined according to Hegarty— it is specifically whatever music 
is not. It is 'a resistance, but also defined by what society resists', 'it can never be positively, 
definitively and timelessly located' (Hegarty 2007). The modernist attempt to broaden 
musicality and incorporate all sounds in music (to varying degrees— Satie, Russolo,
Varese, Schaeffer, Cage) tends to the ideal that all sound is potentially musical, which
146
Hegarty calls neo-Pythagoreanism, 'i.e. the music o f the spheres being out there, even if 
presently inaudible to humans' (Hegarty 2007). However the reception o f  these works (e.g. 
the famous 'riots' at the premier o f  Déserts or at the futurist concerts) suggests this often 
acts as not so much a broadening o f musicality, but an incorporation o f what is considered 
by the audience non-music, noise; a willful and provocative opposition to musical 
tradition.
Haswell's compilation for his OR label OR MD Comp (OR Just 13, 2003) contains 
a live recording o f Farmers Manual playing in the Sheffield Showroom Cinema bar in 
1998. The recording is notable for the contribution o f two audience members who, 
throughout the set, heckle the band for not playing the kind o f music they expect to hear. 
There are quiet, high pitched tones, with very sparse, sporadic, percussive sounds. The 
percussive sounds are loud enough that the potential o f  the sound system is demonstrated. 
A; Hit the beat, boy, hit the beat, boy. We need a beat, boy, we need 
a beat, boy, we need a beat, boy ... Have you plugged in? Have you
plugged in? ... Have you got a bass? You must have a bass.
B: Get a fucking bassline.
A: C'mon, bassline now, bassline now.
B: Who are you anyway?
A: You know you can do it, kick it o f f ... You've got 4 computers 
there, c'mon where's the 'bam-ba-bam-ba-bam'
These taunts are met with no reply and a blank refusal to change anything, the sound 
remains more or less the same throughout the recording.
This oppositional attitude is seen in numerous examples in the history o f Mego. 
Rehberg, at the same gig, put on what is sometimes referred to as a 'spacebar performance', 
i.e. the often maligned practice o f pressing a single button and letting the computer play 
(see for example Puckette 1991, for discussion o f the perceived problem o f performance in 
electronic music from the decoupling of control and output; or for the antithesis see d’ 
Escrivân 2006, who discusses the idea that this does not pose a problem for younger 
generations who have been exposed to electronic control their entire life). In Rehberg's 
approach there is no traditional performance element at all. In this case he was simply 
starting a generative Supercollider patch. Once it was running he walked off stage leaving 
the computer, expressing a dislike for 'faking it' [1]— pretending to control some element 
o f the sound when it was unnecessary. This was simply the type o f software available to 
him at the time, he has pointed out that patches with interactive sliders and controls only
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came later [1], This type o f  performance superficially has a precedent in the acousmatic 
tradition, but the context is entirely different. It becomes very confrontational in concerts in 
which the audience is expecting techno, or a rock band, or even jazz. The degree to which 
it alienates audiences should not be underestimated. He describes similar gigs at which no 
one clapped, they did not even realize the performance had finished f 1].
Reactions range from dismissal to the more extreme. Haswell describes the kind o f  
audience reactions he has previously encountered: 'people have been on stage and pulled 
my leads out, I've had people prod me with things, I've had people that push the laptop lid 
down while I was playing and things like that just to stop me' [6]. Shocks based on 
performance paradigms aside, this is the oppositional effect o f  what can broadly be referred 
to as noise.
Torben Sangild gives three different ways o f defining noise, reflecting the most 
common uses o f the word: acoustic, communicative and subjective. 'Acoustic noise' is 
descriptive o f the basic objective characteristics o f sound— 'sounds that are impure and 
irregular'— i.e. sounds which at a very low-level do not follow a repeating pattern, resulting 
in wide-band spectra. Atonality approaches this, begins to be considered noisy in this 
sense, and as we add more atonal elements we get closer and closer to pure white noise. 
Techniques for introducing noise therefore include the kind o f processes that result in 
resynthesis artifacts, or aliasing and so on, for introducing atonality. Wider-band noise 
results from various distortion techniques, or from simply using noisy material as a sound 
source. It is interesting to note that a sharp click o f the kind described above also has this 
wide-band characteristic (taken to the extreme a theoretical perfect impulse contains every 
frequency, if  only for theoretically no length o f time).
'Communicative noise', as per the standard Shannon and Weaver definition o f noise 
(Shannon et al. 1969), is 'that which distorts the signal on its way from transmitter to 
recipient' (Sangild 1992). It is generally thought o f  as the elements in a sound that arise 
from the imperfection o f the medium. This is perhaps the model which forms the basis o f  
descriptions of'glitch music' in writing such as Cascone's— there is a focus on the medium 
itself, made possible by its failure. Simon Reynolds describes something like this 
understanding o f  noise, but in a slightly more general sense and with an anti-idealist 
corollary:
If music is like a language, if  it communicates some kind o f  
emotional or spiritual message, then noise is best defined as 
interference, something which blocks transmission, jams the code,
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prevents sense being made. The subliminal message o f most music 
is that the universe is essentially benign, that if there is sadness or 
tragedy, this is resolved at the level o f some higher harmony. Noise 
troubles this worldview. (Reynolds 1990)
Like Gidal, Reynolds sees non-identity as the goal here (although, unlike Gidal, his reasons 
are individual rather than political):
[Noise] causes a blockage and destabilization o f the codes by which 
we make sense o f the world ... [it] occurs when language breaks 
down. Noise is a wordless state in which the very constitution o f  
our selves is in jeopardy. The pleasure of noise lies in the fact that 
the obliteration o f meaning and identity is ecstasy (literally, being 
out-of-oneself). (Reynolds 1990)
A disruption o f effective communication is one way o f thinking about this, but it does not 
account for a scenario where this kind o f linear communication has no relevance— where it 
is not attempted in the first place or even alluded to. In such a scenario, technology is not 
mediating, and merely enabling/impeding communication to varying degrees, it is itself 
fundamentally and directly implicated in whatever interaction is taking place. Figure 16 
shows how a slight reformulation o f Shannon and Weaver's model provides us with a basic 
model o f  artistic production in relation to noise music. What this shows is not just an 
emphasis o f the noise (as might be inferred from an aesthetic o f failure), it is a fundamental 
change in the way in which musical production is understood. It also neatly demonstrates 
the importance this gives to technology; previously it was merely a necessary 
inconvenience (or a desired inconvenience in an aesthetic o f failure), but in the 
reformulated model it is primary in determining the result (and is not in any sense o f the 
word 'failing'). Technology is central in creating meaning, not just communicating it. The 
technology or algorithm can be considered a tool, but not a tool with any kind of 
transparency, which merely enables the realization o f an artist's vision. It is fully implicated 
in the result.
Sangild's final definition is 'subjective noise', perhaps the most familiar conception 
o f noise— defined simply as unpleasant or unwanted sound. He makes an interesting point 
regarding the contextual nature o f judgements regarding this type o f noisiness: 'the noise of  
the roaring sea, for example, is not far from white radio noise, but nonetheless is not 
considered unpleasant and irritating. We still seek meaning in nature and therefore the 
roaring sea is a blissful sound, whereas radio noise (even if we were to hear it as
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indistinguishable from the sea) is normally considered a disturbance' (Sangild 1992). In a 
music that allows any sound, nothing is considered noise; it is tempting therefore to say 
that this subjective definition becomes irrelevant. But Sangild warns against ignoring it: 
'that would be a hasty dismissal o f  the important tension you get from infusing the 
formerly negative' (Sangild 1992).
Signal B




Figure 16: Communication model and reformulation
It is easy to see how all three o f these definitions are related— the patternless nature o f  
acoustically defined noise makes it the usual and most effective way in which 
communication is impeded, and its role as impediment to meaning in a given context is 
likely to make it unwanted subjectively. The important point is that when noise is 
antagonistic to meaning, it ceases to operate on a symbolic level and presents the listener 
instead with its materiality. This is the sense in which I will define noise for the purposes of 
this thesis, as an alternative to the three definitions given above. It is close to the 
communicative definition, but the point is that it has nothing to do with this simplistic type 
o f communication at all; it is not the element within a signal that distorts or impedes 
communication, it is itself a signal (that happens to have no determinate meaning). To 
distinguish, I will refer to this as literal noise. So, for example, when noise (acoustically 
defined) is used for  communication, when it has strong symbolic associations, this is not 
literal noise.
In contrast to the acoustic definition o f noise, Reynolds points out the importance of  
high-level inconsistency in the noise, claiming for instance that hip-hop (due to its 
collage/montage structure, as with ExplorersJVe) is more effectively noisy than a barrage 
o f  acoustically noisy material that becomes predictable.
A tangent on literal noise and materialist ontology: if noise is meaningless
150
vibration, then we could define 'material'— the point at which thought fails (Brassier, via 
l i te k  (Brassier 2010))— as noise. Everything is ultimately noise; there is no inherent 
meaning in sound or any other kind o f  vibration. Meanings are culturally or ideologically 
or evolutionarily, but ultimately contingently, assigned to certain patterns in the noise. 
Throughout writing on aesthetics in the materialist tradition, as well as in Heidegger's 
phenomenology, there is the recurring idea that works o f art unmake these meanings, either 
to make new meanings or to glimpse the 'noise'. But given this, Reynolds highlights a 
fundamental paradox in theorizing noise:
To speak o f  noise, to give it attributes, to claim things for it, is 
immediately to shackle it with meaning again, to make it part of 
culture. If noise is where language ceases, then to describe it is to 
imprison it again with adjectives. To confer the status o f value upon 
excess and extremism is to bring these things back within the pale 
of decency. So the rhetoriticians o f noise actually destroy the power 
they strive to celebrate; they are the very start o f the process by 
which subversion is turned into contribution, which is absorbed as 
a renewal for the system. (Reynolds 1990)
This is particularly reminiscent o f Heidegger's revealing/concealing nature o f being; the 
very process o f revealing causes concealment. There is here the implication that meaning is 
somehow 'false'; what I'm calling noise is the 'true' reality underlying normal 
phenomenological experience. This seems to contradict the notion that phenomenology 
overcomes the subject/object dichotomy. Materialism recently, in the form o f speculative 
realism, attacks phenomenology on the grounds that despite claims to the contrary it 
remains what Harman calls 'a philosophy o f access', i.e. it is concerned with how a subject 
accesses objects, a philosophy o f the relationship between humans ('dasien' etc.) and the 
world (Harman 2007). The details o f disagreements between these approaches to 
philosophy do not directly concern us here, but what they seem to share is a conviction that 
there is something undefinable at the base (or even non-base, non-ground) o f reality, which 
is concealed. As Brassier says for instance, his nihilist realism is 'the unavoidable corollary 
o f the realist conviction that there is a mind-independent reality, which despite the 
presumptions o f human narcissism, is indifferent to our existence and oblivious to the 
'values' and 'meanings' which we would drape over it in order to make it more hospitable' 
(Brassier 2010).
Returning to the discussion o f noise, in a separate paper Sangild gives another
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taxonomy, this time regarding the use of noise in music (Sangild 2004b). He describes 
expressionist, introvert and minimal noise. It is clear that Sangild here is interested in the 
meaning of noise. What we are concerned with however is specifically noise as void of 
meaning. Expressionist, introvert and minimal noise are each in opposition to literal noise. 
Accordingly, the examples he gives do not function in the way I have described 
Explorers JVe. He describes noise in The Who, Hendrix, Sonic Youth and so on as a 
'gesture of rush, rage, excitement, aggression, pain, fear, anger, emotional chaos and 
ecstasy'; in My Bloody Valentine as 'drowsy', 'dreamlike', 'melancholic', 'sensual' and 
'intimate'; in Merzbow as 'violently aggressive' at the same time as 'meditative', 'hypnotic' 
and 'trance-like'; and finally in Oval as 'fragile'. None of these descriptions seem suitable 
for Explorers_We.
Some commentators have, following Cascone's implications, focussed on the 
aforementioned possibility of revealing the mediating technology, which was previously 
(or ideally) hidden in its transparency (Bates 2004, Hainge 2007, Stuart 2011). But, to use 
materialist film as an analogy again, this would embody Gidal's concept of'pseudo­
documentary'—to reiterate: 'the point here is not that every procedure should be “there” on 
film, exposed or explained, as that is merely another level of documentation, “seeing what 
is 'really' taking place”' (Gidal 1989). An exposure of the technology and production in this 
way appears not to be the intention in 'glitch' music, particularly since for the most part the 
finished product is presented as a CD presumably for playback on high fidelity equipment. 
At the very least from the stage of mastering to playback, the process is one of illusionistic 
reproduction (Christian Marclay's Record Without a Cover is a notable exception).
Clearly, a 'glitch' album such as Explorers_We, although concerned almost solely 
with technological processes, is not an exposition of, or comment on its own format. This 
would lead to a blatant réintroduction o f semiotic content—a certain kind of semiotic 
content that in its documentary style pertains to a 'truth', the representation of a something 
as if it were not a representation. This would again most likely result in something like the 
high-tech aesthetic, primarily a work about technology not o/technology.
The Explorers_We press release states that the '60 PQ start points [make] full use of 
your dusty shuffle button'. This is an effective use of the CD, subverting and playing with 
the possibilities of the format rather than attempting to 'reveal' it by, for instance, recording 
the playback of a damaged CD and reproducing it on undamaged CDs. Both of these 
approaches result in something real, o f course, but the latter is about a different, previous 
real, recorded and reproduced. It therefore is a work of illusionism and idealism, far from
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its superficially materialist aim of a revelation of process. The futility of such an endeavor 
is highlighted in this irony. But again, this is not the aim of Farmers Manual. As Possert 
says: 'There is no concept. There's nothing' (Sjogren 1998). What remains is literal noise: 
'we are arrested, fascinated, by a convulsion of sound to which we are unable to assign a 
meaning. We are mesmerized by the materiality of music' (Reynolds 1990).
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Returnal and A New Way To Pay Old Debts:
Disinterment of technology and technique
This chapter will look at more recent developments in Editions Mego, in particular two 
albums: Returnal by Dan Lopatin as Oneohtrix Point Never (eMEGO 104,2010) and A 
New Way To Pay Old Debts by Bill Orcutt (eMEGO 119,2011)—a CD reissue of the LP 
release on Orcutt's own Palilalia label (PAL-002,2009), On the surface it seems that these 
two albums have very little in common, but the point of convergence and the focus of this 
chapter is the way in which they both give the impression of looking to the past in some 
way. The evidence and possible reasons for this will be explored, followed by a discussion 
of a number of possible interpretations. Jameson's concept of the 'nostalgia mode' will be 
contrasted with the recent interest in what has become known as 'hauntology'. Both will 
ultimately be rejected in favour o f a third option that is more in line with the general thrust 
of the descriptions of artistic practice in the rest of the thesis.
The VIIS Aesthetic
Returnal (eternal returning—also suggested in the title of track 7, Ouroboros) looks 
primarily to vintage analog synthesis. Lopatin mainly uses a Roland Juno-60, a polyphonic 
analog synthesizer produced in the early 1980s with a single (digitally controlled) 
oscillator per voice, low and high pass analog filters, a triangle LFO and a distinctive 
chorus effect. Importantly it also has a built-in arpeggiator. The characteristic sound of the 
Juno-60 is inevitably reminiscent of 80s synthpop— it was heavily used by bands like The 
Human League, Duran Duran, A-Ha etc. Its arpeggiators and resonant textures are also 
synonymous with library music of the time, recalling science documentaries or obscure and 
forgotten television programmes. The pervasiveness and anonymity of library music makes 
it difficult to pinpoint specific examples of the source of this, but the critical reception to 
the album repeatedly highlights this aspect of the sound, particularly the utopianism 
associated with the period.
It has been described variously as: 'a nostalgic sound, drenched in retro-futurist 
melancholy, conjuring a nightclub of the near future as it might have been imagined by 
some straight-to-VIIS movie from the early 1980s' (Sherburne 2010); 'a shape-shifting 
new-age hymnal whose gamelan-inspired sequences and new-age, pitch-shifted vocals 
converge to form a retro-futurist manifesto’ (Tiny Mix Tapes 2010); a 'repurposed VI IS
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aesthetic' that nonetheless rather than '[focussing] exclusively on the p a s t... focuses on our 
various unfulfilled visions of the future' (Blackwell 2010). Lopatin does not in fact use any 
VHS technology (Powell 2010), this 'VHS aesthetic' therefore refers more to the 
associations we have with the sound of synthesizers like the Juno-60 (and the forms that 
result from their compositional affordances).
S ad  N ews From Korea  and the ontology of songs
A New Way To Pay Old Debts (title taken from the 15th century Philip Massinger play), in 
contrast, is described on its press release as an 'acoustic hardcore blues stormer', and 
consists solely o f unprocessed recordings of Orcutt playing the guitar with occasional 
vocals. The title alludes to an interesting relationship between new and old, which we see 
for example in the second track on the album: a version of Lightin' Hopkins' Sad News 
From Korea (1951), which is completely unrecognizable as the same song. Hopkins' 
standard 12-bar blues is replaced with a very loose riff that hangs on a single high D# hit 
arrhythmically for up to 15 seconds at a time before dropping into rapid chaotic 
strumming, repeated for the roughly 3 minute duration of the track.
This creates an interesting problematization of the ideality implied by separating the 
concept o f a song from any specific instance or version of it. Most musical ontologists (in 
the analytic tradition, for example see (Levinson 1980), (Davies 2005), (Dodd 2007), 
(Kania 2008)) would almost certainly claim that Orcutt's Sad News From Korea is not the 
same song as Hopkins' Sad News From Korea. According to Dodd's ontology for example, 
there is a type-token relationship between a musical work and any given instance of it. That 
is, the work is an abstract type and an instance of it is is a concrete token (as with the 
relationship between 'tree' and 'a tree'). He therefore allows for slight variation between 
tokens while they still count as the same type—pieces can be 'thicker' or 'thinner', i.e. some 
information can be left out or added while still retaining the essence of the piece, and since 
musical works are 'norm-types' (they describe how the world should be) he therefore also 
allows for occasional wrong notes and so on. However the two versions of Sad News From 
Korea stretch this beyond reason. There is not just slight variation, there is almost no 
correlation. If we want to say that they are the same song, then we have to discard the type- 
token view of musical works.
But Dodd claims that the type-token understanding is a necessary prerequisite for 
any musical ontology, since without it there can in fact be no repeatability of a musical 
work at all, i.e. no two performances of a piece are actually the same piece because they
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are not identical. He states that incoherence results if we discard it. But what becomes 
incoherent is not the concept of a musical work as used in any specific situation, only the 
concept of a generalized, all-encompassing universal theory of'musical works'. When the 
boundaries of a musical work become blurred, the question becomes moot; we could 
describe the two versions of Sad News From Korea as the same song, or as different songs, 
but what does this actually tell us? Is it a useful or interesting distinction? Note that both 
options ultimately assume the existence of an abstract 'musical work', of which we are 
debating the nature. Musical works for Dodd are 'eternal, unstructured, unchanging, 
modally inflexible, abstract entities' (Kania 2008), which are discovered, rather than 
created. Flexibility is allowed only in the token, the actual physical sound, which is 
explicitly described as being nol 'the work itself. Kania highlights some of the absurdities 
that entail:
Since musical works are simple sound-event types, there is no 
intentional condition on producing an instance of a work. Thus, 
since all possible sound-event types are eternal existents, whenever 
there is a sound it is an instance of a musical work. If you think 
that’s bad enough, let me turn the screw twice more. First, since 
Dodd allows for thicker and thinner works, whenever a kitten 
walks along the keys of a piano, it does not merely instance one
work, but an infinite number of works: the work that mandates 
exactly those notes in that order; the work that mandates roughly 
those notes, but allows for some variation; the work that mandates 
any notes that fit this harmonic profile; and so on. There is an 
infinite number of such works, since thickness and thinness are
merely two ends on a continuum. Second, the kitten produces an 
instance of more works than this. Since works are norm-types on 
Dodd’s view, the kitten can'get some notes wrong.'It instances not 
only the work that mandates just these notes in this order, but also 
all works that differ from this work by one note, two notes, three 
notes, and so on. Thus, for each of the infinite number of works the 
kitten instances, mentioned above, there is a further infinity of 
works the kitten produces a passable, but imperfect, instance of.
Note also that I picked a kitten on a piano only for convenience.
Every sound event, and every part of every sound event, is an
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Instance of an infinite number of works for just the same reasons.
(Kania 2008)
Whatever the nature of Orcutt's conviction that he was performing Hopkins' Sad News 
From Korea, it seems clear that it displays a disregard for any such ontological idealism. 
The naming of the track in this way is almost arbitrary, other than acting perhaps as a 
reference point. Lightnin' Hopkins influence is clear, not only in this track but throughout 
the album. There is the looseness in the playing, the disregard for tight timing and rigid 
measures, and a recurrent use of riffs that hang on a single note. These aspects, although 
taken to an extreme, are very much reminiscent of Hopkins' style. Other influences 
explicitly mentioned by Orcutt include Fred McDowell and Muddy Waters (Masters & 
Currin 2010).
The style more generally recalls earlier Delta blues, and the very first recordings of 
blues music; one of the most salient aspects of the album is the 'lo-fi' character of the 
recordings. Like the recordings of Robert Johnson— single-session takes recorded in a 
hotel room (or a room next to a busy street in San Francisco in Orcutt's case, see liner 
notes)—aspects such as the room ambience are arguably as important to the aesthetic as the 
guitar playing or singing. This aspect is again taken to something of an extreme in A New 
Way To Pay Old Debts with, for example, no effort being made to hide a phone ringing in 
the background of the opening track Lip Rich, or a police siren that can be heard in Street 
Peaches.
Nostalgia and hauntology
The disinterment of older techniques and aesthetics is relevant to Jameson's concept of the 
nostalgia mode. He uses the term to refer to the cannibalization of styles of the past; note 
that this is not to do with any psychological feeling of nostalgia—as Jameson says, 
'nostalgia does not strike one as an altogether satisfactory word'. He sees in postmodern 
cultural production (film and architecture in particular) a tendency towards historical 
pastiche that ironically militates against any real historicity: 'the nostalgia film was never a 
matter of some old-fashioned 'representation' of historical content, but instead approached 
the 'past' through stylistic connotation, conveying 'pastness' by the glossy qualities of the 
image, and '1930s-ness' or '1950s-ness' by the attributes of fashion' (Jameson 1990).
Postmodern history then is simulacra!. Jameson's theory carries a conviction that 
postmodernism amounts almost to a denial of the past, seeing history only as an archive of 
forms to be reappropriated; reappropriating perhaps in order to distantiate from the past, to
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make it seem less real and to reassert an eternal political present. Given this, the nostalgia 
mode for Jameson is an integral component of the logic of late capitalism. The constant 
reiteration of signifiers of the past essentially reasserts the end of history (Fukuyama 
1993). It also provides a wealth of interchangeable fashions and aesthetics for consumption 
that can be endlessly recycled and presented as if they are new. Mark Fisher's conception 
of hauntology is formulated in opposition to this: 'hauntology is the counterpart to this 
nostalgia mode. The preoccupation with the past in hauntological music could easily be 
construed as ‘nostalgic’. But it is the very foregrounding of temporality that makes 
hauntology differ from the typical products of the nostalgia mode, which bracket out 
history altogether in order to present themselves as new' (Fisher 2008).
Hauntology is originally a Derrida neologism, a play on the word 'ontology', 
referring to the being of a spectre—paradoxically present in its absence. More specifically 
he is referring to the 'spectre of Marx' (Derrida 2006); the ghost that continues to haunt 
Europe even after the fall of the Berlin wall—post-end-of-history. The result of this 
haunting according to Derrida is a looking to the past in aesthetics and ideology which 
appears to be quite different to the nostalgia mode, perhaps because it represents a genuine 
nostalgia, a yearning for modernist utopianism. Reynolds describes this, quoting David 
Toop, as a 'nostalgia for the future' (Reynolds 2006a). Fisher explains how this has become 
manifest in music recently, using the first Burial album (Hyperdub HDBCD001,2006) as 
an example:
If there is one act which makes a case for the supreme pertinence of
the concept of hauntology in relation to music today, it is Burial.
Precisely because Burial deals with nostalgic longings, his music
does not belong to the nostalgia mode. What you hear in Burial’s 
two LPs is a craving for a past which nevertheless appears 
irretrievably lost, veiled behind a relentless drizzle of crackle.
Beyond the longing for a particular moment or a particular musical 
genre is a longing for the ceaseless forward motion of a culture 
which once appeared capable of infinite renewal, but which is now 
used up, involuted. The nostalgia for modernism resists the 
postmodern nostalgia mode. (Fisher 2008)
The overall feeling is that o f dyschronia; 'time is out of joint' (also from Derrida's Spectres 
o f Marx, originally a Hamlet quote). This is described in particular through aspects such as 
'surface noise'—the sound and distortions of the recording medium.
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Dyschronia is not repressed in hauntology; it rises to the surface.
Or rather, it unsettles the very distinction between surface and 
depth, between background and foreground. In sonic hauntology, 
we hear that time is out of joint. The joins are audible - in the 
crackles, the hiss ... What Little Axe, Burial, Ghost Box, The 
Caretaker share with Tricky is that they foreground the surface 
noise. There is no attempt to smooth away the textural discrepancy 
between the crackly sample and the rest of the recording. This is 
one reason why hauntology is not just some lazy, hazy term for the 
ethereal. Hauntology isn't about hoky atmospherics or 'spookiness' 
but a technological uncanny ... The surface noise of the sample 
unsettles the illusion of presence in at least two ways: first, 
temporally, by alerting us to the fact that what we are listening to is 
a phonographic revenant, and second, ontologically, by introducing 
the technical frame, the unheard material pre-condition of the 
recording, on the level of content. We're now so accustomed to this 
violation of ontological hierarchy that it goes unnoticed. (Fisher 
2006)
So is this theory o f hauntology an appropriate way to understand the albums considered 
here? Superficially both have remarkably similar characteristics to the kind of music 
discussed in writing on 'sonic hauntology'. In A New Way To Pay Old Debts, there is the 
surface noise that has already been mentioned; there is its uncanny resemblance to blues of 
the 1950s and earlier; there is even what could be heard as a yearning melancholy at some 
points—particularly Poor Black Math, in which the distortion and surface noise could 
easily be read on a metaphorical level as signifiers of the degredation of memory, as tends 
to be the case with audio processing effects in hauntology based analyses.
Similarly in Returnal, there is what is often interpreted as a melancholic nostalgia 
for a lost future (see previous quotes from critics); the sound o f '80s analog synthesis and 
its various associations (mainly in Stress Waves, Returml and Where Does Time Go); the 
appearance on Ouroboros o f a clear layer o f 'surface noise'; and throughout the album a 
large amount of audio processing-taking recordings of the synthesizers and time 
stretching, pitch shifting, and repeatedly 'sampling and resampling' on a computer (Powell 
2010)— again apparently befitting the (slightly trite) memory metaphor Various samples 
from youtube are also used in this process (certainly 'lo-fi' but not necessarily 'retro').
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Reynolds, in a later article, claims that actually 'the [hauntological] is surely an 
undercurrent within all recorded music... the recording process being inherently eerie and 
out of joint' (Reynolds 2006b). All music refers to the past in some way, if not through 
traces of the recording process, simply through the adoption of techniques and aesthetics 
which are a development or a negation of previous techniques and aesthetics. It is perhaps 
something of a red herring to understand these albums as being specifically concerned with 
the past any more than other music, given that music will always be historically situated.
At the other extreme, references to the past could be seen as only byproducts; 
byproducts in a search for materials to explore, which just happen to be in the form of 
older technologies and techniques. The aspects that are being foregrounded in these works 
are technological artifacts, some of which signify particular periods in history through 
association, but this of course is arbitrary, it does not have to be the case. The prevalence of 
these kinds of sounds (vintage synthesis, intentional surface noise) in recent music actually 
might reduce their symbolic efficacy in this regard—because the associations are 
specifically to do with history, their repeated use in a contemporary context erodes such 
associations. Their symbolic associations become less important, and to some extent they 
are re-assimilated into musical production simply as extra material to work with, for their 
sonic qualities alone. If there is a trend of looking backwards for material to work with in 
electronic music, this is perhaps simply due to the feeling that older technology offers more 
fertile ground for experimentation. Lopatin describes his experimental approach to the 
technology: 'My relative lack of know-how when it comes to analog synthesis helps me 
because I don't approach gear with metaphors in mind. Like, if I run this patch into that 
patch and modulate the shit out o f the LFO, blah blah blah— I just don't get it. I just play 
with stuff (Powell 2010).
Surface noise
To return to the surface noise example, its figurative use signifies that this is merely a trace 
of something that previously took place. The music (the thing that is not the surface noise 
— it is behind the surface noise) is hidden or degraded, to approximate half forgotten 
memories and so on. 'In sonic hauntology, disinterment goes alongside internment, the 
deliberate burial of signal behind noise' (Fisher 2006). Once again we see the 
communication theory model—an ideal music mediated and impeded by technological 
noise. In a more general sense, Reynolds refers to a 'half-erased or never-quite-attained 
songform'. The ideal form is intentionally degraded, acting as a signifier of its materiality.
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It deals with temporality, contingency and so on, on a metaphorical level. This is 
predicated either on the idea of a record as documentation or trace of a previous event, a 
way of accessing some kind of'presence' (in the Derridean sense); or as an imperfect 
medium for 'remembering' the ideal songform.
But what if we see the record not as a way of accessing something else, but as a 
thing in itself? The ontology of the music shifts—the recorded sound is no longer a 
degraded form of the ideal music, we instead take the music to be whatever sound the 
record produces. The surface noise should be seen as a fundamental part of the music, not 
something that the music hides behind. The term surface noise is sometimes used as a 
synecdoche; not just to refer to noise on the surface of vinyl, but to any aspect of a 
recording that is introduced by the recording process or medium itself. If we take this 
definition to an extreme, it essentially points towards any influence of technology on the 
sound—the ways in which the contingencies and characteristics of an instrument are 
implicated in a composition for that instrument, technologies such as notation, and more 
recently sequencers, DSP techniques and so on. The argument in this thesis, then, is that 
music can be thought of as nothing but surface noise.
In A New Way To Pay Old Debts, the songs seem so shot through with contingency 
that the concept of an ideal songform is not even suggested. For instance it might be 
tempting for a critic to describe the Sad News From Korea cover as a 'twisted' or 'mangled' 
version of the original, but the differences are so great that this would require quite a 
stretch of the imagination. Throughout the album there is never the impression of an 
originary song behind the 'twisted or 'mangled' riffs. The approach is very much straight 
improvisation: 'it's based around a scale, and I'll have a general structure in mind, and 
certain things I know I want to hit along the way, certain phrases or dynamics. So I'll go 
into it with those few landmarks in mind, and navigate my way through it.' (Masters & 
Currin 2010).
The noise aspects (and artifacts in the audio such as distortion) are not added post­
production, in a deliberate way after the fact, for a specific semantic effect. Any surface 
noise is fundamental part of the process o f recording. Compare this to something like 
Selected Memories From The Haunted Ballroom by the Caretaker (1999, V/Vm Test 
Records, OFFAL02), taken by writers like Fisher to be an archetype of sonic hauntology. It 
consists of recordings of swing and ballroom music from the 1930s, processed in extreme 
ways such that the'hidden'nature of the music is hugely emphasized. There is an 
exaggerated amount of surface noise-—vinyl crackle, hiss etc.—as well as other kinds of
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processing to degrade the audio that further indicate the idea that these are faded memories. 
'It's a stranger’s past relocated within your own memories, a re-imagined history from an 
alien past' (Fletcher 2008).
The approach taken in A New Way To Pay Old Debts, in contrast, is not based 
around the simulacral—creating the 'image' of a recording, something that sounds like a 
recording; it simply is a recording. The presence of surface noise in A New Way To Pay Old 
Debts could be explained as the result of an approach that treats the recordings as 
something closer to field recordings. To clarify, this is in contrast to studio recordings; the 
way in which one would normally think of studio recordings is in the isolation of one or 
more particular elements, instruments for instance. There is an ideality and reductionism 
implied in the studio approach. The idea is to record the music, in what is thought perhaps 
to be a contextless way, to get the perfect recording by reducing any effect from the 
external world. The studio is the equivalent of the white space of an art gallery— a context 
that is supposed to be neutral but in fact has a very peculiar character of its own.
A field recording, however, makes use of the contingency in capturing all aspects of 
a location's context (if the point were to capture a single element in the environment out of 
its context then one would ideally take this element into some kind of studio, i.e. it would 
be a studio recording rather than a field recording). As discussed in chapter 2, Demers 
argues that the field recording approach can be related to literalism; sounds as 'autonomous 
objects free of residual associations' (Demers 2009). The idea in a field recording is not 
just to record 'music', i.e. an abstract linguistic construct, but to record contingent sound 
that does not necessarily have a communicative aspect. Orcutt's recordings are intentional 
recordings o f an instrument, but the contextual and contingent aspects of field recording 
are introduced. Orcutt's guitar is just one o f many elements in the recordings, that are 
presented as flat durations, slabs of recording, unedited except for the sudden splicing into 
different recordings between tracks. An interesting exception to this is found in High 
Waisted; at 2:46 into the track, the recording, at this point only room ambience, is cut to 
silence, then a wailing distorted microphone feedback sound quickly cuts in and plays for 
the remaining 37 seconds of the track. This editing is very much like the approaches we 
have encountered in previous chapters— a brutal foregrounding of the editing itself, of'the 
splice'.
Instruments
We could also compare the approach in Returnal and A New Way To Pay Old Debts to
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Haswell and Hecker's approach to the UPIC discussed in chapter 3. Found technologies or 
existing techniques are used as the material that constitutes the work. Furthermore the 
found technologies are used in a 'raw' (deliberately naïve?) way. This foregrounds the 
contingency of the material means in all three cases. For instance, Orcutt describes how he 
came to use his four-string guitar, and why it sounds the way it does:
1 strung the guitar back with four strings and just started to play 
again ... this was the one that I got when I was in college. It had 
always been around and I had played it on and off, and it was 
broken a couple times. When I moved to San Francisco, the neck 
was broken off. So I took it to some shop here and the guy said 
what he would charge me to put it together was more than the value 
of the guitar. And I said, 'That's fine, I just want something to play.'
So after he put the neck back on he said, 'Don't tune it back up to 
concert pitch because the neck's not going to be strong enough to 
hold it.' He had tuned the low E string down to a C, and that's 
where I left it. (Masters & Currin 2010)
Lopatin describes a similar history in his relationship with the Juno-60, having inherited it 
from a young age and becoming accustomed to its peculiarities; 'that closeness and history 
yields a lot o f interesting results' (Powell 2010). So Lopatin's music can be said to be 
largely a result of this relationship. However there remains the feeling that Lopatin, more 
so than Orcutt, is to some extent playing with listeners associations with the past (if we 
look at the previous Oneohtrix Point Never album, Rifts (2009, No Fun Productions, NFP- 
56), we can see a much more explicit nostalgic reference—the accompanying videos of ~ 
super-8 video footage and so on. See e.g. Laser To Laser).
Despite this, Lopatins practice has been described by one commentator with the 
phrase 'synth as synth’ (Keenan 2009). This is an interesting concept to examine more 
closely. It implies a literalness—the synth-as-something-else would be depictive, 
representational. The most obvious case o f depiction would be to synthesize acoustic 
instruments. However this does not entirely capture the use of synthesis in Oneohtrix Point 
Never. In an interview, Lopatin compares his father's use of the Juno-60 to his own: 
Lopatin: All his sounds emulated accordions and whatnot.
Interviewer: He didn't let the machine do what the machine does 
best—he didn't let it not be a real-world acoustic instrument.
Lopatin: I guess not, but it's pretty far out to use an analog synth to
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strive towards emulation of'the natural'. Enter the uncanny valley.
(Powell 2010)
Rifts in particular features synth sounds that have this uncanny resemblance to acoustic 
instruments. See for example the flute-esque loop in Physical Memories, or the more reedy 
sounding oboe lead on Betrayed In The Octagon. But it is the way in which these sounds 
'fail' to properly imitate acoustic instruments that remains the focus—their uncanny-ness, 
similar but not the same. In this aspect o f the sound we are still therefore primarily 
foregrounding the influence and character of the Juno-60.
The 'synth as synth' could refer not just to an opposition to synthesis o f acoustic 
instruments, but also in a more generalized sense to all kinds o f depiction; synth-as-synth 
opposed to any use of the synth-as-medium—for expressivity, narrativity, etc. Returnal 
could certainly afford listening on this level, however Lopatin's own description of his 
work again undermines this: '[the Juno-60] is used for lead voices. She's the narrator, and 
when she’s not narrating, she's generating lots o f  environmental data, like the shape o f the 
landscape. But it's just data, and I need to sculpt it to actually turn it into the landscape' 
(Powell 2010). So the synthesizer sounds are in fact not 'merely' the sounds of a 
synthesizer, but are descriptions o f landscapes and narratives (for Lopatin at least).
Label curation
To return to the question of what unites the music associated with Mego, so far we have 
seen that this might be to do with what I have defined as noise music; an approach that 
avoids the imposition of meaning or the use of representation. The result is therefore 
something like literalism. If this is the case, we can perhaps conclude that Orcutt's work is 
in line with the existing 'Mego aesthetic' to a greater degree than Oneohtrix Point Never. 
This is perhaps counter-intuitive because of the superficial aspect o f genre—Oneohtrix 
Point Never as drone based electronic music fits into the Mego catalogue quite 
innocuously, whereas Orcutt playing acoustic blues seems to stick out as an anomaly.
So there are two kinds o f inconsistency here: a superficial change in genre with 
Orcutt, and a more fundamental change, towards a romantic, narrative sound in Oneohtrix 
Point Never (which, it should be noted, does perhaps have at least one precedent in the 
Mego back catalogue in the form of Fennesz). But on both counts this is actually in line 
with Rehberg's approach as a curator. His idea is to keep the label's vitality by avoiding 
predictability in the releases. There are shared sensibilities between the majority of artists 
associated with Mego as we have seen, but exceptions to the rule are necessary for
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Rehberg. There is a desire to avoid a totalized overarching aesthetic:
I always wanted to do a label that was loud, not loud in terms of 
sound, but like 'here we are', rocking the boat a bit. I still have that 
approach. Lots o f labels and groups get into a generic flow of 
things and always do the same thing. I never was interested in that, 
so that's why the catalogue is quite jagged, you can't pigeon hole 
the label. [1]
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Conclusion
This thesis has been centered around splitting approaches to music into two general 
categories, defined by their ontology. A representational or idealist approach (and 
corresponding rationalism) was described in numerous contexts— in classical philosophy, 
in romanticism, in the electro-acoustic tradition, in algorithmic composition literature, and 
also in the design of software such as digital audio workstations. O f particular relevance is 
the idealism found in the notion of a 'digital aesthetic'. Digital technology is seen as a 
means of exploring 'the deepest aesthetics between math and art' (Ikeda in Eubank 2008); 
this sums up precisely what Coyne means by 'technoromanticism' (Coyne 2001).
I claimed that sound is seen as the means o f representing a musical eidos in all o f 
these approaches. A listener is supposed to recover this eidos, and the model therefore is a 
kind of communication, which can then be very roughly grouped into either the classical or 
romantic; mimetic or expressive. As Hiller and lssacson put it: 'an imitation of a 
fundamental divine harmony of universal significance' on the one hand, or 'a direct 
emotional expression and an explicit and subjective communication' on the other. The 
music is communicating something about the world, or more commonly, humanity; 
infusing it with signifiers of humanity— love, aggression, loneliness, joy, etc. If  we take a 
materialist view, this can only be seen as the construction o f various fictions, largely based 
on naturalizations— concepts that are particular to an ideological orientation but are taken 
to be universal. The fictions constructed by these notions feel real and inescapable, making 
them somewhat oppressive.
Linguistic representation, cultural signifiers and so on, represent in their totality 
something like Lacan's 'symbolic order'. The symbolic order highlights the difference 
between what he refers to as reality and the Real; the world as we are (inescapably) 
indoctrinated to interpret it, and the chaotic, meaningless, 'traumatic' thing at its base. The 
Real is beyond the symbolic order, beyond reality as we experience it, as 'that which resists 
symbolization absolutely' (Lacan 1991). According to Lacan the Real is only occasionally 
glimpsed, as a gap or rupture in the symbolic order, where something is unrecognizable 
and meaning cannot be grasped.
For Marxists, the symbolic order might be understood as the dominant ideological
superstructure. Marx split society into its 'base' and 'superstructure'. He defined the base as 
the forces and relations of production, and the superstructure as institutions, culture, 
religion and so on, elements that are largely superficial but sometimes influence the base.
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Althusser reversed this priority, claiming that the superstructure is prior to the base, it is the 
ideological underpinning that shapes and supports it (Althusser 2008). Ideologies are not 
statements of political reality, they orient subjects' relations and therefore construct a 
political reality (Zizek 1989). Furthermore Althusser claimed that ideology is material; i.e. 
it is precisely things like music, cultural products, that constitute it.
The concept o f naturalization is crucial to ideology; a necessary condition for the 
proper functioning of an ideology is that it is viewed as non-ideological. It should appear to 
be based on facts rather than values. The purpose of a truly progressive art has often been 
seen as disrupting such ideology. Fisher summarizes this: 'as theorists from Brecht through 
to Foucault and Badiou have maintained, emancipatoiy politics must always destroy the 
appearance of a “natural order”, must reveal what is presented as necessary and inevitable 
to be a mere contingency'(Fisher 2009).
Another similar (but less politically motivated) theory is found in Heidegger's 
distinction between 'world' and 'earth'. 'World' is the web of significance and relations in 
which we exist, and 'earth' is the unintelligible outside of this. Worlds nonetheless are built 
upon or emerge from earth. He claims that art, although it is an object of'world', appeals to 
'earth' in its materiality (Heidegger 1993). It provides a temporary rupture in the world. 
Again we return to the idea of'revealing'; truth for Heidegger is a product of this temporary 
glimpsing.
Romanticism, as I have defined it, appears to be predicated precisely on conserving 
the current symbolic order (or maintaining the dominant ideology). The romantic goal of 
expressing human truths is achieved through emotion and instinct; the elevation of the 
artist's subjectivity. But in order to communicate emotional content, it must rely on the 
repetition of existing signifiers of this or that emotion. It proceeds by association. 
Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries any art form that embraced the romantic notion of 
expression was seen as the epitome of bourgeois individualism. For example, 
expressionism (unsurprisingly—the clue is in the name) was at the centre of much debate 
in Marxist aesthetics in the early 20,h century (see Adorno et al. 2007).
This argument is based around a specific politics, but we can also say that 
romanticism is conservative in a more general, structural sense: an approach focussed on 
expression epitomizes the myth of creativity, of the self as source of ideas. As Butler puts 
it, this is the idea that 'works of art are made, semi-miraculously, in the imagination, and 
the creative process restores a wholeness lost in common experience' (Butler 1981). Under 
this misconception, one is blind to the existence of external influence, and is likely to
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simply express the prevalent ideas o f the period, under the guise o f radically, it has been 
argued that this is the case with the original romantic movement itself, that it was 
ultimately a conservative or even reactionary movement, despite its revolutionary outward 
appearance (Brown 2001, Honour 1979, Butler 1981). The unifying element in 18th/! 9th 
century romanticism, in as much as one can be identified at all, was not one of technique, it 
was not stylistic or formal. It was rather to do with these notions—an elevation of the artist 
expressing subjective but fundamental truths; the patriarchal structure of a genius 
communicating his humanity to a grateful audience.
This is relevant beyond the romantic period. Rock music seems like the natural 
descendent of romantic ideas of authenticity and expression. But I have also discussed the 
romanticism in approaches such as spectromorphology. In approaches like this the concept 
o f gesture is normally taken to be fundamental in communicating meaning. Middleton 
prioritizes meaning, specifically meaning via gesture, in his analysis of popular music, but 
also claims that this contributes to a general musicology (Middleton 1993). In the course of 
this thesis I repeatedly found that gesture was an inappropriate way to talk about the music, 
at least not in the most common sense of the word—as changes in sound properties that are 
analogous to movements o f the body. We therefore cannot consider the sound as merely a 
medium for communicating abstract gestural content.
This is a subtle distinction in the way we think of the abstract in music, Miranda, 
for example, states that 'musical compositions carry abstract structures' (Miranda 2001).
But abstractions, precisely because they are abstractions, are supervened on by the thing 
they are abstracted from -the  sound. The sound is primary, the abstraction cannot exist 
without it, in the same way that form cannot exist without matter; form is matter (and 
matter is form). Musical compositions carry form only in the sense that any other physical 
entity carries form. There is no reason therefore to necessarily consider the abstract as the 
essence of music. Taube argues that 'the score is not the same thing as the music, it is a 
representation of the music ... [it] can be thought o f as constituting a level of abstraction 
above the sonic waveform'(Taube 2004). The crux of this approach is in seeing 
representations as representations.
In order to develop this position, l drew from materialist philosophy (in which, as 
above, the abstract is seen as exactly that—an abstraction, from  material reality) and from 
pragmatic philosophy (in which the existence or non-existence of abstracta is simply not 
considered an issue at all). J claimed some level o f compatibility between these 
philosophies for as far as the purposes of this thesis go. In the musics 1 considered, the
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intention is not representation or the communication of ideas. In particular, notions of 
expression tend to be avoided as far as possible. Without the anthropocentric focus on 
subjectivity, it is less likely to reinforce the current dominant ideology via representation 
and identification as described above.
In thinking o f a music not based on communication, one thinks of the notion of 
'absolute music': 'an ideal of “pure” music independent of words, drama or representational 
meaning ... understood as objective structure without expressive content' (Grove & Sadie 
1988). But absolute music is o f course a romantic concept, and the conclusion I reach in 
this thesis does ironically begin to resemble the romanticism we began in opposition to; the 
idea of re-unification with, or illumination of, an ineffable reality. It is not inconsistent with 
notions o f the sublime—glimpsing something beyond comprehension. There is a paradox 
in either a materialist or anti-metaphysical philosophy that has something unexplainable at 
its base that almost seems ideal: 'matter', or Heidegger's 'Being' (often capitalized in the 
way that 'God' is capitalized, giving it a mystical overtone).
The difference appears superficial but is actually fundamental. As discussed in the 
introduction, Romanticism (according to Schlegel) is concerned with somehow expressing 
'the infinite—a term that implies escapism via abstraction. The quest ultimately is for an 
absolute meta-physical unity, by means of universal such as beauty. Schlegel said that 
'beauty is a symbolic representation of the infinite' (Bonds 1997). Therein lies the 
difference in approach—a literal aesthetic is not concerned with symbolically representing 
anything. It strives for apprehension of the 'thing itself—the ding an sich that for Kant is 
fundamentally unknowable, but for Heidegger is inseparable from phenomenal experience 
(phenomenology is ontology).
So absolute music represents perhaps that aspect of nineteenth century romanticism 
that is concerned with expressing 'the infinite'. It is opposed to anything 'extra-musical' and 
yet it remains an entity that points beyond itself:
To borrow an imagery central to Schlegel's philosophy, a work is 
like an ancient fragment that has been torn from an original form, 
but is still able to recapture in its brokenness the perfection of an 
unknown totality that the Romantic imagination can reconstruct...
A work as a fragment therefore always gestures beyond itself; it is 
never complete. (Chua 1999)
The music of Mego in contrast cannot be said to point towards 'the perfection of an 
unknown totality'. It is quite the opposite of absolute; I have shown it to be specific and
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contingent. There is nothing underpinning it that is universal. The music of Mego attempts 
to reveal only its physical existence. Of course, meaning can be found in the music, but it 
was not 'put there' intentionally, hence the model is not one of linear communication or 
representation.
Absolute music, as with other examples encountered in previous chapters—  
Greenberg/Fried, acousmatic listening, spectromorphology, and so on— is concerned 
primarily with transcending the material, to appreciate either the form that it embodies, 
free o f contingency and context, or some symbolic association with what is depicted. In 
their foregrounding of materiality, musics such as that represented by Mego should not 
therefore be considered 'absolute' in any way. The words that best describe it are words that 
are defined precisely in opposition to concepts of absoluteness: specificity, arbitrariness, 
contingency, impurity—--it is very specific to its technological context, with arbitrary 
compositional decisions based on the contingency of that situation, and the unity of a work 
is often undermined by various aesthetic inconsistencies. Furthermore even issues of 
individual taste and aesthetics are certainly not bracketed out, this is all part of the context 
in which the process of production is taking place.
Returning to Goodman's terminology mentioned in the introduction, this music is 
simply a non-notional artform. It is literal. The object of contemplation is the-thing-itself, 
not a depiction or representation of abstract content/meaning. There is not considered to be 
a need for the music to point to something else beyond its own physical existence. But just 
because the music does not predicate itself on communicating something else, this does not 
mean it exists in an absolute realm, separated from meaning, ideology, and so on. Rather, 
that its position and function in the world (in some sense its 'meaning') must be found 
external to the work, in the aesthetic or political implications of the concept of a non- 
notional artform. For Chua, this is also the case, despite its claims to the contrary, with 
absolute music: 'absolute music cannot be confined to the history of music as if it were 
purely musical, circling in its own autonomous sphere. What it claims to be is embedded in 
structures outside music(ology)' (Chua 1999). In Mego there is no implied claim to be 
autonomous in this manner. In line with Chua's description, meaning is not embedded in 
the music and yet a statement is certainly made in the act of creating/distributing it. A 
statement that is primarily oppositional—the music defines itself in opposition to 
individualist expression, or narrative escapism (this is how it becomes literal noise music; 
using the realm of material process and technological experimentation to avoid fonns that 
could be taken in this way).
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The centrality of ontology to aesthetics has been demonstrated at length in 
numerous examples. If sound is not seen as a communicative medium, carrying abstract 
musical content, then structures and forms that imply it is (e.g. expressively gestural or 
overtly narrative musics) will inevitably be viewed with distaste. And conversely, if a 
listener understands music as being fundamentally concerned with communicating 
something beyond itself, then they will tend to react with (sometimes extreme) distaste to 
noise music. The understanding of what music in general 'is' affects the value judgements 
in listening to and creating it.
Linguistic models of music (see for example Levinson 1991) require fundamentally 
that music is intelligible. Noise music however is unintelligible, the mode of listening is 
different. Herein lies the importance of noise; does it present the only escape from the 
'fictions' I described in romantic artistic production? Noise could be considered either an 
attempt to step outside of the symbolic order, making us aware of its existence, or perhaps 
an attempt to reconfigure it. So we return to the two possible theses mentioned in the 
introduction:
1. Any meaning produced, although not the point of the work, is not detrimental to the 
appreciation of the music. The point is that the meaning is not determined by the 
composer, it is left open, and arises from a specific listening context.
2. Meaning produced is actually detrimental to appreciation of the music, since the 
music is attempting to be an 'empty-signifier'. This is something like the absolute 
music described above, but attempting apprehension of a specific and contingent 
reality rather than an abstract absolute one.
To put it in Lacanian terms: does noise offer new ways of seeing reality, or of glimpsing; 
the Real? Dewey provides some support for the first of these options. He sees 
technological inquiry specifically as the way in which meaning \s produced, i.e. meaning is 
continually constructed in the process of properly experimental inquiry. It is for him in fact 
the only way in which meaning is produced. Compare this to the conception of technology 
as a medium for the communication of meaning. Likewise in Marxist aesthetics, theorists 
like Gidal tend to see materialist artistic production as a means of undermining ideological 
structures in order to open the possibility of new ideologies: 'the denial ofsemioticity ... is 
each time an ideological position rather than the representation o f a prior essence, truth, or 
nature' (Gidal 1989).
However something closer in to the second option is suggested by Heidegger, or, I 
should say, by my deliberately selective reading of Heidegger. Gumbrecht makes a similar
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reading, in which art is fundamentally about 'presence', presenting something that is not to 
be interpreted but experienced in a physical way, revealing being. Meaning is certainly 
detrimental to this. Like Dewey though, for Heidegger, it is technics that is central: 
techne ... reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not 
yet lie here before us, whatever can look and turn out now one way 
and now another... Thus what is decisive in techne does not lie at 
all in making and manipulating nor in the using of means, but 
rather in the aforementioned revealing. It is as revealing, and not as 
manufacturing, that techne is a bringing-forth. (Heidegger 1993)
It initially seems difficult to reconcile the two possibilities, they appear to be mutually 
exclusive. But perhaps we should emphasize the way in which being is revealed in the 
process o f  a disruption and reconfiguring of meanings, and vice-versa. For Heidegger 
revealing/concealing is a constant process, in that being is always interpreted, but when it 
is glimpsed, 'bringing-forth', it immediately withdraws, as the understanding of it becomes 
a new interpretation itself. Reciprocally, an approach like Gidal's, in undermining existing 
ideology, if nothing else makes the viewer very aware of the existence of ideology, and 
therefore aware of at least the potential of an outside-of ideology.
Perhaps we could say that there does not exist the possibility of gaining access to 
something outside of symbolically mediated reality, the symbolic order; the Real remains 
inaccessible. But through a lack of identification, replaced by an awareness and material 
presence, the symbolic order is temporarily disrupted and one is made more acutely aware 
of its existence. The alternative is to become further entrenched in it, which requires its 
continued concealment by being re-presented as natural and universal. The experience of 
presence is thus shifted external to the way traditional aesthetics explains the experience of 
art. But there still remains a sense of the sublime, in the existence of something beyond 
meaning that is unknowable or ungraspable. Perhaps this does not imply some truth merely 
beyond comprehension waiting to be revealed, but rather the lack of anything to reveal 
(Borges: 'this imminence of a revelation which does not occur is, perhaps, the aesthetic 
phenomenon' (Borges 2000)).
This thing that is either revealed, cannot be revealed, or in fact does not even exist, 
is referred to in various philosophies ('philosophies of access' (I larman 2007)) as 'material', 
the 'thing-in-itself, 'noumena', 'the Real', 'presence'... (It is tempting to say that Macbeth 
has the last word on this; reality, like noise music, is 'full of sound and fury, signifying 
nothing). For Brassier and ¿¡?.ek it is simply the point at which thought fails (Brassier
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2010). For Derrida, it should not even be considered a 'non-ground' (i.e. it is not even 
'nothing', as 'nothing' is itself a kind of thing). He posits an infinite deferral with no 
fundamental to which we can appeal. Deconstruction in fact offers a good model for the 
artistic production described in this thesis: rather than appealing to final or absolute 
determined meaning in communicating ideas, it engages in the constant flux of 
experimentation, 'play' (Caputo 1988). Or, as Gumbrecht puts it, rather than a new 
worldview, 'resistance to a smooth integration into any metaphysical worldview' 
(Gumbrecht 2004).
Note that one thing this kind of work is not concerned with revealing (in most 
instances) is the material processes used in production. This to reiterate, is best described 
by Gidal, as 'pseudo-documentary', pertaining to a 'truth' and is thus a representation. This 
is sometimes the basic idea described by those writing on 'glitch', where the sounds are 
taken to be failures of the technology (Cascone 2000). In contrast, the conclusion here is 
that these sounds are not to do with notions of fidelity, but are a quite normal process of 
what is sometimes referred to as extended technique. Glitches, surface noise and so on can 
all be considered in this way, not as impediments to an original sound, but as original 
sounds themselves. It is 'extended' because it moves beyond the traditional use of an 
instrument, beyond its 'institutional' use. Such experimentation with materials once again 
emphasizes embodied knowledge of material processes, making. It also highlights the lack 
of distinction between composition and performance, the exploration and use of 
improvised extended technique is part o/the compositional process. Extended technique 
and material processes do not provide a truth regarding production, but, can certainly be 
used to subvert a conventionally representational medium, thereby creating something of 
heightened materiality.
For fear of becoming lost in abstractions, one final example will ground these 
concepts and hopefully demonstrate their relevance to musical practice. Thus far I have 
only discussed the algorithmic work o f Evol, but more recent work, culminating in Ten 
Canisters O f Pressurized Tetrafluoroethane Over Three Weeks (Alku 89, 2009), is based 
around experimentation with gas horns.
The first EVOL performance to involve the use of pressurized gas 
horns dates from late 1999 in Barcelona's legendary Moog Club.
Back then, the combination of horns and computer generated 
sounds was more a humorous prop (an extension of the computer 
music for hooligans motto) than a deliberate aesthetic statement.
But just a couple of years later, these mighty 120 dB!) sound 
generators quickly became a regular ingredient in EVOL 
performances, featuring entire acoustic sections where the horns 
mimic textures, timbres and dynamics of the electronic parts of the 
show. Sometimes, these acoustic interludes have involved up to 
four horn operators, hiding among the audience in each corner of 
the room. (Jiménez de Cisneros 2009)
Jiménez de Cisneros says that other than the 'computer music for hooligans’ link, the initial 
attraction to gas horns arose from the observation that their sound shares qualities with the 
synthetic sounds he was already working with [3]. This tentative and indeterminate goal 
was followed, and experimentation (in the form of actual performance practice in this case) 
suggested greater and greater subtleties and techniques in the use of the airhorns. For 
example, he found that firing two horns into each other produces amplitude modulation 
('purely physical renditions of classical synthesis techniques' (Jiménez de Cisneros 2009)), 
and the chaotic bubbling of the final pressurization as the canister is near to empty gives 
very similar results to some of the algorithms he was using. By the time Ten Canisters O f 
Pressurized Tetrafluoroethane Over Three Weeks was recorded, the focus had shifted 
entirely to the airhorns; the record contains no electronic sounds (by which I mean 
synthesized sounds). It is recordings of airhorns only, with no processing or even 
overdubbing. Jiménez de Cisneros refers to this as a continuation of the same practice, part 
of the Evol computer music project, reconfiguring notions of computer music. A precedent 
was perhaps set in this respect by Goodiepal, whose computer music project has 
superficially very little to do with computers (or music for that matter, in some cases) (see 
for instance Goodiepal 2009).
So Jiménez de Cisneros followed an 'end-in-view', which incrementally suggested 
further goals, to the point where it became clear that the horns provide enough potentially 
interesting material to form an entire record by themselves. Although aesthetic preferences 
(based partly on previous experience in algorithmic music) were clearly taken into account, 
there remains the sense that the horns were approached 'from scratch—their possibilities 
being explored without much preconception of the result. The result therefore is quite 
radically unique in its materials and structure.
The recordings are incredibly varied given the limited palette used, yet almost the 
entire record consists of sounds at a pitch of around 440I Iz, since this is generally the pitch 
chosen by gas horn manufacturers. What varies are aspects such as the amplitudes and
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panning, but most importantly, the harmonic makeup of the sound, and its timbral qualities 
at various stages of canister depletion, or at different orientations and room positions. The 
tones are not held for long enough for it to be suited to the term drone music, but it 
certainly also has no melodic content in any traditional sense. It is presented as a series of 
experiments, rather than using the horns as an expressive medium.
Derivation of meaning is therefore frustrated, and in listening one becomes 
concerned with the sheer 'physicality' of the sound. Volume is, as always, important for 
Jiménez de Cisneros (the sleeve notes stating in the usual way, 'play loud, at 45 RPM!!!'). 
When particular meanings are ascribed to the sound in the act of listening, it tends to be a 
surprising reconfiguration of associations. For instance, in a similar vein to previous Evol 
releases in the Punani series, the idea that loud sounds signify aggression is often 
undermined, with one of the most common reactions being laughter.
To return to the issue of'where is the art “located”?', when someone hums a tune it 
is generally considered to be the same 'music' as an official recording or performance of it 
despite being very different, i.e. the music is not the same thing as the sound. Noise music, 
or more generally, music that is in some sense fundamentally timbral, is categorically 
different. You cannot hum the tunes. Being timbral, it cannot be easily reduced to an 
abstract higher level entity.
With regard to a hummable tune, the abstract work entity does exist nominally, 
since it is clearly useful to have such a concept in language. Kania describes this ontology 
in classical music as 'the most defendable, albeit defeasible, view' (Kania 2005). He goes 
on to define recorded tracks as being 'the work' in rock music, where tracks 'manifest 
songs'. In jazz, the situation is more complicated, he claims this is a tradition without the. 
concept o f'a  work'—performances are compared directly without reference to an 'enduring 
object'. If we require a nominal work concept in contemporary computer music, it might 
have elements of both Kania's rock and jazz ontology. A work in this field can generally be 
considered as either a performance, a recorded track, or an installation. Importantly, all of 
these exist without reference to an enduring object; tracks do not 'manifest songs' for 
example (even in the case of someone like Bill Orcutt as discussed in chapter 7).
The concept of a score in classical music means that a composer is working less 
directly with the materials that ultimately constitute their work, in contrast to, for example, 
the way that a painter works quite directly with paint. This may be one of the fundamental 
reasons for the often discussed 'reification of the score' situation, where the score is seen as 
'the music' itself. However in practices such as those discussed in this thesis (and timbral
musics in general) the situation is moved back closer to the plastic arts. There is no 'score' 
as such, so the process is usually more direct. The sound producing technologies, or 
material processes in general, are not separated from the act of composition and are 
therefore integral to the result. The situation is closer to a craft practice rather than an 
eidetic rational exercise.
Christian Marclay has been quoted as saying: 'music is material. Recording 
technology has turned music into an object' (Curiger 1997). This is true not just of 
recording technologies, but also sound production technologies. The composer can work 
with the material of sound rather than a more abstract score. As this quote highlights, it is 
via the exploration of approaches to technology that we can realize the importance of 
ontology. The influence of technology, or in a more general sense, process, is an effective 
means by which existing vocabularies, and expressivity are avoided. The work is less able 
to function by association, taking the focus away from ideas behind the sound, placing it 
more on the sound itself. The unintelligibility of the result establishes it as literal. In 
Heidegger's words, it exists only to 'show something that has the character of a thing' 
(Heidegger 1993).
I attempted to define the above approach/aesthetic/ontology by comparing a 
number of pieces from the Mego catalogue to various alternative antitheses. I first drew a 
comparison against music that engages with technology on a symbolic level, i.e. that 
promotes a 'digital aesthetic'. I then compared it to a music that attempts total generality, 
and in particular the approach to technology that this engenders (the desire for a value- 
neutral, transparent technology). Then a further examination of some of the tools used led 
to the idea that non-value-neutrality and limitations are important in a pragmatic approach . 
centered on experimentation, providing a basis for the formation of goals and ends-in-view. 
Algorithmic composition was then identified as one particular way of introducing 
technological influence, to move beyond the limitations of the imagination, This is in 
contrast with much writing on algorithmic composition that focusses on reproducing 
existing musical forms or algorithms as a means o f accessing the beauty of pure 
mathematical form. I then developed a definition of noise music, with 'literal noise' as that 
which is unintelligible, and militates against intrinsic meaning.
Finally, the approach was shown to also exist, to some extent, in recent Mego 
releases that superficially have more semantic content. Mirroring the music, there seems to 
be a 'noise' approach in the curation of the label—a refusal to allow comprehension of any 
pattern. A curatorial approach of complete eclecticism could be seen as analogous to w hite
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noise—predictably unpredictable. So some consistency is required in order for the 
inconsistencies to function as noise. This, problematically for a thesis, makes 
generalizations difficult. The approach described is a vague connection between the artists 
on Mego, but there are inevitably exceptions, necessarily, to achieve what Rehberg refers 
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